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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three papers investigating the causes and consequences of anti-
liberal and populist trends that affected Western countries in the first two decades of the 20th
century.
The first paper investigates the link between social media and hate crime in Germany.
We show that anti-refugee sentiment on Facebook predicts crimes against refugees in otherwise
similar municipalities with higher social media usage. To establish causality, we exploit
exogenous variation in the timing of major Facebook and internet outages. Consistent with a
role for “echo chambers”, we find that social media posts contain narrower and more loaded
content than news reports. Our results suggest that social media can act as a propagation
mechanism for violent crimes by enabling the spread of extreme viewpoints.
The second paper studies whether social media can activate hatred of minorities, with a
focus on Donald Trump’s political rise. We show that the increase in anti-Muslim sentiment
in the US since the start of Trump’s presidential campaign has been concentrated in counties
with high Twitter usage. To establish causality, we develop an identification strategy based
on Twitter’s early adopters at the South by Southwest festival. We also show that Trump’s
tweets about Islam-related topics are highly correlated with anti-Muslim hate crimes after
the start of his presidential campaign, but not before.
The third paper sheds light on the trends in citizen polarization in Western countries.
To this end, we propose a novel methodology to identify the underlying ideologies of citizens
by applying Latent Dirichlet Allocation to political survey data. This approach indicates that
in addition to a left-right scale, confidence in institutions defines another major ideological
dimension. We find evidence for citizens shifting away from centrist ideologies into anti-




In 1992, Francis Fukuyama declared “The End of History” in his book of the same title
(Fukuyama, 1992). He argued that the fall of the Soviet Union and thereby communism
marked the final triumph of Western-style liberal democracy over other rival ideologies, such
as monarchy and fascism. Liberal democracy supposedly marked the endpoint in the evolution
of forms of government as it did not contain the inherent inconsistencies that led to the failure
of previous ideologies. Fukuyama predicted that liberal consensus together with liberal values
would spread around the globe reaching millions if not billions of people.
Over the last 30 years, these hopes have not yet turned out to be true. While liberal
democracy could still triumph in the long run, in the current moment it rather appears that
“History” has returned with a vengeance. Not only did liberal values not uniformly spread
around the globe, authoritarian regimes are flourishing and consolidating their power in many
countries (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020). Most worryingly, even many Western countries
have seen a backlash against the liberal world order, driven by a rise in populist parties and
politicians (Norris and Inglehart, 2019), which oppose liberal values.
My PhD dissertation investigates the causes and consequences of some of these anti-
liberal trends in three research projects. First, two co-authored papers with Karsten Müller
study the effect of anti-minority sentiments on social media on real-life hate crimes. These
projects are motivated by the fact that many populists appear extremely successful in utilizing
social media for their political purposes (Sunstein, 2017). While speeches of politicians always
have been understood as an important policy tool, the advent of social media increased the
speed and breadth with which such information is disseminated. Recent work by Guriev et al.
(2019) provides further evidence for the fact that populists appear to profit from the rollout
of 3G mobile broadband across countries.
Among all the consequences of these new media platforms on society (e.g. polarization
and misinformation), their link to violence is the most worrisome, as it not only undermines
the government’s monopoly on the use of force (Weber, 1919) but also threatens cooperation in
civil society. While the potential consequences of hateful online rhetoric and offline outcomes
have been widely debated in the media and among policymakers, there is little empirical
evidence for a causal relationship between the two phenomena. Karsten Müller and I attempt
to close this gap with the two research projects.
1) Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media and Hate Crime
This paper studies the link between social media and hate crime using data from the Facebook
page of the right-wing party “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD). The AfD as the first
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far-right party in the German parliament since 1945, is the most important representative of
the new populist trends in Germany. Particularly during the European refugee crisis in the
years 2015 and 2016, the AfD’s Facebook page became a hub for the exchange of anti-refugee
messaging. The paper uses this fact to create a measure of anti-refugee sentiment in German
social media, which as we show, predicts violence against refugees, especially in municipalities
with higher exposure to such content. To establish causality, the paper puts forward a
novel identification strategy based on local internet outages and Germany-wide Facebook
outages to create quasi-experimental variation in Facebook exposure. We document that even
these short-run interruptions to social media are associated with decreases in the number of
anti-refugee incidents. Together with additional evidence on the high prevalence and negative
tone of anti-refugee speech on far-right social media, the findings of this paper suggest that
social media are indeed a powerful tool for the transmission of anti-minority sentiments. As
such, our work contributes to the existing literature on media and violence, which so far
focused on nationalistic propaganda in settings of high ethnic tensions Yanagizawa-Drott
(2014); Adena et al. (2015) and DellaVigna et al. (2014). In contrast, our setting highlights
that even in absence of state-sanctioned anti-minority propaganda, social media provides an
alternative forum for the exchange and spread extreme rhetoric and viewpoints for the fringe
elements of society.
2) From Hashtag to Hate Crime: Twitter and Anti-Minority Sentiment
The second paper with Karsten Müller sheds additional light on the mid- to long-term
consequences of the exposure to social media content. In particular, we focus on the 45th
president of the United States, Donald J. Trump, one of the most prominent representatives
of recent anti-liberal trends. We ask whether Donald Trump’s political rise was associated
with a rise in hate crimes against Muslims and if anti-Muslim sentiments propagated through
the social media platform Twitter.
In line with this hypothesis, we first show that the increase in anti-Muslim hate crime
since the start of Trump’s presidential campaign has been concentrated in counties with high
Twitter usage. To rule out that other county characteristics that correlate with Twitter usage
could explain this finding, we develop an identification strategy based on Twitter’s early
adopters at the South by Southwest (SXSW) festival. The 2007 SXSW festival marked a
turning point in Twitter’s popularity. We show that Twitter usage picked up considerably
after the festival in areas with more SXSW 2007 attendees and that these areas still have
higher Twitter usage today. People who started following SXSW on Twitter prior to the
2007 event have no such predictive power, nor do other festivals similar to the SXSW festival.
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Using the likely 2007 SXSW attendees as an instrument for Twitter usage, we confirm that
social media played a role in the increases in anti-Muslim hate crime.
We also show that Trump’s tweets about Islam-related topics are highly correlated with
spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes after the start of his presidential campaign, but not before.
To rule out that such spikes are driven by other events that occur at the same time (e.g.
terrorist attacks), we exploit that Trump is more likely to tweet about Muslims on days
when he plays golf in an instrumental variable framework. This analysis is motivated by the
fact that many commentators have argued that golf shifts Trump’s state of mind away from
politics. We find that our findings also persist when instrumenting for Trump’s anti-Muslim
tweets. As further evidence of the mechanism, we illustrate how Trump’s tweets lead his
Twitter followers to share his messages and produce their own anti-Muslim content. Taken
together, the evidence suggests that Trump’s presidential campaign and Twitter rhetoric
influenced the willingness of some people to commit hate crimes against Muslims, in the
short-run as well as in the mid- to long term. The paper also provides important insides into
the importance of populist leaders and their support for existing anti-minorities views.
3) How Polarized are Citizens? Measuring Ideology from the Ground-Up
The last paper in my dissertation makes a more conceptual and methodological contribution
to our understanding of populist movements and polarization. My joint work with Mirko
Draca proposes a new methodology to measure the underlying ideologies of citizens based on
the unsupervised machine learning technique Latent Dirichlet Allocation. We exploit the fact
that people of similar ideologies give similar answers to the same questions. Latent Dirichlet
Allocation can then identify the underlying ideologies that best describe the responses in
the data. An ideology is then simply defined as particular questions response profile. Each
individual, in turn, is described as a probabilistic mixture of ideological types.
This approach hence allows us to identify the ideologies of citizens exclusively based
on the co-occurrence patterns of responses in the World Value Survey. This approach has 3
main advantages. First, it allows us to move beyond pre-defined definitions of ideology like
the left-right spectrum or party affiliation. Secondly, it allows for a comparison off ideologies
across countries and over time. Third, given the flexibility of our approach, we believe it to
be applicable to a wide array of other settings in which researchers so far relied on predefined
groups.
Our analysis uncovers, in addition to the traditional left-right spectrum, the existence of
a stable ideology centered around the distrust in major societal institutions (e.g. parliament,
churches). It is this ideology that drives support for populist parties. As such our work provides
a rare cross-country perspective in the growth of populist movements in Western countries.
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Further, the created individual level type shares allow us to investigate the polarization of
citizens based on the measures suggested by Esteban and Ray (1994); Duclos et al. (2004).
We again find that the increasing prevalence of low trust ideologies drives recent increases in
the polarization of citizens, especially in the United States.
Together the three papers in my dissertation expand our understanding of modern
populist movements. The papers simultaneous highlight roots and dangers of populism which
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1) Fanning the Flames of Hate:
Social Media and Hate Crime
Carlo Schwarz (University of Warwick)
Karsten Müller (Princeton University)
1.1 Introduction
Social media has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. In the wake of the 2016
presidential election in the United States, for example, relatively recent phenomena such as
fake news, social media echo chambers, and bot farms have been subjects of widespread media
coverage and public discourse (e.g Times, 2016, 2017b). The role of online hate speech in
particular has been at the center of an intense and polarized debate. Despite public interest
and calls for policy action, there is little empirical evidence on how hateful social media
content translates into real-life behavior.
In this paper, we investigate the role of social media in the propagation of hate crimes.
Previous research has shown that traditional media can play a role in violent outbursts or
ethnic hatred (e.g Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Adena et al., 2015; DellaVigna et al., 2014). In
contrast to traditional media, social media platforms allow users to easily self-select into
niche topics and extreme viewpoints. This preferential selection may limit the spectrum of
information people absorb and create “echo chambers” (Sunstein, 2009, 2017), which reinforce
similar ideas (see e.g. Bessi et al., 2015; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Schmidt et al., 2017). Social
media has also become a widely-consumed news source, particularly for young people: in
Germany, for example, social media is among the main news sources of 18 to 25 year olds
(Hölig and Hasebrink, 2016). In the US, around half of all adults use social media to get news
and two thirds of Facebook users use it as a news source (Center, 2018). This suggests that
social media could be particularly effective in propagating hateful sentiments.
We study the link between anti-refugee sentiment on Facebook and hate crimes against
refugees in Germany. The German setting is motivated by the influx of around one million
refugees into the country between 2015 and 2016 (BAMF, 2016), which was accompanied
by frequent violent crimes committed against them (see, for example, recent video coverage
by Times, 2017c). Between January 2015 and early 2017 alone, the non-profit organization
“Amadeu Antonio Stiftung” recorded around 3,300 anti-refugee incidents, including over 750
cases of arson or outright assault.
We posit that social media can reinforce anti-refugee sentiments, which may push some
potential perpetrators over the edge to carry out violent acts. Our empirical strategy exploits
differences in Facebook usage at the municipal level and weekly variation in anti-refugee
sentiment on social media. We create a novel measure for the salience of anti-refugee hate
speech on social media based on the Facebook page of the “Alternative für Deutschland”
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(Alternative for Germany, AfD hereafter), a relatively new right-wing party that became the
third-strongest faction in the German parliament following the 2017 federal election. The
AfD has positioned itself as an anti-refugee and anti-immigration party. With more than
300,000 followers, 175,000 posts, 290,000 comments, and 500,000 likes (as of early 2017), their
Facebook page has a broader reach than that of any other German party.1
This widespread reach makes the AfD’s Facebook page uniquely suited to measure
anti-refugee sentiment on social media. In contrast to established political parties like Angela
Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) or the German Social Democrats (SPD), the
AfD allows users to directly post messages on its Facebook wall. The AfD is also the only
party that does not explicitly outline rules of conduct, e.g. by threatening to remove racist,
discriminating, or otherwise hateful comments. We show that the content on the AfD page is
consistently more focused on refugees than that of traditional news reports and frequently
contains loaded terms that civil rights groups have identified as “hate speech”. These detailed
data also allow us to construct a measure of each town’s exposure to Germany-wide anti-
refugee sentiment using the share of the population that is active on the AfD Facebook
page.
Using fixed effects panel regressions, we find that—during periods of high salience of
refugees on right-wing social media—anti-refugee hate crimes increase in areas with higher
Facebook usage. This correlation is especially pronounced for violent incidents such as
assault. Controlling for a large vector of municipality characteristics, interacted with our
salience measure, makes little difference for the magnitude and statistical significance of these
estimates.
A concern is that our measures of exposure to right-wing social media may be correlated
with unobserved municipal characteristics that explain disproportionate increases in hate
crimes during times of high anti-refugee sentiment. To narrow down the social media
transmission channel, we provide quasi-experimental evidence using the exact timing of
country-wide Facebook outages and local internet disruptions, which reduce the number of
social media posts.
To begin, we study large, Germany-wide Facebook outages resulting from programming
or server problems at the platform. These outages disrupt users’ exposure to this particular
social media platform without affecting other online channels. We find that Facebook
disruptions reduce local hate crimes, particularly in areas with many AfD users. Further,
1We provide a short history of the AfD in Section 1.5.1 in the online appendix.
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during Facebook outages, higher anti-refugee sentiment is not associated with a differential
increase in hate crimes in areas with high Facebook usage. These results suggest that social
media might play a propagating role in translating online content into offline violence.
We also exploit the precise timing of hundreds of local internet disruptions as a source
of granular exogenous variation in access to social media. These local disruptions reduce
a particular town’s exposure to social media content while leaving Germany-wide refugee
salience unaffected. Notably, the frequency of internet disruptions is geographically dispersed
and largely unrelated to observable local characteristics, including AfD likes on Facebook.
We find that, while hate crimes increase in periods of higher refugee salience, this
correlation disappears for municipalities experiencing an internet outage. Quantitatively,
a typical internet disruption fully mediates the link between social media and hate crime.
Further, once we take into account social media transmission, these internet outages themselves
are no longer associated with anti-refugee incidents, nor are their interactions with local
internet usage or mobile internet access. These results point to social media as propagation
mechanism rather than other online channels. It also makes it unlikely that we are capturing
a “displacement effect” arising from potential perpetrators fixing their internet access.
We also analyze how other salient news events mediate the link of anti-refugee Facebook
posts with the number of violent incidents, building on Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) and
Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018). Specifically, we look at the European Soccer Championship,
Brexit, and Donald Trump’s presidential election, all of which crowded out the salience of
refugees. Similar to our outage results, social media exposure has a significantly more muted
relationship with hate crimes during these events. The link we uncover appears to be specific
to anti-refugee sentiment: other posts on the AfD Facebook page, e.g. those related to
Muslims or the European Union, do not have the same predictive power for anti-refugee hate
crimes. Consistent with the hypothesis that social networks can act as transmission channel,
the correlation with hate crime is larger in regions where AfD users show higher Facebook
engagement.
When interpreting our results, we do not claim that social media itself causes crimes
against refugees out of thin air. Rather, our argument is that social media can act as a
propagating mechanism for hateful sentiments that likely have many fundamental sources.
We find evidence for two potential channels. First, our results are driven by refugee attacks
committed by groups of perpetrators. This suggests that social media may motivate collective
action, consistent with existing evidence on other political outcomes such as protests (e.g.
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Enikolopov et al., 2020). Second, we find evidence for a spillover channel. Hate crimes are
considerably more common in weeks when neighboring towns also experience them, and this
is particularly true for towns with many right-wing social media users when anti-refugee
sentiment is elevated. In contrast, we find little evidence that social media provides useful
information to perpetrators. Our results are also unlikely to be explained by persuasion
effects, because we focus on high-frequency variation.
Related literature. Our work provides evidence that social media may have effects on
real-life outcomes, as measured by hate crimes. We build on existing work on media exposure
and persuasion (see e.g. DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010; DellaVigna and La Ferrara). In
addition to work on traditional media and violence cited above, Dahl and DellaVigna (2009)
show that—in contrast to experimental settings—violent movies decrease violent crime in
the field due to displacement effects. Television has also been associated with short-lived
outbursts of domestic violence (Card and Dahl, 2011). In other research, Bhuller et al. (2013)
demonstrate that exposure to pornographic material on the internet is linked to increased sex
crime. Bursztyn et al. (a) find that media coverage of close elections increases voter turnout,
while Gavazza et al. (2018) show that broadband diffusion decreased voter turnout in the
United Kingdom (see also Gentzkow, 2006; Manacorda and Tesei). Enikolopov et al. (2020)
find that social media exposure spurs protest participation in Russia by reducing coordination
costs.
We contribute to this literature by investigating the role of social media in stirring up
violence. Previous research has documented the prevalence of online hate speech (Oksanen
et al., 2014). Other work has shown that Google search data can be used to measure racial
animus (Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014). In complementary work, we study the effect of Twitter
usage on anti-minority sentiments in the United States (Müller and Schwarz, 2018b). Bursztyn
et al. (b) study the effect of social media on xenophobia in Russia. In contrast to these papers,
we focus on the short-run impact of social media posts, rather than long-run effects that may
work through persuasion or changes in social norms.
Our paper also builds on research about the polarization of citizens (e.g Fiorina and
Abrams, 2008). There is no consensus on whether social media increases or decreases
polarization: some authors argue that social media are divisive (Pariser, 2011; Gabler, 2016),
while others find that polarization decreases with social media usage (Barberá, 2014; Boxell
et al., 2017). Our work suggests that—independent of whether social media affects overall
polarization or not—social media content can be associated with violent crimes.
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We also build on the literature on culture and violence. Summarizing a vast body of
research, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) find that cultural and and religious fragmentation
predict the likelihood of civil war across countries. Voigtlander and Voth (2012) show that
anti-Semitic violence in Germany is highly persistent: pogroms during the era of the Black
Death predict pogroms in the 1920s, Jewish deportations, and synagogue attacks during the
rise of the Nazi party. Similarly, Jha (2013) shows that medieval interethnic complementarities
in trade decrease the likelihood of modern Hindu-Muslim riots. These papers, however, are
largely silent on the existence of volatile, short-lived bursts of sentiment leading to violent
incidents. As such, our work is also related to Fouka and Voth, who show that monthly
variation in public acrimony between Greek and German politicians during the Greek debt
crisis affected German car purchases particularly in areas of Greece where German troops
committed war crimes during World War II. Our results also align with the findings of Colussi
et al. (2016), who show that a higher salience of minority groups increases the likelihood of
hate crimes.
While traditional media such as television are regulated in most countries, legislators are
now beginning to address social media. Our work is thus particularly topical in light of the
political discussions in many countries about anti-hate speech laws and censoring hate speech
on social media. The German parliament, for example, passed an anti online hate speech
law (“Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz”) on June 30, 2017, which threatens providers of online
platforms such as Facebook with fines up to EUR 50 million for failing to delete “criminal”
content that is “obviously unlawful”. The controversial law was the initiative of German
Minister of Justice Heiko Maas, who lamented social media platforms’ unwillingness to address
“online hate crime”.2 The European Union has issued independent guidelines calling on social
media companies to remove illegal hate speech as well. In the United Kingdom, the Crown
Prosecution Service plans to increase prosecution of online hate crimes (Guardian, 2017; BBC,
2017). Our paper serves as a first attempt to address this important topic empirically.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2 we introduce the data used in our empirical
analysis. Section 1.3 presents the results. Section 1.4 concludes.
2See, for example, the official statement of the German parliament on bundestag.de.
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1.2 Data
We construct a dataset on social media activity and anti-refugee hate crimes in Germany.
In total, we combine data from 12 different sources which we describe in more detail in the
following subsections: (1) Municipal-level data on anti-refugee hate crimes; (2) Facebook
data on posts, likes, and comments on the AfD page; (3) hand-collected municipal-level data
on Facebook user locations; (4) municipal-level data on internet outages; (5) a hand-coded
dataset on major weekly Facebook outages; (6) municipal- and county-level socioeconomic
data from the German Statistical Office; (7) municipal-level voting data; (8) county-level data
on broadband access; (9) municipal-level data on newspaper sales; (10) data on the content of
reporting about refugees from Nexis; (11) city-level data on neo-Nazi murders and historical
anti-Semitism; and (12) weekly Google search data on major news events in our sample. The
final panel dataset covers 4,466 German municipalities for the 111 weeks from 1st January
2015 to 13th February 2017. Summary statistics for the main variables of interest can be
found in Table 1.1 and Table 1.10. The online appendix provides a comprehensive overview
of the data sources and variable definitions (see Table 1.11).
1.2.1 Anti-Refugee Incidents
The data on incidents targeting refugees were collected by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation
and Pro Asyl (a pro asylum NGO).3 These data cover incidents including anti-refugee graffiti,
arson of refugee homes, assault, and incidents during protests in Germany between January
2015 and early 2017. This period is of particular interest since it includes the beginning and
height of the refugee crisis in Germany. All 3,335 anti-refugee aggressions feature a short
description and are classified into four groups. The most common cases are property damage
to refugee homes (2,226 incidents), followed by assault (534), incidents during anti-refugee
protests (339), arson (225). 11 events are classified as suspected cases that were still under
investigation. Table 1.9 in the online appendix lists examples for each class of anti-refugee
activity.
All incidents are geo-coded with an exact longitude and latitude, which we use to assign
them to municipalities.4 Figure 1.1 shows the location of the anti-refugee incidents in our
3These data are available at https://www.mut-gegen-rechte-gewalt.de/service/
chronik-vorfaelle.
4To assign coordinates to municipalities, we use the shape files provided by the ©GeoBasis-DE/BKG 2016
website. The shape file contains data for the 4,679 German municipalities (“Gemeindeverwaltungsverband”).
25
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Main Variables
Level Obs Mean SD Min. Max.
Refugee Attacks
Refugee attacks Muni.-Week 495,726 0.007 0.099 0 8
Arson attacks Muni.-Week 495,726 0.000 0.022 0 2
Other property damage Muni.-Week 495,726 0.004 0.076 0 8
Assaults Muni.-Week 495,726 0.001 0.035 0 3
Protests Muni.-Week 495,726 0.001 0.030 0 5
Social Media Data
AfD users/Pop.† Municipality 495,726 0.301 0.286 0 8
Refugee posts Week 495,726 84 61 2 259
Posts/AfD users Municipality 395,493 0.554 3.882 0 118
Comments/AfD users Municipality 395,493 1.1 7.3 0 270
Likes/AfD users Municipality 395,493 1.8 12.3 0 370
Auxiliary Variables
IInternet outage Muni.-Week 495,726 0.001 0.025 0.000 1.000
IFacebook outage Municipality 495,726 0.072 0.259 0.000 1.000
Baseline Controls
Ln(Population (2015)) Municipality 495,726 9 1 6 15
GDP/Worker County 493,617 63,095 9,846 46,835 136,763
Population density Municipality 495,726 282 382 7 4,653
AfD vote share (2017) (in %) Municipality 492,618 15 7 3 45
Share high school (in %) Municipality 495,726 29 8 0 58
Share broadband access (in %) Municipality 495,726 83 11 44 100
Share immigrants (in %) Municipality 483,072 14 8 2 50
Asylum Seekers/Pop. County 495,726 0.011 0.006 0.000 0.102
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the main variables in the estimation sample. Variables tagged
with a † are scaled by population (in 1,000).
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observation period for each German municipality.
The data appear to be high quality. Each entry has a clearly indicated source. Nearly
half of the incidents in the dataset are reported by the federal government in response to
inquiries by the left-wing party “Die Linke”. Other sources include police reports and national
or local media outlets. We hand-checked a random sample of 100 incidents and found their
coding accurately reflected the information reported in the respective source.
1.2.2 Facebook Data on Refugee Salience
We construct a proxy for the frequency of anti-refugee messaging on social media based on
the Facebook page of the AfD. We chose the AfD’s page because the party is by far the most
popular far-right political movement in Germany. At the time of the refugee crisis, the AfD
also had the highest number of Facebook followers of any German party. This makes their
page arguably the most important platform of exchange about refugees among Germany’s
right-wing social media users.
We start by using the Facebook Graph API to collect all status posts, comments, and
likes from the AfD Facebook page (see Section 1.5.2 for an introduction to Facebook). The
API provides a unique identifier for each post, allowing us to link posts to comments and
likes, as well as the users who posted, commented, or liked anything on the page. Overall, we
collected 176,153 posts, 290,854 comments, 510,268 likes, and 93,806 individual user IDs.
As our baseline measure for the salience of anti-refugee hate speech on social media,
we use the number of posts on the AfD Facebook page that contain the word “Flüchtling”
(refugee) in any given week. The narrative in these posts centers around the idea that the
“elites”—politicians and mainstream media outlets—have betrayed “the people” by allowing
“streams” of illegitimate “economic refugees” to enter the country, who are described as being
criminals and rapists for “cultural reasons”. Table 1.8 in the online appendix provides a
few representative examples; Section 1.3.5 provides a more in-depth analysis. A potential
downside of this approach is that we may inadvertently tag posts that do not express negative
sentiments towards refugees. However, a careful content analysis of posts and comments
reveals that the overwhelming majority appear to agree with the positions of the AfD. This
213 of these municipalities do not have inhabitants (e.g. forest areas) nor anti-refugee incidents. After
dropping these cases, we are left with 4,466 municipalities in our estimation sample. We use the level of
the “Gemeindeverwaltungsverband” since these exhibit smaller differences in their size and population than
the 11,165 German “Gemeinden” and are therefore more suitable for spatial analysis according to the data
provider (see link).
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Figure 1.1: AfD Facebook Usage per Capita and Anti-Refugee Incidents
Notes: This map plots the number of Facebook users of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) page
per capita for each of the 4,466 German municipalities. The red dots indicate the locations of the
3,335 anti-refugee incidents from the Amadeu Antonio Foundation.
28
is perhaps unsurprising given that only people who “like” the AfD Facebook page will be
informed about new posts. Critics, on the other hand, have a strong incentive not to indicate
publicly that they “like” the party.
We plot the total number of AfD Facebook page posts about refugees and the number
of anti-refugee incidents in Figure 1.2. Weeks with more refugee posts also tend to have more
anti-refugee events. Both series clearly spike during salient events related to refugees, such as
Angela Merkel’s widely reported statement “Wir schaffen das” (“We can do this”) during a
press conference on the challenges of the refugee situation. A simple time series regression of
refugee attacks on AfD posts yields a R2 of 0.34 (unreported).
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Notes: This figure plots the number of posts about refugees on the Facebook page of the “Alternative
for Germany” and the number of anti-refugee incidents in Germany over time.
1.2.3 Municipal-Level Facebook Measures
We construct a measure of exposure to right-wing social media at the municipal level. Because
survey data about German Facebook usage are, to our knowledge, only available at the level
of the 16 federal states, we hand-collect user location data by using the unique user identifiers
provided by the Facebook Graph API. Due to Facebook’s privacy policy, we are only able to
collect this information for people who make it publicly available.
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Because we are interested in the transmission of right-wing social media sentiment, we
measure exposure to it on Facebook based on users of the AfD page. In total, we can identify
93,806 users who interacted with the page at least once.5 We were able to hand-collect and
geocode a place of residence for 34,396 of these users. Overall, we were able to identify at least
one AfD Facebook page user for 3,563 of the 4,466 municipalities.6 In Figure 1.1 we visualize
the distribution of AfD users per capita. Anti-refugee incidents are concentrated in areas
with more right-wing social media users. To illustrate this, Figure 1.9 in the online appendix
shows the share of municipalities with at least one refugee attack, depending on whether we
can identify at least one AfD Facebook page user. Municipalities with AfD users are three
times as likely to experience an attack during our observation period. Out of the total 3,335
attacks on refugees in our sample, 3,171 occurred in municipalities with AfD Facebook page
users. A t-test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference between the mean of the two groups
with a value of 22.95.
Using the location data for AfD users, we can also assign posts, comments, and likes
to municipalities. Based on these data, we construct auxiliary measures of social media
interactions, e.g. the number of local posts scaled over the number of AfD users.7
1.2.4 Data on Internet and Facebook Outages
We collect data on local internet outages from Heise Online. Heise lists user reports of internet
problems by telephone area codes and includes start times and duration. We use area codes
to assign internet problems to municipalities; the start date and duration allow us to count
the number of problems for each municipality and week.8 The internet outage reports are
geographically dispersed with no clear patterns of regional clustering (see Figure 1.11a). The
outages are also dispersed over time Figure 1.11b.
5The Facebook API does not provide data on which users “like” a page but only on users who interact
with a page, e.g. by liking another user’s comment. As a result, the total number of user IDs we have is
smaller than the more than 300,000 people who had liked the AfD Facebook page as of 2017.
6Note that the decision of users to disclose their location is unlikely to matter in our setting. This is because
we exploit variation within the same location over time, which abstracts from time-invariant endogenous
selection using municipality fixed effects.
7We find that some users post and comment excessively, which leads to a few outliers in measuring how
active users are in a given municipality. We therefore winsorize the number of posts, comments, and likes we
can attribute to local users at the 99.9th percentile to avoid individual users driving the results.
8If an area code spans multiple municipalities, we assign an internet outage to the municipality that
overlaps most with the area code. We prefer this over to assigning the outage to all municipalities within the
area code’s territory because some area codes include minor overlaps with many municipalities. Assigning an
internet outage to all of these municipalities would introduce substantial noise.
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To validate the Heise data, we search for newspaper reports on major internet disruptions.
While the large-scale and short-lived outages discussed in the newspaper reports are not
representative of the more localized and longer-lasting outages we exploit in our regressions,
they do suggest that the Heise data provide a valid proxy for internet disruptions. For all
major disruptions we could identify in newspapers, the Heise data suggest an increase in the
number of outages specific to the internet provider experiencing the outage. Table 1.12 lists
several examples of newspaper reports on such outages and the respective information in our
data.9
We focus on major outages that fulfill two criteria: (1) they have to last longer than 24
hours, and (2) they affect a significant part of the population (be in the top quartile of the
reported internet problems to population ratio). This gets around the issue that some reports
may reflect individual users’ glitches rather than general disruptions.10
We also collect information on major Facebook disruptions. To identify these, we start
by searching for newspaper reports of Facebook problems in our sample period. In total, we
find reports on eight large outages (see Table 1.13 for an overview and more details). We then
validate their precise timing using the number of weekly user-reported Facebook problems
on the website of “Allestörungen”, a portal for aggregating user complaints on individual
websites and apps. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the eight outages widely reported on in the news
media are also associated with spikes in user-reported problems.
Using these data, we define a dummy variable that is 1 for weeks with Facebook outages
and 0 otherwise. These outages have the advantage that they are specific to Facebook; in
fact, they are uncorrelated with the total number of weekly internet outages in a given week
from our Heise data. In contrast to the internet disruptions, the downside is that Facebook
outages are rare, shorter, and only generate weekly variation.
1.2.5 Auxiliary and Control Variables
We obtain control variables from a host of sources, which are explained in more detail in
the online appendix. Socioeconomic data on the municipality and county level are from the
9To interpret the number of outages, note that the Heise data reports an average of four reported internet
outages per provider per week. That means even an increase of 15 reported outages represents a large increase.
10In some cases, users do not seem to report the end date of the internet outage, which can lead to unlikely
durations of several months. We thus winsorize the maximum duration at 3 weeks, but this choice is not
material for our results. We scale outages over population because towns with more inhabitants mechanically
also report more disruptions. As we discuss below, our results are robust to using alternative definitions of
this cut-off.
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German Statistical Office, available via www.regionalstatistik.de. We include information on
each municipality’s population by age group, GDP per worker, population density, the share
of the population with a high school degree (“Abitur”), the share of the population receiving
social benefits, the share working in manufacturing, and the vote results for the 2017 German
Federal Election. To control for “pull factors” of anti-minority crimes, we also obtain the
share of the population that are immigrants and asylum seekers.
To measure the extent to which people use the internet, we use the share of households
in a county with broadband access as well as average mobile download speeds, collected by
the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI).11 In addition, we use
the number of registered .de internet domains per capita in a county to measure internet
affinity, which has a correlation of 0.48 with broadband access.
To measure the local penetration of traditional media, we obtain data for 2016/2017
newspaper sales from the “Zeitungsmarktforschung Gesellschaft der deutschen Zeitungen
(ZMG)” (Society for Market Research of German Newspapers).12 Based on this data, we
construct a measure of traditional newspaper consumption as the number of newspaper sales
per capita.
For our comparison of social and more traditional media, we collected the number of total
and refugee-related reports in German news media from Nexis UNI (previously LexisNexis).
We use this to construct the weekly share of news reports about refugees. For further analysis,
we obtained the full text of all refugee-related reports using the Lexis bulk data API, as well
as all Facebook data from the pages of five major German newspapers (Welt, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Tageszeitung (TAZ), Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), and Bild).
We also include controls for the local prevalence of right-wing extremism. One such
measure is the number of murders committed by neo-Nazis in each municipality from 1990
until 2016, which were collected by “Mut gegen rechte Gewalt” (Courage Against Right-Wing
Violence). We complement this proxy for contemporary right-wing violence with data on the
11Broadband access is highly correlated with publicly available survey data on individuals’ internet use
from Eurostat; these data are only available on the state level (see Figure 1.10 in the online appendix).
12These data contain the number of print newspapers sold in each municipality with more than 3,000
inhabitants. Newspapers are listed if, in any given town, they (1) sell at least 50 copies and (2) have a market
share of at least 1%. To have a similar sample size across specifications, we impute values for 1,120 towns for
which news paper sales data are not available, based on a municipality’s population, population density, AfD
vote share, and county fixed effects. However, the results are almost equivalent without imputation (available
upon request).
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historic prevalence of anti-semitism collected by Voigtlander and Voth (2012).13
Finally, we obtain Google trends data on overall interest in the search terms “Brexit”,
“Trump”, and “UEFA EM 2016” in Germany to proxy for distracting news events. Google
scales the weekly number of searches for these terms on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100
marks the week with the highest search interest in the preceding 5 years. The time series
plots in Figure 1.15 in the online appendix suggest these measures are sound approximations
for attention paid to Brexit, the Trump election, and the UEFA European Championship
(one of the most widely followed sports events in Germany).
1.3 Empirical Strategy and Main Results
1.3.1 Empirical Strategy
We begin to investigate the link between social media and anti-refugee incidents by estimating
fixed effects panel regressions akin to a Bartik-type approach (Bartik, 1991). In particular, we
use the interaction of local right-wing Facebook usage (AfD Users/Popi) and weekly refugee
posts on the AfD Facebook page (Refugee Postst) to measure the differential change of hate
crimes conditional on anti-refugee sentiment on social media. This empirical set-up creates
variation by week and municipality, which we exploit in the following regression model:
Refugee attackit = β AfD Users/Popi ×Refugee Postst
+ γ Controlsi ×Refugee Postst
+Week FEt +Municipality FEi + εit,
(1.1)
The dependent variable is a dummy for the incidence of a refugee attack in municipality
i in week t. β measures the differential change in anti-refugee incidents conditional on
Germany-wide posts about refugees on the AfD page—as a proxy of Germany-wide anti-
refugee sentiment on social media—and right-wing social media users per capita. We control
for a host of local characteristics interacted with the refugee post measure. Because we include
many fixed effects and interaction terms, we estimate 1.1 using Ordinary Least Squares,
13From their dataset, we use the natural logarithm of one plus the number of deported Jews as well as one
plus the number of letters written to “Der Stürmer”, the antisemitic newspaper published by Nazi politician
Julius Streicher. Towns with no information are coded as zero. We do not use scaled variables because the
data from Voigtlander and Voth (2012) only cover a fraction of the municipalities in our sample.
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which yields the linear probability model. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. We
consider alternative specifications of the dependent variable and standard errors in robustness
exercises.
This framework has three key features. First, it circumvents reverse causality, because
refugee incidents in one town are unlikely to change anti-refugee sentiment in all other towns.
Second, our measure of social media exposure is time-invariant and thus not the result of
whether a municipality experiences refugee attacks in a given week.14 Third, a full set of fixed
effects controls for unobserved heterogeneity that affects all towns at the same time (such as
salient news events), as well as time-invariant differences across towns (such as a history of
anti-minority violence).
The main concern with estimating Equation (1.1) is that AfD Users/Pop. may be
correlated with other municipality characteristics that could explain differences in how local
anti-refugee attacks co-vary with the salience of refugees online. In that case, we would not be
capturing a pure social media “effect”. For example, the share of AfD Facebook subscribers
may partially pick up general right-wing attitudes, which could lead to more anti-refugee
attacks in times of high refugee salience. This concern may also not be sufficiently addressed
by controlling for interactions of observable municipality characteristics with the refugee
salience measure.
We therefore develop an identification strategy based on Facebook and internet outages.
These disruptions induce plausibly exogenous variation in people’s exposure to social media
while leaving other local characteristics unchanged. The first part of this empirical strategy
exploits the timing of major server problems at Facebook, which disrupt access to the platform.
In the second part, we build on the insight that German internet infrastructure is trailing
behind that of many other European Countries (e.g. Latvia) and the OECD average (see
Times, 2017a; OECD, 2016). As a result, prolonged internet outages are relatively common.
Because around 50% of worldwide Facebook users accessed the platform with their computers,
many users are exposed to disruptions in internet access. In Germany, this share is likely to
be even higher because of the relatively slow adoption of mobile internet.15
Local internet outages are widely dispersed geographically: Figure 1.11a visualizes the
14In the robustness section below, we alternatively measure local social media penetration before the start
of the refugee crisis, at the cost of reducing the number of users for whom we have location data. This
adjustment makes little difference for the results.
15Data on Facebook usage patterns reported on Statista.com and on mobile internet usage in Germany on
(also on Statista.com) support this assessment.
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Notes: This figure plots the coefficients of the regression Internet outagesi = α+ X
′β + εi, where
the dependent variable is the total number of internet outages in a municipality (based on our
baseline definition) and X is a vector of local characteristics for which we plot the estimates. To
make the magnitudes comparable, we standardize all variables to have a mean of zero and standard
deviation of one. 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered by municipality.
distribution of disruptions per capita across Germany. The outages are also not particularly
clustered in a particular time period (see Figure 1.11b). Crucially, the frequency of internet
problems is uncorrelated with the share of the population on the AfD Facebook page. As such,
internet disruptions provide exogenous variation that is not already captured by our variable
on local Facebook usage. The number of reported internet problems is also uncorrelated
with the total number of refugee attacks in a given municipality. In fact, regressing the
frequency of internet outages on a host of municipality characteristics in Figure 1.3 suggests
that they are largely uncorrelated with observable factors: the estimated coefficients are
nearly all statistically indistinguishable from zero and quantitatively small. Taken together,
our interpretation is that whether an internet outage occurs in a given town and week is as
good as randomly assigned with regard to unobserved other factors that might drive hate
crimes.
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We analyze the effect of Facebook and internet outages in a flexible empirical framework.
We begin by asking whether these outages reduce anti-refugee attacks, and whether they
do so particularly in areas with a higher concentration of AfD Facebook users. We then
study whether these disruptions also decrease our baseline correlation of local exposure to
anti-refugee sentiment and hate crimes. More formally, the most saturated regressions have
the following triple difference form:
Refugee Attackit = β AfD Users/Popi ×Refugee Postst
+ λ Outageit × AfD Users/Popi ×Refugee Postst
+ δ1 Outageit + δ2 Outageit ×Refugee Postst
+ δ3 Outageit × AfD Users/Popi
+ γ1 Controlsi ×Refugee Postst
+ γ2Controlsi ×Outageit
+Week FEt +Municipality FEi + εit,
(1.2)
For the Facebook outages, which only vary by week, we replace Outageit with Outaget.
16 For
the initial tests, we focus on the estimates for δ1 and δ3 while excluding the coefficients β, λ,
δ2, and γ1. That is, we ask whether outages reduce anti-refugee incidents, and whether they
reduce them more in areas with more AfD Facebook users. In the fully interacted regressions,
the main coefficient of interest λ captures the correlation of anti-refugee attacks and local
exposure to anti-refugee sentiment on social media, depending on whether an outage occurs.
Put differently, we test whether outages break the correlation between real-life incidents
and refugee salience, particularly for areas with high right-wing Facebook penetration. The
vector Controlsi ×Outageit controls for the differential effect of outages based on observable
characteristics, such as internet affinity.
The identifying assumption of this approach is that Facebook and internet outages only
affect anti-refugee incidents through their effect on social media exposure. This assumption is
plausible for Facebook outages. In the case of internet outages, for which we have variation
at the municipality-week level, one may be worried about alternative online channels. We
discuss these and other potential threats to identification in the next section.
16Note that, as a result, the estimates of δ1 and δ2 in Equation (1.2) are absorbed by the week fixed effects.
36
Exploiting variation in Facebook and internet outages also allow us to address the
concern that towns with a stronger right-wing presence may show differential trends whenever
the nationwide sentiment towards refugees changes. This is because these relatively short-lived
outages are unlikely to affect the presence of deep-rooted right-wing attitudes in a municipality;
absent online channels, the outages should thus not have an impact on real-life outcomes. The
framework in Equation (1.2) further addresses reverse causality concerns. If we were merely
capturing that local incidents drive posts on social media, Facebook and internet outages
should not reduce the number of hate crimes. Instead, they should only reduce social media
activity, keeping the number of anti-refugee incidents unchanged.
1.3.2 Panel Regression Results
We illustrate the intuition behind our regression framework in Figure 1.4. The figure shows
a binned scatter plot of anti-refugee attacks and anti-refugee sentiment, split by the degree
of exposure to right-wing social media. Higher refugee salience is associated with a higher
probability of anti-refugee attacks in both sub-samples, but the positive slope is far more
pronounced for towns with an above median AfD user to population ratio (Panel (a)). Our
baseline regression coefficient picks up the difference in slopes between municipalities with
high and low Facebook usage.
Table 1.2 presents the regression results from estimating Equation (1.1) with varying
sets of control variables (interacted with refugee salience). The coefficient on the interaction
of local Facebook usage and Germany-wide refugee posts is positive and highly significant in
all specifications. Column 1 shows the panel regressions with the baseline control variables,
which yields a coefficient 0.024 on the interaction term. This correlation does not appear to
be driven by support for the AfD alone: the result holds although we control for the AfD
vote share in the 2017 federal election. This highlights a distinction between our social media
measure and general support for the party.
To get a sense of the magnitudes, consider as a case study the cities of Bochum and
Hannover, which are about one standard deviation apart in the ratio of AfD users to population
(in 1000s) (≈ 0.29). Holding average anti-refugee sentiment in our data constant (84 posts),
this means a one standard deviation higher right-wing social media usage is associated with a
10% higher probability of an anti-refugee incident relative to the mean. Table 1.19 in the
online appendix shows that this correlation is largely driven by cases of assault.
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Notes: This figure plots the average number of anti-refugee attacks against our measure of anti-
refugee sentiment for municipalities below and above the median of AfD Users/Pop. Refugee
attacks are binned by 20 quantiles of refugee posts and residualized with respect to population.
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In columns 2 through 6, we introduce a richer set of controls that accounts for local
right-wing attitudes, general media exposure, more socio-economic factors, and the vote shares
of all major parties in the 2017 election (see Table 1.10 for an overview of the control variables).
In column 7, we add all interacted controls jointly. The inclusion of these covariates makes
little difference to our main estimate. This is a first indication that the correlation between
social media exposure and anti-refugee incidents is not driven by observable municipality
differences unrelated to Facebook usage.
Table 1.2: Baseline Correlations — Facebook Posts and Hate Crime
Additional interacted controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Right Socio- 2017 Age
Baseline Wing Media economic vote structure All
controls controls controls controls controls controls controls
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.024*** 0.020** 0.023** 0.024** 0.021** 0.023** 0.016**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 479,964 479,964 479,964 474,303 479,964 476,856 474,303
R-squared 0.082 0.083 0.082 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.084
Municipalities 4324 4324 4324 4273 4324 4296 4273
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls [8] × Posts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Right-wing controls [4] × Posts Yes Yes
Media controls [4] × Posts Yes Yes
Socio-econ. controls [4] × Posts Yes Yes
Election controls [7] × Posts Yes Yes
Age controls [4] × Posts Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes against refugees on the interaction of local
social media usage and anti-refugee sentiment as in Equation (1.1). The dependent variable is a dummy for the incidence of a
refugee attack. AfD users/Pop. is the ratio of people with any activity on the AfD Facebook page to population. Refugee posts is
the Germany-wide number of posts on the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the word refugee (“Flüchtling”). All control variables are
interacted with the Refugee posts measure; see text for a description of the controls. Robust standard errors in all specifications
are clustered by municipality. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
1.3.3 Quasi-Experimental Evidence: Facebook and Internet Out-
ages
To isolate the importance of social media, we next draw on internet and Facebook outages as
sources of quasi-experimental variation. To count as a severe internet disruption, our baseline
measure has to fulfill two criteria: (1) it has to last at least 24 hours, and (2) it has to affect
a significant part of the population, i.e. be in the top quartile of reported internet disruptions
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per capita, which vary by municipality and week (see section Section 1.2 for more details).
This gives us 313 severe internet outages.17
Internet outages. Are local internet outages severe enough to decrease a municipality’s
exposure to social media? We investigate this question by using a sample of posts from the
AfD Facebook page for which we know the users’ locations.18 Figure 1.5a plots the local
number of posts against the intensity of local internet outages. Local Facebook activity
falls with outage intensity and is close to 0 as soon as we observe more than 0.25 outage
reports per 10,000 inhabitants. Figure 1.12 shows that we observe significantly fewer posts
and comments on Facebook for municipalities that experience an internet disruption. These
results lend credence to the idea that exposure to social media content is reduced in the
affected municipalities and not compensated by users accessing Facebook with their mobile
phones.
If internet outages indeed reduce local social media exposure, we would expect them to
mediate the capacity of social media to propagate anti-refugee incidents. As described in Sec-
tion 1.3.1, we test this hypothesis by interacting the main terms of interest AfD Users/Popi×
Refugee Postst with Internet Problemsit, our dummy for severe internet disruptions. We
graphically illustrate the results in Figure 1.5b. The binned scatter plot is almost identical to
Figure 1.4, except that we plot a separate slope for municipalities that experience an internet
outage. This reveals a striking pattern: while anti-refugee attacks increase with anti-refugee
posts, this relationship disappears in municipalities that experience an internet outage. This
holds true for municipalities with high and low Facebook usage.
Figure 1.5b implies that internet outages have a substantial attenuating effect. Consider
the pattern in panel (a). Without outages, there is a strong correlation of refugee posts and
attacks. During outages, the correlation is essentially zero. This means that the outage effect
is larger than the baseline estimate for AfD Users/Pop.×Refugee posts, which is given by
the slope difference of the dotted lines in panels (a) and (b). We interpret this as evidence
that cutting of users from social media completely has large effects.
We next estimate versions of Equation (1.2) and report the regression results in Table 1.3.
Column 1 shows that internet outages reduce anti-refugee violence. The coefficient of −0.003
17In the online appendix, we show our results are robust to alternative definitions. We also exploit the eight
major Facebook outages, which only vary by week. We discuss the results and their interpretation in turn.
18These posts and comments are a sub-sample by users who publicly disclosed their location in their
Facebook profiles.
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Figure 1.5: Quasi-Experimental Results from Internet Outages
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Notes: Panel (a) shows a binned scatter plot of local posts on the AfD Facebook page as a function
of the reports on internet outages in a given week. Panel (b) plots the average number of anti-refugee
attacks against our measure of anti-refugee sentiment for municipalities above and below the median of
AfD Users/Pop. Refugee attacks are binned by 20 quantiles of refugee posts. We additionally split
towns by whether they experience an internet outage in a given week (gray squares). The number of
anti-refugee attacks is residualized with respect to population; hence, the number of attacks can be
slightly below 0 in some bins.
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implies that, during such outages, the probability of a refugee attack is 53% lower relative
to the dependent variable mean (≈ 0.006). In Figure 1.6, we investigate the timing of this
drop in incidents. Because the outages are relatively rare in the municipality-week panel, the
estimates are necessarily noisy. Nonetheless, we can see a reduction in anti-refugee incidents
that is sharply concentrated in the week of the internet outage.
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Weeks since major internet outage
Change in probability of anti-refugee incident
Notes: This figure plots estimates the estimates for δ from the event study regression Attacksit =∑2
t=−2 δw=tOutageit+Fixed Effects+εit, where Outage refers to internet outages in municipality
i in week t. 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered by municipality.
Column 2 in Table 1.3 implies that this effect is driven by periods of high sentiment; it
may also be driven by areas with many AfD Facebook users (column 3) but the coefficient
is not statistically significant. In columns 4 through 6, we estimate the full triple-difference
model. Here, we estimate the effect of outages in areas with high social media use at times
of high anti-refugee sentiment. The estimates suggest that internet problems reduce social
media’s impact on anti-refugee violence. While the coefficient of refugee posts and social
media exposure is similar to our baseline correlations, the triple interaction term with internet
outages is negative and statistically significant in all three specifications. Quantitatively,
internet outages appear to mitigate the entire effect of social media. In line with the graphical
evidence in Figure 1.5b, we find that the triple interaction coefficient is larger than the baseline
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coefficient. Put differently, for a given level of anti-refugee sentiment, there are fewer attacks
in municipalities with high Facebook usage during an internet outage than in municipalities
with low Facebook usage without an outage.
Table 1.3: Local Internet Outages and Social Media Transmission
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Interaction
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.024*** 0.016** 0.016**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
AfD users/Pop. × Posts × Outage -0.181*** -0.184*** -0.172***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.057)
Outage Interaction
Outage -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003** -0.001 -0.002 -0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
Refugee posts × Outage -0.005*** -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AfD users/Pop. × Outage -2.685 4.441 4.455 4.391
(3.464) (4.384) (4.054) (4.058)
Internet Usage Interaction
Share broadband access × Outage -0.000
(0.000)
Internet domains/Pop. × Outage 0.021*
(0.012)
Mobile Broadband Speed × Outage 0.000
(0.000)
Observations 479,964 479,964 479,964 479,964 474,303 474,303
R-squared 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.084 0.084
Municipalities 4324 4324 4324 4324 4273 4273
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls [8] × Posts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All other controls [22] × Posts Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes against refugees on the interaction of local
social media usage and anti-refugee sentiment as in Equation (1.1). The dependent variable is a dummy for the incidence of a
refugee attack. AfD users/Pop. is the ratio of people with any activity on the AfD Facebook page to population. Refugee posts is
the Germany-wide number of posts on the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the word refugee (“Flüchtling”). Internet outages are
defined as municipality-weeks that are in the top quartile of the ratio of reported internet outages to population. The coefficient
of “Refugee posts × Outage” is multiplied by 100 for readability. Columns 1-4 include the baseline controls. Columns 5 and 6
include all controls as in column 7 of table 1.2, interacted with Refugee posts (unreported). Column 6 further adds the interaction
of broadband access and internet domains/pop. with local internet outages. Robust standard errors in all specifications are
clustered by municipality. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
Could it be that the effect of internet outages is merely coincidental? As an alternative
way of assessing statistical significance, we perform a randomization test. Instead of the actual
internet disruptions, we randomly define 313 municipality-week pairs as placebo outages. We
then estimate the same regression using 500 different sets of placebo outages. This allows
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us to evaluate the probability of finding a statistically significant coefficient in our dataset.
Using this procedure, we find that more than 99% of the placebo triple interaction coefficients
exhibit a lower t-statistic than our estimate. Our findings are thus unlikely to be purely
coincidental. We show the full distribution of t-statistics from this randomization test in
Figure 1.14a in the online appendix.
The identifying assumption for internet outages in our framework is that they only have
an effect on anti-refugee hate crime through the reduced exposure to social media. Could it
be that we observe reduced hate crimes because users are cut off from the internet generally,
not from social media in particular? Two pieces of evidence support the idea that we capture
a social media channel.
First, when we include interactions of internet disruptions with measures of internet
usage (broadband access, per capita internet domains, mobile internet access), our main
coefficient is unaffected (see column 6 in Table 1.3). The coefficients of the internet usage
interactions are generally statistically insignificant or have the opposite of the expected sign.
This is at least some indication that we are not merely capturing general internet usage. It
also suggests that our findings are unlikely to capture that people are busy fixing internet
access problems. If we were merely capturing such displacement effects, one would expect it
to more strongly affect people in areas with high internet usage, which does not seem to be
the case in the data. Second, after including the other interaction terms in columns 4 through
6, the coefficient on internet outages is no longer statistically significant. This result also
supports the idea that internet outages reduce hate crime by limiting access to social media.
Another concern could be that hate crimes are less likely to be reported during internet
outages. We believe this is unlikely to explain our findings because we analyze incidents that
happened years in the past. While internet outages might hamper the flow of information, it
seems highly unlikely that incidents such as assault or property damages are never reported
due to a temporary internet disruption. As further evidence, we limit our analysis to official
reports by the police or the German parliament, for which social media reporting is an unlikely
concern. This yields similar results (see column 1 of Table 1.15).
We also run a number of tests to rule out that our Germany-wide measure of refugee
posts is affected by local internet outages. As stated above, this appears unlikely because
we focus on local disruptions to the internet; Table 1.14 in the online appendix shows that
the total number of internet outages in a given week is uncorrelated with the total number
of Facebook posts. The outage results are also robust to using a leave-one-out measure of
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refugee posts (column 2), Germany-wide posts in the previous week (column 3), and an
alternative measure based on Google search intensity for the word refugee (Flüchtling) in
column 4. The implied magnitudes are almost equivalent.19 This suggests that the outage
effect is driven by exposure rather than the production of anti-refugee content. In Table 1.17,
we show additional robustness checks for alternative transformations of the dependent variable.
The findings remain robust throughout. Table 1.18 shows that the results also hold using
alternative definitions of the outage dummy.
Facebook outages. As further evidence for the social media transmission mechanism, we
use eight major Germany-wide Facebook outages as a source of exogenous variation specific
to social media access. Table 1.13 outlines the details of each of the eight outages and links
to relevant press reports. By definition, these outages are Facebook-specific and therefore do
not affect other potential channels of online transmission.
Table 1.14 in the online appendix shows that these outages are large enough to disrupt
weekly activity on right-wing social media. Column 1 and 2 show that, during weeks with
Facebook outages, there are on average 11% fewer new total posts and 24% fewer posts about
refugees on the AfD page.20 There is no evidence of such an effect in the week before. Column
5 shows that Facebook outages are also uncorrelated with the total number of weekly internet
disruptions (t = −0.41).
We next present the results of interacting Facebook disruptions analogous to the internet
outages in Table 1.4. The results again reveal a clear pattern. The coefficient of −0.001
in column 1 shows that the probability of an anti-refugee incident is around 18% lower in
weeks with major Facebook outages (relative to the unconditional probability of an attack).
Figure 1.13 suggests that the timing of this effect is concentrated in the week of the Facebook
outage, without significant effects in the week before or after the outage. Because we solely
rely on the weekly variation from the few major Facebook outages, the estimates are noisier
than those for internet outages. Column 2 shows that, intuitively, this effect is also larger
in areas with many users on the AfD Facebook page. The coefficient of 2.222 suggests that
Facebook outages reduce the probability of a hate crime by 12% more for a one standard
19To see this, consider the effect implied by dividing the triple interaction coefficients by the standard
deviation of these salience metrics. This suggests that internet outages have a mediating effect of 9.6, 10.5,
and 11.0 for the AfD posts about refugees, the leave-one-out measure, and Google trends, respectively.
20The average number of refugee posts in the time series is around 84. The coefficient estimate of 19.880
implies an effect of Facebook outages on posts of −19.880/84 ≈ 0.24 relative to the mean.
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deviation increase in AfD users /Pop..21 This is additional evidence that social media per
se might affect hate crimes.
Next, we introduce the triple interaction of Facebook outages with social media usage
and our refugee salience measure. The triple interaction is negative and statistically significant
in all three specifications in columns 3 through 5. Quantitatively, we find that Facebook
disruptions fully undo the baseline correlation of refugee attacks and exposure to social media
sentiment. For example, consider that the coefficient of AfD users/Pop. and Refugee Posts
is 0.027 in column 4 but −0.04 on the triple interaction. This implies that, in weeks of major
Facebook outages, heightened refugee sentiment is not associated with a differential increase
of anti-refugee attacks in municipalities with higher Facebook usage.
It is worth noting that we would expect the Facebook outage coefficients to differ in
magnitude from the internet outage coefficients. This is because Facebook outages eliminate
the differential exposure between areas with high and low social media usage to anti-refugee
posts. In contrast, internet outages further exploit variation within municipalities. Because
within-municipality variation induced by internet outages appears to matter more in our
setting, we find smaller coefficients for Facebook outages.
We again perform a randomization test to assess the statistical significance of the
Facebook outage results. We randomly assign placebo Facebook outages to eight weeks in
our data, excluding the weeks in which we identified Facebook outages. We then estimate the
same regression using 500 different sets of placebo outages. Using this procedure, we find
that 92% of the placebo triple interaction coefficients exhibit smaller t-statistics. We show
the full distribution of t-statistics from this randomization test in Figure 1.14b in the online
appendix. This confirms that our findings are unlikely to be a matter of coincidence.
Taken together, the evidence here suggests that the relationship of anti-refugee sentiments
online and hate crimes is attenuated by Facebook and internet outages. These results are
most consistent with a causal propagation effect of social media.
In the online appendix, we conduct additional robustness exercises for our outage results.
In Table 1.16, we show a range of different standard errors. We also assess our results’
robustness to different transformations of the refugee attack variable and estimation methods
in Table 1.17. Our results are similar when we use the number of attacks, log(1+refugee
21In unreported results, we also find that the interaction of Facebook outages with refugee posts has a
statistically significant negative coefficient.
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Table 1.4: Facebook Outages and Social Media Transmission
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Interaction
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.021** 0.021**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
AfD users/Pop. × Posts × Outage -0.040* -0.040* -0.046** -0.046**




AfD users/Pop. × Outage -2.222* 1.164 1.164 1.367 3.230
(1.273) (1.833) (1.833) (1.862) (1.969)
Observations 479,964 479,964 479,964 479,964 474,303 474,303
R-squared 0.079 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.084 0.084
Municipalities 4324 4324 4324 4324 4273 4273
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls [8] × Posts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All other controls [22] × Posts Yes Yes
All controls [30] × Outages Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes against refugees on the interaction
of local social media usage and anti-refugee sentiment as in Equation (1.1). The dependent variable is a dummy for
the incidence of a refugee attack. AfD users/Pop. is the ratio of people with any activity on the AfD Facebook page
to population. Refugee posts is the Germany-wide number of posts on the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the word
refugee (“Flüchtling”). Facebook outages refer to weeks in which Facebook experienced considerable disruptions; see the
online appendix for more details on how these are defined. Note that the other interaction terms Outage, Refugee posts
and Outage×Refugee posts are absorbed by the week fixed effects in columns 3-5. Columns 1-3 include the baseline
controls. Columns 4 and 5 include all controls as in column 7 of table 1.2, interacted with Refugee posts. Column 5 adds
the interaction of these control variables with Facebook outages. Robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered
by municipality. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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attacks) or the ratio of refugee attacks to asylum seekers as dependent variable. In all cases,
the estimated coefficients are highly statistically significant.
1.3.4 Additional Results
Other Posts on the AfD Facebook Page: If the channel we uncover is indeed specific
to refugees, we would expect a weaker correlation between refugee attacks and posts about
other topics on the AfD Facebook page. We test this hypothesis in Table 1.20, where we
plot the baseline estimation with refugee posts in column 1 for convenience. We also report
coefficients for standardized post measures (with a mean of zero and standard deviation
of one) in square brackets to compare coefficient sizes across the different posts. Next, we
estimate Equation (1.1) using all posts except those containing the word refugee (“Flüchtling”)
in column 2. The estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero. We also repeat our
baseline test using posts containing the words “Muslim”, “Islam”, or “EU”—the latter is
motivated by the AfD’s long-standing criticism of the European Union. For all these terms,
we find no significant relationship between the number of posts and the number of attacks;
all estimated coefficients are considerably smaller in standardized terms compared to the
baseline measure. This shows the specificity of our refugee measure: the correlation we
capture does not appear to be an artifact of general anti-minority sentiment, but rather a
predictable result of increased animosities towards refugees on social media in particular weeks.
Intensive Margin of Facebook Usage: If social media works as the propagating mechanism
for hate speech, we would also expect its effect to increase with how frequently users interact
with the AfD Facebook page. We explore this issue empirically in Table 1.21, where we
interact our main interaction term with the total number of local posts on the AfD wall and
the number of comments and likes on AfD posts, all scaled over the number of AfD users in
a municipality.22 These measures of usage intensity are not systematically correlated with
local Facebook penetration, city size, or population density. As such, they create additional
variation in social media engagement across towns.
22Note that we can only construct these measures on the intensive margin of municipalities where we can
identify at least one AfD user. Our baseline results also hold in this sub-sample, which we show in Table 1.26
in the online appendix.
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The results suggest that local engagement on Facebook matters: all three triple inter-
action terms are positive and statistically significant. Consistent with the hypothesis that
social media enables hateful sentiment to spread, a higher reach per AfD user increases the
correlation of social media exposure with hate crimes. These interactions work on top of
our baseline interaction term, which remains similar in magnitude and highly statistically
significant throughout. The smallest coefficient on the triple interaction term of 0.001 in
column 3 implies that a one standard deviation increase in likes per user (around 12) increases
the baseline coefficient by 25%.23
Distracting News Events: As an additional piece of analysis, we investigate the role of
news shocks on the transmission of online hate speech to real-world actions. We build on the
evidence in Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018), who show that the Israeli army is more likely to
strike against Palestinian targets when US media outlets are distracted by other news events.
In our case, we hypothesize that other important news events might distract people from
the topic of refugees. This is somewhat analogous to Facebook outages in that we exploit
additional exogenous weekly variation: if major news events act as a distraction, they should
reduce the correlation of exposure to refugee salience with hate crimes.
To measure these news shocks, we obtain Google Trends data on weekly search interest
on the terms “Brexit”, “Trump”, and “UEFA Euro 2016’. Figure 1.15 shows that these spike
around the respective events. In Table 1.22, we show that they are indeed associated with a
crowding out of refugee salience: the share of posts about refugees is markedly lower during
these key events. As an example, the spike in search interest for Brexit (100 on the Google
search index) is associated with an almost 30% drop in the share of refugee posts (relative to
the mean).
We next investigate whether, as a result, refugee salience has a weaker link with hate
crimes in the weeks these major events attracted particular news attention. If this is the case,
we would expect that these events decrease the correlation of social media transmission with
refugee attacks. As before, we implement this by including the Google trends measures as a
further interaction in our panel regressions.
Table 1.5 plots the results. For each of the events in columns 1 to 3, we find a significant
23To see this, consider that the total implied estimate including interaction is calculated as 0.001×12 ≈ 0.012,
which is about 25% than the baseline coefficient of 0.049.
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negative coefficient on the number of anti-refugee incidents for the triple interaction with
distracting news. The negative sign of the coefficient indicates that, during weeks of major
news events, changes in anti-refugee incidents correlate less with heightened refugee salience.
As the salience of other events crowds that of refugees, there are smaller increases of hate
crimes in municipalities with more AfD social media users.
Table 1.5: News Shock Salience and Hate Crime Propagation
(1) (2) (3)
Brexit Trump UEFA EM 2016
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.071*** 0.096*** 0.067***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.017)
AfD users/Pop. × Posts × News shock -0.019** -0.009*** -0.002**
(0.008) (0.003) (0.001)
Observations 495,726 495,726 495,726
R-squared 0.078 0.079 0.078
Municipalities 4466 4466 4466
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes against
refugees on the interaction of local social media usage and anti-refugee sentiment as in Equa-
tion (1.1). The dependent variable is a dummy for the incidence of a refugee attack. AfD users/Pop.
is the ratio of people with any activity on the AfD Facebook page to population. Refugee posts
is the Germany-wide number of posts on the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the word refugee
(“Flüchtling”). The news shocks refer to the Google searches as indicated in the text. Robust
standard errors in all specifications are clustered by municipality. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 0.01%, 0.05%, and 0.1% levels, respectively.
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1.3.5 Differences Between Social Media And Traditional Media
How does social media differ from traditional media? And could such differences partially
explain our results? Existing work has highlighted the ability of users to self-select and interact
on social media (e.g. Schmidt et al., 2017). In the following, we highlight three aspects of
far-right social media in Germany that may make it a particularly effective transmission
mechanism for anti-refugee sentiment compared to mainstream news sources.
First, Figure 1.7a shows that the share of content about refugees is consistently higher
on the AfD’s Facebook page compared to traditional news outlets in the Nexis data. The
share of refugee mentions on Facebook is also far more volatile and spikes coincide more clearly
with salient news events like Merkel’s “Wir schaffen das” speech or the Cologne New Year’s
Eve incidents. In both of these examples, the share of refugee posts on right-wing social media
is nearly 100% higher than the share of news stories on refugees, which is consistent with
the idea that the topics discussed on Facebook are considerably narrower than in traditional
media.
In Figure 1.16a in the online appendix, we show that this also holds true in a like-for-like
comparison of the share of refugee posts on the AfD’s Facebook page relative to the Facebook
pages of five major German news outlets. AfD users post twice as much about refugees
compared to the next-ranked newspaper. This suggests that the narrowness of content is
unlikely to be explained only be the editorial constraints (e.g. space limits in newspapers) of
traditional media outlets. Instead, self-selection of like-minded people into the AfD Facebook
page likely also play a role. Combined with the interactive nature of social media, this result
points towards an anti-refugee group dynamic on the AfD’s Facebook page.
Second, as argued by Sunstein (2017), self-selection of like-minded people can lead to
the expression of more extreme viewpoints. To shed light on this hypothesis empirically, we
compare the full text of news reports about refugees with posts on the AfD Facebook page.
Existing reports on far-right hate speech on social media highlight three characteristics as
typical (see for example Dinar et al., 2016; Kreißel et al., 2018; Ott and Gür-Seker, 2019):
(1) a belief to speak for the “true will” of the people, i.e. the in-group (citizens) compared
to the out-group (refugees); (2) an opposition to “elites”, in particular politicians and the
media, who supposedly mislead or betray the people in an undemocratic way; and (3) a
legitimization of discrimination against refugees by highlighting crimes by refugees, an alleged
incompatibility of cultural differences, and negative repercussions for vulnerable “locals” (e.g.
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Figure 1.7: Highlighting Social Media Echo Chambers
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the share of posts/reports about refugees on the AfD Facebook page and
major German news outlets from Nexis. Panel (b) plots the 10-week moving average of the number
of refugee posts per person as a function of a user’s time spent on the AfD Facebook page, proxied
by the time since the first post. The shaded area indicates 95% confidence intervals.
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women, children or pensions).
We find evidence for all three of these features of right-wing hate speech on the AfD’s
Facebook page. Our approach is to investigate which words occur with a higher probability in
posts on the AfD page relative to news reports in the Lexis corpus.24 We filter words using the
word stems of the German terms for people, elite, democratic, press, crime, foreign, culture,
refugee, betrayal, and several vulnerable groups (pensioners, children, women, homeless).
The results of this exercise in Table 1.6 reveal a clear pattern (see also Table 1.23 in the
online appendix). As one example, the term “Volksbetrug” (betrayal of the people) is 1715
times more likely to appear on the AfD page than in traditional news outlets. Criticism of
“elites” and the media are also far more frequent. Another main difference is how often crimes by
refugees are discussed, based on the use of loaded terms like “Flüchtlingskriminalität” (refugee
crime). We see expressed fears about “Fremdkulturen” (foreign cultures) and “Burkafrauen”
(burka women). This analysis clearly shows that far-right ideas that have widely been
interpreted as hate speech are far more pervasive on the AfD page than in traditional media
reports.
We find similar results using a text analysis approach using machine learning. In
particular, we train a L1 regularized logistic regression model classifier that predicts whether
a text comes from the AfD Facebook page or a traditional media outlet. The classifier
thereby identifies the words with the highest predictive ability for posts on the AfD Facebook
page. Figure 1.17 shows a word cloud of the 100 words that best separate social media from
traditional media content, based on the model with the highest cross-validated out-of-sample
F1 scores.25 The size of the words represents the magnitude of the coefficients as a measure
of variable importance. Consistent with the findings in Table 1.6, critiques of establishment
parties and the economic or social costs of refugees are among the words that most uniquely
identify posts on the AfD page.
Third, we investigate how individuals’ posting behavior varies with the length of exposure
to far-right social media content. We construct a balanced panel of users’ activity on the
AfD’s Facebook page. In Figure 1.7b, we show users’ average number of posts about refugees
since their first post on the page. To avoid that a changing sample composition drives our
24We calculate word probabilities for each corpus by dividing the number of times a word is men-
tioned (Wordi) by the total number of words in the corpus (
∑





WordsNewsi . The relative probability is the ratios between the two calculated the two proba-
bilities, i.e. P (WordFacebooki )/P (Word
News
i ).
25Note that the model was run in German and the words translated by the authors afterwards. For more
details on the machine learning model, see the notes to Figure 1.17.
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Table 1.6: Relative Word Frequencies on the AfD Facebook Page
Rank Word Translation Relativ prob.
Panel A: Flücht (refugee)
1 Flüchtlingsenklaven refugee enclave 780
2 Flüchtlingslüge refugee lie 693
3 Flüchtlingsirrsinn refugee insanity 650
4 Flüchtlingsmafia refugee mafia 520
5 Flüchtlingsbefürworter refugee supporter 520
Panel B: Krimi (crime)
1 Regierungskriminalität goverment crime 1300
2 Diskriminierungsgesetze anti-discrimination laws 520
3 Schwerstkriminellen dangerous criminals 260
4 Fluechtlingskriminalität refugee crimes 260
5 Kriminalitätssteigerung increase in crime 260
Panel C: Presse (media)
1 Freie Presse free press 390
2 Propagandapresse propaganda press 260
3 Presseempfang press meeting 260
4 Meinungspresse opinionated media 260
5 Nazipresse nazi media 260
Panel D: Volk (people)
1 Volksbetrug betrayal of the people 1715
2 volksfeindlich hostile to the people 780
3 volksverdummenden brainwashing the people 520
4 Volksverhetzungsparagraphen law against incitement 520
5 Volksprotesten protest by the people 260
Panel E: Verrat (betrayal)
1 Volksverrats betrayal of the people 130
2 Vaterlandsverrat betrayal of the fatherland 43
3 Volksverrat betrayal of the people 43
4 Hochverrat high treason 36
5 verratenen betrayed 32
Notes: This table plots the relative probability of words mentioned on the AfD Facebook page compared
to reports by major German news outlets on Nexis. We report the results by groups of word stems identi-
fied as likely to reflecting right-wing hate speech on social media by previous work in Dinar et al. (2016).
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results, we restrict the analysis to the approximately 60% of users who first interacted with
the AfD page before June 2015 and thus have been active on it for at least 100 weeks. The
results are similar without this restriction.
The frequency of refugee posts strongly increases with users’ duration on Facebook:
within the first year, the average user on the AfD page goes from close to zero to posting at
least once about refugees every 2 weeks.26 This result suggests that the AfD page does not
merely attract already active Facebook users with right-wing views, but may increase the
willingness of people to express anti-refugee views over time.
This analysis also highlights an important distinction compared to existing research
on media and violence. Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) Adena et al. (2015), and DellaVigna et al.
(2014) all investigate the effect of nationalistic propaganda in settings of high ethnic tensions.
In our setting, there is no nationalistic anti-minority propaganda in traditional media outlets.
Rather, we find that social media provides an alternative forum to exchange and spread
extreme rhetoric and viewpoints for the fringe elements of society.
1.3.6 Mechanisms
In theory, multiple mechanisms could be consistent with social media playing a propagating
role in real-life hate crimes. We discuss four mechanisms: information exchange, persuasion,
collective action, and local spillovers. We provide suggestive evidence that collective action
and local spillovers likely play a role in our setting.
First, social media might facilitate the exchange of information. In our setting, relevant
information for potential perpetrators could, for example, include the locations of refugee
homes and meeting points for demonstrations. We analyze the content of the refugee posts
on the AfD Facebook to identify any post that might contain location information. To do so,
we tag posts that either contain a zip code, mention the word “straße” (street), “weg” (path),
“Flüchtlingsheim”, “Asylantenheim”, “Flüchtlingsunterkunft” (all three translate to refugee
home) or refer to a name of a German town or village.27 We then manually check the content
of tagged posts. This analysis suggests that while some locations like Berlin and Cologne
are frequently mentioned in the posts as references to politicians and crimes committed by
refugees, we find no mention about specific local information. We found no instance of zip
26The same holds true for the total number of posts (see Figure 1.16b in the Online Appendix).
27We base the search on a comprehensive list of 2,061 German towns and 11,000 municipalities from the
German statistical office, which covers villages with as little as 20 inhabitants.
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codes or exact addresses. It hence appears unlikely that this channel is the primary driver
behind our findings.
A second mechanism could be a persuasion channel, implying that social media persuades
potential perpetrators that refugees may be dangerous or undeserving, which may then push
some people over the edge. We believe that the timing in our setting makes this channel
unlikely. In contrast to other work in Müller and Schwarz (2018b) and Bursztyn et al. (b),
we focus entirely on high-frequency variation in social media posts and refugee violence. To
the extent that social media changes people’s attitudes, this is unlikely to happen in a single
week and revert back after anti-refugee salience has subsided. This is particularly true for the
results on Facebook and internet outages: it seems unlikely that being cut off from social
media during such disruptions reduces hate crimes because potential perpetrators become
less xenophobic for a single week.
Third, social media could motivate collective action. Existing evidence in Enikolopov
et al. (2020) and Manacorda and Tesei suggests that social media and mobile internet increase
the incidence of protests. In our setting, users could coordinate to carry out hate crimes or
learn about others’ willingness to carry them out via social media. To investigate this, we
rerun the panel regressions in Equation (1.1) but limit refugee attacks to those undertaken
by multiple perpetrators.28 In line with the collective action hypothesis, Table 1.7 suggests
that our panel regression results are predominantly accounted for by cases with four or more
perpetrators. We find no relationship for incidents with fewer than 4 perpetrators. Within
the sub-sample where we can identify the number of perpetrators, these attacks account for
a similar number of total incidents compared to the cases with more than 4 perpetrators.
Hence, this finding is unlikely to be the result of limited statistical power.
Fourth, and somewhat relatedly, it could be that social media enables local spillovers,
e.g. through “copy-cat” incidents. This mechanism suggests that potential perpetrators
may use social media to learn about other attacks taking place, which could inspire them to
carry out additional hate crimes. Because friendship networks on social media are clustered
geographically (Bailey et al., 2018), this should be particularly pronounced for attacks
happening nearby. We thus again rerun the panel regressions in Equation (1.1) but now
include a dummy variable if neighboring municipalities experience an attack in a given week.29
28We were able to hand-code the number of perpetrators for 28% of the hate crimes.
29This is akin to the common correlated effects (CCE) estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006) to hold
common shocks constant.
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Table 1.7: Mechanism — Anti-Refugee Incidents, by Number of Perpetrators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Known
perp. sample 1 perp. <4 perp. ≥4 perp.
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.010** 0.003 0.004 0.007**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 479,964 479,964 479,964 479,964
R-squared 0.081 0.037 0.046 0.055
Municipalities 4,324 4,324 4,324 4,324
Share of attacks 1 0.245 0.494 0.534
Mean of DV 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls [8] × Posts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes
against refugees on the interaction of local social media usage and anti-refugee senti-
ment as in Equation (1.1), where we vary the definition of the dependent variable
based on the number of perpetrators. All control variables are interacted with the
Refugee posts measure. Robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered
by municipality. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and
0.1 levels, respectively.
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Table 1.24 suggests that hate crimes happening in the same week nearby are associated
with more anti-refugee incidents. This correlation strongly interacts with the popularity of
right-wing social media, particularly when anti-refugee sentiment is elevated. In other words,
having an attack in a neighbouring municipality is associated with a stronger correlation of
exposure to right-wing social media and the probability of an anti-refugee incident.30
Overall, our results appear to be most consistent with the idea that short-run bursts
in anti-refugee sentiment on social media can translate into real-life hate crimes by enabling
coordination online, both through group actions and local spillovers.
1.3.7 How Many Refugee Attacks Are Caused By Online Hate
Speech?
We conduct a back-of-the-envelope calculation of how many attacks against refugees would
have taken place with lower anti-refugee sentiment on right-wing social media. Given that we
rely on high-frequency variation, this question is difficult to address. As our estimates are
likely to pick up two separate facets of exposure to social media.
On one hand, it could be that exposure to anti-refugee sentiment on social media merely
affects the exact timing when refugee attacks occur without changing their total number. On
the other hand, the time series of hate crimes and refugee posts on social media in Figure 1.2
exhibits prolonged overall increases in the number of anti-refugee incidents with the onset of
the refugee crisis. These increases are not easy to explain if anti-refugee sentiment exclusively
affects the timing of incidents. In our empirical setting, we cannot distinguish between these
possibilities.
Despite this important caveat, we still believe it is instructive to assume social media
indeed increases the number of hate crimes to illustrate the magnitudes of the results. We
calculate the predicted number of attacks, based on the coefficient estimate of 0.024 from
a regression with the baseline control variables (see column 1 in Table 1.2). Multiplying
this coefficient with AfD users/Pop. and Refugee posts gives us the estimated effect on
anti-refugee attacks. We sum over all observations to get the total predicted number of
anti-refugee attacks as a result of social media. This calculation implies that in absence
of social media transmission on social media would result in 289 (10%) fewer anti-refugee
incidents.
30Note that, although they are suggestive, we do not interpret these estimates as causal “peer effects”,
because we cannot distinguish them from common shocks (see Manski, 1993).
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1.4 Conclusion
Social media has become a powerful tool for sharing and disseminating information. In this
paper, we investigate whether social media can play a role in propagating violent hate crimes.
Our findings suggest that social media has not only become a fertile soil for the spread of
hateful ideas but also motivates real-life action. By combining detailed local data on Facebook
usage with user-generated content, we can shed light on the link between online posts and
anti-refugee incidents in Germany. Plausibly exogenous variation in disruptions to users’
Facebook or internet access supports the view that some of the correlations we document
reflect a causal effect.
Existing research shows local cultural attitudes towards foreigners are enormously
persistent (e.g. Becker and Pascali, 2019; Becker et al., 2016; Voigtlander and Voth, 2012,
2015). We extend this literature by showing that volatile, short-lived bursts in sentiment
within a given location have substantial effects on people’s behavior and that social media
may play a role in their propagation. Our findings are particularly timely in light of recent
policy debates about whether and how to “regulate” hate speech on social media. Such
legislation may come at a high price: since the lines between what constitutes free speech
and hate speech can be blurred, regulation can open the door to censorship. Our work does,
however, suggest that policymakers ignore online hate speech at their peril. Future research
should investigate effective ways to tackle online hate speech. By quantifying the extent of
the challenge, our paper takes a first step towards identifying potential harm arising from
extended social media usage.
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1.5 Appendix: Fanning the Flames of Hate
1.5.1 Appendix: A Short History of the AfD
The AfD was founded by Bernd Lucke, a professor of Economics at the University of Hamburg
in 2013. Initially, the AfD positioned itself as an opposition party to the common European
currency and the bailouts Greece and Spain received as a result of the financial crisis. Right
from the start, however, the party also pandered to the right with a conservative social policy.
Representatives of the AfD frequently attracted attention for using nationalist terminology
and attacking the “Lügenpresse” (Lying Press), a term popularized by the Nazis. With this
political program and rhetoric, the AfD attracted 4.7% of the votes in the 2013 German
Federal Election, only narrowly missing the 5% electoral threshold.
Nonetheless, the AfD celebrated several victories in state elections and winning seats
in the state parliaments of Hesse, Saxony, Thuringia, Brandenburg, Bremen, and Hamburg.
Furthermore, the AfD reached 7.1% of the votes in the 2014 European Parliament election.
As the Euro Crisis cooled, the party began to shifts its focus further to the right on topics like
traditional family values or the role of Islam in Germany. These more nationalist-conservative
political positions, championed by Frauke Petry, attracted a significant share of far-right
recruits to the party. In 2015, Petry was elected the main speaker of the party, a major defeat
for its founder, Bernd Lucke. As a result of this loss, Lucke resigned from his leadership
position and left the party completely, followed by several other key party members.
In the run-up to the 2017 federal election, the AfD leadership included Frauke Petry,
Alexander Gauland, Björn Höcke, Jörg Meuthen, and Beatrix von Storch, all of whom
hold staunch national conservative opinions. With the beginning of the refugee crisis, the
aggressively framed mass immigration as dangerous and declared they were unwilling to
accept any refugees into Germany. This messaging was accompanied by increased xenophobia
and criticism of Islam.
Under the new leadership and impelled by the refugee crisis, the AfD continued to win
elections, securing seats in 14 out of the 16 state parliaments in 2016. In the 2017 federal
election, the AfD became the third strongest force in the German Parliament with 12.6% of
the votes.
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1.5.2 Appendix: Additional Details on the Data
A Short Introduction to Facebook Pages and User Data
On Facebook, celebrities, universities, restaurants, and political groups like the AfD have
created their own Facebook pages. The AfD page is the starting point for its followers on
Facebook. Any Facebook user who is interested in or supports the AfD can “like” its page.
The messages posted on the AfD’s page then will show up in that user’s Facebook feed. The
Facebook feed consists of the individualized news and updates every user receives based on
his friendship network and interests. In this way, the AfD is able to reach and rally their
followers with political messages and party news.
In addition to receiving information from the AfD, Facebook users can become active on
the party’s page as well. In general, such interactions fall into three categories. First, people
can post their own messages, links, or pictures on the fan page. These posts are visible to
everybody but will not automatically appear in other users’ Facebook feeds. Second, users can
comment on posts and comments by other users or the AfD itself. Those comments appear
below the original post and are also visible to the public. Third, each post or comment can
be “liked” as a sign of support.
Figure 1.8a shows an example of how these three interaction types show up on the AfD
page. The Facebook Graph API allowed us to collect all post, comments, and likes from the
AfD’s fan page, information we highlight ins Figure 1.8a. Facebook assigns each user a unique
ID that makes it possible to attribute posts and comments to individual profiles.
To hand collect user data, one must visit each individual Facebook user profile, from
which, depending on the user’s privacy settings, one can determine his/her place of residence
and place of birth. Figure 1.8b shows an example of a Facebook user profile and where to
find the relevant information. If the user decided to hide this information, the box with the
user information will be empty.
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Figure 1.8: Facebook Examples
(a) Alternative for Germany Facebook Page
(b) Facebook User Profile
Notes: Panel (a) shows a screenshot of the Alternative for Germany’s Facebook page. The boxes and labels
highlight the parts extracted using the Facebook Graph API. Panel (b) shows an example of a Facebook user
profile. The box highlights the publicly available user information extracted from Facebook. The authors





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Examples on Anti-Refugee Incidents
Table 1.9: Examples of Anti-Refugee Incidents
Date Place Description Type
03.11.2016 Braunsbedra A 20-year old Syrian man was riding his bike in the evening
and approached a man he assumed needed his help. Suddenly,
two additional men appeared and all three started kicking and
punching the victim.
Assault
28.12.2016 Langenhagen An unknown person sprayed graffiti on a refugee home. The
graffiti read “Deutsch Nantional“ (German-National, misspelled
in original), “18” (code for Adolf Hitler) and “88” (code for
Heil Hitler).
Property Damage
17.11.2016 Oschersleben A fire occurred in a villa which had until recently accommodated
refugees. After a forensic analysis, the police concluded it to be
a case of arson, since the fire started in several places at once
using fire accelerant. A detonation occurred when the police
arrived. Nobody was injured.
Arson
30.01.2016 Schmölln 450 people participated in a demonstration of the “Thügida”
(Pegida in Thuringia). The police charged 4 people with violat-
ing gun control laws and the Public Meetings Act.
Demonstration
30.01.2016 Berlin The police investigated an insult against inhabitants of a refugee
home.
Suspected Cases
Notes: This table reports one example for each class of anti-refugee incidents in the data. The descriptions
were translated by the authors.
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Notes: This figure plots the share of municipalities with at least one refugee attack in our sample
by whether we have evidence of at least one AfD Facebook page user in the municipality. We are




Table 1.10: Summary Statistics for Additional Controls
Level Obs Mean SD Min. Max.
Additional Media and Internet Controls
Internet outages/Pop.† Municipality 495,726 0.007 0.071 0.000 3.614
Registered domains/Pop. County 495,726 0.141 0.056 0.057 1.390
Mobile broadband speed County 495,726 12 2 6 24
News paper sales/Pop. Municipality 491,175 0.092 0.077 0.000 1.644
Additional Right Wing Controls
Nazi murders/Pop.† Municipality 495,726 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.282
NPD vote share (2017) (in %) Election Distr. 495,726 0.491 0.410 0.000 2.006
Ln(1+Deported Jews) Municipality 495,726 0.606 1.350 0.000 10.930
Ln(1+Stürmer letters) Municipality 495,726 0.125 0.449 0.000 5.872
Additional Soci-Economic Controls
Average age Municipality 479,853 45 2 27 56
Share benefit recipients (in %) Municipality 495,726 0.424 0.187 0.051 1.207
Share non-Christians Municipality 479,853 0.325 0.219 0.029 0.941
Manufacturing share (in %) County 493,062 27 9 2 58
Additional Voting Controls
CDU vote share (in %) Municipality 492,618 36 7 20 64
SPD vote share (in %) Municipality 492,618 19 7 5 47
Left vote share (in %) Municipality 492,618 8 4 2 26
Green vote share (in %) Municipality 492,618 7 4 1 25
FDP vote share (in %) Municipality 492,618 10 3 3 28
Voter turnout (in %) Election Distr. 495,726 76 3 66 84
Additional Demographic Controls
Share aged 0-24 (in %) Municipality 479,853 25 3 14 37
Share aged 25-49 (in %) Municipality 479,853 33 2 22 45
Share aged 50-74 (in %) Municipality 479,853 33 3 22 50
Share aged 75 and older (in %) Municipality 479,853 9 2 4 18
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the additional control variables in the estimation sample. Variables tagged with
a † are scaled by population (in 1,000).
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60 70 80 90 100
% of households with access to internet with>=16 Mbit/s
% of individuals using internet daily (Eurostat)
Notes: This figure plots the municipal-level share of households with access to broadband internet
(≥ 16 Mbit/s) against the state-level percentage of individuals using the internet daily taken from






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.5.3 Appendix: Additional Details and Results on Internet and
Facebook Outages
Figure 1.11: Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Internet Outages
(a) Map of Internet Outages







2015 w1 2015 w26 2016 w1 2016 w26 2017 w1
Number of internet outages





0 100 200 300 400 500
Internet outage duration in hours
Percent
Notes: The map in Panel (a) plots the geographic distribution of internet outages per million inhabitants
for the German municipalities in the data. Panel (b) plots the distribution of total internet outages per
week. Panel (c) plots the distribution of the duration of the individual user reports from Heise.de used in the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.13: Validation of Facebook Outage Data
Peak Date Description Source
26/01/2015 The Facebook page was unavailable globally due to a server error. According
to the official statement, the error “occurred after we introduced a change
that affected our configuration systems.” Initially, the outage had been
attributed to an attack by infamous hacker group “Lizard Squad”. The
outage affected millions of users worldwide, including users of Facebook
messenger, Instagram, and the dating app Tinder (which uses Facebook
data).
Link
08/04/2015 Facebook users complaint that the site is not loading properly. The outage
was particularly concentrated in Western Germany, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom.
Link
15/07/2015 Facebook suffered a worldwide outage, showing users a simple “Service
Unavailable” message. The outage affected all services including the popular
Facebook messenger. Although the initial issue was resolved relatively
quickly, the problems persisted for many users.
Link
29/09/2015 Users experienced extremely slow or no access to Facebook after a previous
disruption on September 24. User reports and news coverage indicate that
Germany was particularly badly hit. In a statement to CNBC, Facebook
acknowledged the outage and explained that “configuration problems” were
at the root of it.
Link, Link 2
14/03/2016 Users in Western Europe - particularly Germany, Austria, Poland, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom - were barred from logging
into or commenting on Facebook. The Facebook app was particularly
affected.
Link
16/06/2016 Facebook had an outage concentrated in Western Europe. Users were unable
to log in, post, use the messenger, or could not access pages (including that
of the AfD).
Link
14/09/2016 Worldwide Facebook outage, affecting almost the entire European continent
and the eastern United States. Users were unable to log in, post, or read
content.
Link
13/01/2017 Users in Western Europe and the eastern United States experienced
widespread issues in accessing Facebook, particularly from computer devices.
Link, Link 2
Notes: This table lists the dates of the major Facebook outages that occurred during our sample period. The
links lead to the news articles used to identify the disruptions.
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Figure 1.12: Do Local Internet Outages Reduce Local Facebook Activity?






Local Posts Local Comments
Average number of posts/comments
Notes: This figure plots the arithmetic mean and 95% confidence intervals of local Facebook activity
measures based on linking users’ locations to their posts and comments. The bars marked “Outage” are
municipality-week observations in which a local internet outage occurs. The average values are below
one, since we do not observe a post or a comment from each municipality in every week. For example, a
mean value of around 0.08 for local comments during weeks without outages implies that on average we
observe 1 comment for every 12.5 municipality-weeks pairs (out of 480,963) in our data.
77
Table 1.14: Time Series Evidence — Outages and Aggregate Facebook Activity
Outage
Post outcomes correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Refugee Total Refugee Facebook
posts posts posts posts outage (t)
Facebook outage (t+1), 46.159 -9.413
(78.768) (17.718)
Facebook outage -107.372** -19.880**
(50.326) (7.917)
Facebook outage (t-1), -26.517 -15.459*
(78.355) (7.895)
Internet outage 8.178 0.739 -0.007
(12.093) (1.728) (0.017)
Observations 108 108 109 109 111
R-squared 0.368 0.830 0.344 0.812 0.002
Week-of-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents weekly time series regressions of different metrics of Facebook activity on
a dummy for Facebook outages in a given week (columns 1-2). Columns 3-5 show that the sum of
local internet outages is uncorrelated with Germany-wide Facebook posts and the likelihood of a severe
Facebook outage. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively.
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Table 1.15: Robustness — Ruling Out Alternative Channels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leave Google
Official One Out Lagged Sentiment
Reports Estimator Posts Measure
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.009* 0.057*** 0.011 0.103***
(0.005) (0.021) (0.008) (0.032)
AfD users/Pop. × Posts × Outage -0.137*** -0.372*** -0.164*** -0.571***
(0.042) (0.115) (0.062) (0.219)
Observations 474,303 474,303 470,030 474,303
R-squared 0.045 0.084 0.084 0.084
Municipalities 4273 4273 4273 4273
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All controls [30] × Posts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes against refugees
on the interaction of local social media usage and anti-refugee sentiment as in Equation (1.1). The
dependent variable is a dummy for the incidence of a refugee attack. AfD users/Pop. is the ratio of
people with any activity on the AfD Facebook page to population. Refugee posts is the Germany-wide
number of posts on the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the word refugee (“Flüchtling”). Column 1
only uses anti-refugee incidents based on official reports (police or parliament), which are unlikely to
be subject to time-varying reporting bias. In column 2 we construct a leave one out measure of Refugee
posts. Internet outages are defined as municipality-weeks that are in the top quartile of the ratio of
reported internet outages to population. Columns 1-3 include all controls as in column 7 of table
1.2, interacted with Refugee posts and all additional interactions of the outage dummy (unreported).
Robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered by municipality. ***, **, and * indicate























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-2 -1 0 1 2
Weeks since Facebook outage
Change in probability of anti-refugee incident
Notes: This figure plots estimates the estimates for λ from an event study regression of Equation (1.2)
which includes 2 leads and lags of the outage interactions. 95% confidence intervals are based on
standard errors clustered by municipality.
Table 1.18: Robustness — Alternative Definitions of Internet Outages
Change outage definition Include shorter outages No extended outages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Baseline) 75th 90th 75th 90th 75th 90th
percentile percentile percentile percentile percentile percentile
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
AfD users/Pop. × Posts × Outage -0.181*** -0.103** -0.145*** -0.116*** -0.161*** -0.097*
(0.058) (0.052) (0.043) (0.040) (0.058) (0.055)
Observations 479,964 479,964 479,964 479,964 479,964 479,964
R-squared 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082
Municipalities 4324 4324 4324 4324 4324 4324
Number of outages 308 122 579 231 246 98
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls [8] × Posts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes against refugees on the interaction of local social media usage and
anti-refugee sentiment as in Equation (1.2). The dependent variable is a dummy for the incidence of a refugee attack. AfD users/Pop. and textitRefugee
posts is the Germany-wide number of posts on the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the word refugee (“Flüchtling”). Each column includes all additional
interactions of the outage dummy (unreported). In columns 1-2, we use the baseline dummy explained above, i.e. outages in the top quartile. In columns
3-4, we include outages shorter than 24 hours (as discussed in Section 1.2 we exclude this for our baseline measures) and define a new dummy for outages
in the top quartile. Columns 5-6 further do not extended outages beyond a single week. Robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered by
municipality. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Notes: This figure shows the results of the randomization test, in which we randomly assign placebo internet
outages to 313 municipality-week pairs. We repeat this process 500 times and save the t-stat of the triple
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Percent
Notes: This figure shows the results of the randomization test, in which we randomly assign placebo Facebook
outages to eight weeks in our data. We repeat this process 500 times and save the t-stat of the triple interaction
term of interest. The vertical line marks the t-stat of the actual estimate.
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1.5.4 Appendix: Additional Results
Table 1.19: Violent vs. Non-Violent Incidents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Property
Arson Assault Damage Protest
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.002 0.007** 0.012* 0.005*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Observations 479,964 479,964 479,964 479,964
R-squared 0.016 0.053 0.060 0.060
Municipalities 4324 4324 4324 4324
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls [8] × Posts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes
against refugees on the interaction of local social media usage and anti-refugee sentiment as
in Equation (1.1). The dependent variable is a dummy for the incidence of a refugee attack;
see 1.11 for definition of attack types. AfD users/Pop. is the ratio of people with any
activity on the AfD Facebook page to population. Refugee posts is the Germany-wide num-
ber of posts on the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the word refugee (“Flüchtling”). All
control variables are interacted with the Refugee posts measure; see text for a description
of the controls. Robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered by municipality.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Table 1.20: Other Facebook Posts and Anti-Refugee Hate Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Refugee Muslim Islam EU
(Baseline) posts posts posts
AfD users/Pop. × FB posts 4.027*** 0.765 -0.043 0.387
(1.009) (0.502) (0.456) (0.385)
Observations 495,726 495,726 495,726 495,726
R-squared 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078
Municipalities 4466 4466 4466 4466
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes
against refugees on the interaction of local social media usage and anti-refugee sen-
timent as in Equation (1.1). The dependent variable is a dummy for the incidence
of a refugee attack. AfD users/Pop. is the ratio of people with any activity on the
AfD Facebook page to population. FB posts is the Germany-wide number of posts on
the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the word refugee (“Flüchtling”), with the baseline
being refugee (“Flüchtling”). Standardized coefficients are reported in square brackets,
based on variable transformations with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
Robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered by municipality. ***, **, and
* indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Table 1.21: Social Media Reach and Hate Crime Propagation
(1) (2) (3)
Number Received Received
of posts comments Likes
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.049***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts × Reach 0.003*** 0.002** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 381,174 381,174 381,174
R-squared 0.086 0.086 0.086
Municipalities 3434 3434 3434
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls [8] × Posts Yes Yes Yes
Corr(Reach,Population) 0.010 0.011 0.009
Corr(Reach,AfD users/Pop.) 0.017 0.006 0.020
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes against
refugees on the interaction of local social media usage and anti-refugee sentiment as in Equa-
tion (1.1). The dependent variable is a dummy for the incidence of a refugee attack. AfD
users/Pop. is the ratio of people with any activity on the AfD Facebook page to population.
Refugee posts is the Germany-wide number of posts on the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the
word refugee (“Flüchtling”). The reach variables in the top row refer to the number of local
posts on the AfD wall, as well as comments and likes for AfD posts, all scaled by the number
of AfD users (municipalities with zero users are dropped). See text for an explanation of the
control variables. Robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered by municipality.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Table 1.22: Time Series Evidence – Distractions and Aggregate Facebook Activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Horse





UEFA EM 2016 -0.048*** 0.058
(0.013) (0.043)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R-squared 0.120 0.119 0.098 0.169
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents weekly time series regressions of the share of refugee posts
on the AfD page on Google indeces tracking interest in the topics Brexit, Trump, and
the European Football Championship. All regressions include week-of-year and month
fixed effects. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** and **
indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively.
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Google Trends Index: UEFA EM 2016
Notes: These figures plot the Google Trends search index (ranging from 0 to 100) for the terms
“Trump”, “Brexit”, and “UEFA EM 2016” for the sample period.
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Figure 1.16: Differences of Social and Traditional Media — Additional Results
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Notes: Figure (a) plots the share of posts on the “wall” of the AfD Facebook page and five major
German news outlets. Panel (b) plots the 10-week moving average of the number of posts per
person as a function of a user’s time spent on the AfD Facebook page, proxied by the time since
the first post. The shaded area indicates 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1.23: Relative Word Frequencies on the AfD Facebook Page
Rank Word Translation Relativ prob.
Panel A: Demokra (democratic)
1 linksliberaldemokratisch left-liberal 260
2 Demokratiegedanken idea of democracy 130
3 postdemokratisches post-democratic 130
4 scheindemokratische sham democratic 87
5 pseudodemokratischen pseudo-democratic 65
Panel B: Renter/Kinder/Frauen/Obdachlose (vulnerable groups)
1 Kinderbande gang of children 520
2 Kinderbanden gangs of children 260
3 Burkafrauen burka women 260
4 Armutsrentnern poverty-pensioners 260
5 Kindersex pedophilia 260
Panel C: Elite (elite)
1 Elitegruppe elite group 260
2 Leistungseliten accomplished elites 130
3 Geldeliten rich elites 87
4 Staatselite state elites 87
5 Politelite political elites 74
Panel D: Fremd (foreign)
1 Fremdkulturen foreign cultures 676
2 Fremdvölker foreign people 260
3 Fremdverwendung foreign use 260
4 fremdgesteuerten foreign-controlled 130
5 zweckentfremdeter misused 130
Panel E: Kultur (culture)
1 Fremdkulturen foreign cultures 676
2 Kochkultur cooking culture 520
3 Kulturgewohnheiten cultural habits 260
4 Rückkehrkultur return culture 260
5 Clankulturen clan culture 260
Notes: This table plots the relative probability of words mentioned on the AfD Facebook
page compared to reports by major German news outlets on Nexis. We report the results
by groups of word stems identified as likely to reflecting right-wing hate speech on social
media by previous work in Dinar et al. (2016).
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Figure 1.17: Word Cloud — Predictors of AfD Facebook Content
Notes: This figure plots the 100 words with the highest predictive power for AfD Facebook content
relative to traditional news media based on an L1 regularized logistic regression model. The size of
the words corresponds to the magnitude of the coefficients. The input to the model are the tf-idf
weighted words from the AfD’s Facebook posts and comments and full text articles from Nexis
that contain the word refugee. We exclude words that are shorter than four letters and words that
appear in less than five documents. The optimal regularization strength is chosen using 10-fold
cross-validation. The selected model achieves an out-of-sample F1 score of above 0.99. The words
were translated from German by the authors.
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Table 1.24: Mechanism — Local Spillovers
(1) (2) (3)
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.016*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Attack in neighboring municipality 0.004*** -0.000 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Attack in neighboring municipality × Posts 0.000 -0.004**
(0.001) (0.002)
Attack in neighboring municipality × AfD users/Pop. 13.765*** 1.610
(4.782) (4.914)
Attack in neighboring municipality × AfD users/Pop. × Posts 0.121**
(0.052)
Observations 479,964 479,964 479,964
R-squared 0.082 0.082 0.083
Municipalities 4324 4324 4324
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls [8] × Posts Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes against refugees
on the interaction of local social media usage and anti-refugee sentiment as in Equation (1.1). The
dependent variable is a dummy for the incidence of a refugee attack. AfD users/Pop. is the ratio of
people with any activity on the AfD Facebook page to population. Refugee posts is the Germany-
wide number of posts on the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the word refugee (“Flüchtling”). Attack
in neighboring municipality is a dummy equal to 1 if a neighboring town experiences a refugee attack
in the same week. The coefficient for “Attack in neighboring municipality × Posts” is multiplied by
100 for readability. Robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered by municipality. ***,
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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1.5.5 Appendix: Robustness Checks for Specification
Table 1.25: Further Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged Pre- Refugee Refugeee
Dependent Population 2015 Refugee Post Post
Variable Weighting Users Comments Likes Share
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.023*** 0.029*** 0.034**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.015)
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee sentiment 0.076*** 0.015** 0.437***
(0.025) (0.006) (0.140)
Observations 475,640 479,964 479,964 479,964 479,964 479,964
R-squared 0.085 0.097 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082
Municipalities 4324 4324 4324 4324 4324 4324
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls [8] × Posts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes against refugees on the interaction of local
social media usage and anti-refugee sentiment as in Equation (1.1). AfD users/Pop. is the ratio of people with any activity on
AfD’s Facebook page to population. Refugee posts is the Germany-wide number of posts on the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the
word refugee (“Flüchtling”). Column 1 includes a lagged dependent variable. Column 2 uses weighted least squares (WLS) based on
each municipality’s population. In column 3, we replace the number of AfD users calculated over the whole sample with the number
of users before the sample start (that is, pre-2015). Columns 4 and 5 present results based on the comments and likes (in 100s) of
posts on the AfD Facebook page containing the word refugee, rather than the number of posts on the Facebook wall. Column 7 uses
the share of posts (in %) containing the word refugee in all posts we observe in a given week. All control variables are interacted
with the Refugee posts measure; see text for a description of the controls. Robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered
by municipality. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Accounting for the Skewed Distribution of AfD Users
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of the ratio of AfD users in a municipality to population. The vertical
lines indicate the 50th and 90th percentile of the distribution, respectively, which we make use of in Table 1.26.
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Table 1.26: Accounting for the Skewed Distribution of AfD Users
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Drop Only Only
municipalities above below 10-90th User
0 users median median percentile quartiles
AfD users/Pop. × Refugee posts 0.053*** 0.035* 0.100*** 0.076***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.026) (0.024)
AfD users/Pop. (Q2) × Refugee posts 0.012*
(0.006)
AfD users/Pop. (Q3) × Refugee posts 0.018***
(0.007)
AfD users/Pop. (Q4) × Refugee posts 0.057***
(0.011)
Observations 395,493 247,863 247,863 345,876 395,493
R-squared 0.082 0.097 0.026 0.042 0.082
Municipalities 3563 2233 2233 3116 3563
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes against refugees on the interaction
of local social media usage and anti-refugee sentiment as in Equation (1.1). The dependent variable is a dummy for
the incidence of a refugee attack. AfD users/Pop. is the ratio of people with any activity on AfD’s Facebook page to
population. Refugee posts is the Germany-wide number of posts on the AfD’s Facebook wall containing the word refugee
(“Flüchtling”). In column 5, the excluded category is the first quartile of AfD users/Pop.; zero-user municipalities are
excluded. The coefficients in column 5 are multiplied by 1000 for readability. Robust standard errors in all specifications
are clustered by municipality. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Addressing Many Zeros in the Dependent Variable
A potential concern with the results in the paper is the sparsity of the dependent variable.
Even though anti-refugee incidents were relatively frequent in our sample in absolute numbers,
they are rare events in the full sample of municipalities and weeks. In this section, we discuss
potential issues and provide evidence for the robustness of our estimates.
The first concern is that the standard errors could be biased, which might make it
more likely to find statistically significant estimates. We attempt to address this concern
by showing that our estimates are robust to a wide array of specification of standard errors
(see Table 1.16). We also run a randomization check, which yields estimates in line with
the p-values from our regressions. Additionally, as shown in Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.13,
our regressions also exploit the precise timing of outages. If many zeros would lead us to
mechanically find significant effects, this should also be observable in the week before and
after the outages, which is not the case in the data. Taken together, the sum of these tests
show no evidence that we are overly likely to reject the null hypothesis.
A second concern is that the linearity of the conditional expectation function is violated
in our setting and that our coefficients thus misleading. While this seems unlikely as the
effect of internet outages is even visible in the raw data Figure 1.5b. To mitigate this concern,
we re-code the main interaction of interest as the interaction of two indicator variables. In
particular, we define periods of “high sentiment” as those in in the top 50% of the weekly
number of posts about refugees. We create a dummy for “High Exposure” for towns in the
top 50% of the AfD Facebook users to population ratio.
We then estimate our baseline regression models using “dummified” interaction terms.31
The resulting saturated model is completely general and yields unbiased estimates without
assumptions about functional form (Wooldridge, 2001, p.456-457): the dummies pick up the
mean difference in the number of anti-refugee incidents when refugee salience and exposure to
it are high. In fact, these models fit the conditional expectation function perfectly no matter
how the dependent variable is distributed (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, p.38). As a result this
approach naturally also accommodates rare events. As we report in Table 1.27, our baseline
results are essentially unchanged in this specification.
To reiterate, we find a correlation between refugee incidents and posts on the AfD
page in the time series; a link between these incidents and the usage of the AfD page across
31We also create dummies that split each control variable at the median and interact these with the refugee
post measure as well as the remaining terms when when including outage interactions.
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towns; a panel correlation using the variation in both; and an event study effect of Facebook
and internet outages. The panel results also hold in a highly restricted panel where refugee
attacks are not rare events and in a saturated model that picks up mean differences without
assumptions about functional form. Given the range of approaches, we conclude that it is
highly unlikely that another form of rare events bias drives our findings.








High Exposure × High Sentiment × Outage -0.009*** -0.003*
(0.003) (0.002)
Observations 474,303 474,303 474,303
R-squared 0.082 0.082 0.082
Municipalities 4273 4273 4273
Total attacks 2681 2681 2681
Mean attacks 0.006 0.006 0.006
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes
All controls [8] × Posts Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes
against refugees on the interaction of local social media usage and anti-refugee senti-
ment as in Equation (1.1). High Exposure is a dummy equal to 1 for towns in the top
50% of the AfD users/Pop. ratio. High Sentiment is a dummy equal to 1 for weeks in
the top 50% of refugee posts, the Germany-wide number of posts on the AfD’s Face-
book wall containing the word refugee (“Flüchtling”). The baseline control variables
are interacted with the Refugee posts measure; see text for a description of the con-
trols. Robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered by municipality. ***,
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Table 1.28: Addressing Many Zeros in the Dependent Variable
Panel A: Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4)
≥ 1 attacks ≥ 2 attacks ≥ 3 attacks ≥ 4 attacks
Refugee posts × AfD users/Pop. 0.194*** 0.276*** 0.243* 0.305
(0.051) (0.092) (0.138) (0.203)
Panel B: Internet outage only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
≥ 1 attacks ≥ 2 attacks ≥ 3 attacks ≥ 4 attacks
Outage -0.013*** -0.032*** -0.052*** -0.066***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.015) (0.019)
Panel C: Internet outage interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
≥ 1 attacks ≥ 2 attacks ≥ 3 attacks ≥ 4 attacks
Refugee posts × AfD users/Pop. 0.194*** 0.277*** 0.243* 0.306
(0.051) (0.092) (0.138) (0.204)
Outage -0.011 -0.035* -0.043 -0.104
(0.007) (0.019) (0.039) (0.065)
AfD users/Pop. × Posts × Outage -0.657*** -1.518*** -1.776*** -3.597***
(0.205) (0.311) (0.492) (1.008)
Observations 136,641 62,715 32,856 20,535
R-squared 0.074 0.090 0.107 0.122
Municipalities 1231 565 296 185
Total attacks 2848 2182 1677 1375
Mean attacks 0.021 0.035 0.051 0.067
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from a regression of hate crimes against
refugees on the interaction of local social media usage and anti-refugee sentiment as in Equa-
tion (1.1). In each column, we successively restrict the sample to municipalities with a total of
at least 1, 2, 3 or 4 attacks on refugees over the sample period. Robust standard errors in all
specifications are clustered by municipality. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the
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2) From Hashtag to Hate Crime:
Twitter and Anti-Minority Sentiment
Carlo Schwarz (University of Warwick)
Karsten Müller (Princeton University)
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, we study whether social media platforms can affect anti-minority sentiments
online and offline. We investigate this question in the context of a particularly notable
case study: the political rise of Donald Trump. Trump has been widely criticized for his
inflammatory rhetoric on Twitter and is frequently cited as an example of how social media
can increase anti-minority sentiments (Times, 2017d). Minnesota congresswoman Ilhan Omar,
for example, has linked tweets by Trump targeting her Muslim faith to “an increase in direct
threats on my life - many directly referring or replying to the president’s video” (BBC, 2019).
We interpret Trump’s presidential campaign as a shock to the salience of anti-Muslim
views, particularly for those exposed to his rhetoric on social media. This interpretation is in
line with experimental evidence that Trump’s popularity on the campaign trail and subsequent
election win increased people’s willingness to publicly express xenophobic views (Bursztyn
et al., c). Building on this insight, we ask if social media may play a role in propagating of
anti-Muslim sentiment and real-life violence.
We start by documenting that the frequency of anti-Muslim hate crimes has doubled
since Donald Trump’s presidential campaign compared to the presidencies of Barack Obama
and George W. Bush. This is particularly striking because Bush’s term included a temporary
ten-fold increase in such crimes following the 9/11 terror attacks, the largest spike since the
beginning of the FBI records in 1990 (Gould and Klor, 2016; Panagopoulos, 2006; Hanes
and Machin, 2014). It is also consistent with evidence that the Muslim community has been
particularly affected by Trump’s political rise (e.g. Hobbs and Lajevardi, 2019).
We investigate the potential role of social media in enabling such hate crimes using
a difference-in-differences approach. We find that the increase in hate crimes targeting
Muslims predominantly originates in counties with high Twitter usage. We also observe
disproportionate increases in tweets containing the hashtags #BanIslam and #StopIslam
in these counties. These regressions, however, may not isolate a pure “social media effect”
because counties with many Twitter users likely also differ in many unobservable dimensions.
This may bias our estimates upwards or downwards, depending on how individuals select into
social media usage. For example, areas where many people use relatively new technologies
such as Twitter may react less because they are more liberal and tolerant, which could bias
our estimates downwards. On the other hand, such areas may have a larger share of minority
groups and thus more potential targets for perpetrators of hate crimes.
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To overcome these concerns, we construct an instrument for county-level Twitter usage
in the United States based on the home towns of the platform’s early adopters at the South
by Southwest (SXSW) Festival in March 2007.32 SXSW is widely regarded as the tipping
point for Twitter’s popularity and an important early catalyst for the site’s success. One
indication of SXSW’s importance in explaining Twitter’s trajectory is that the number of
daily tweets tripled during the festival. We also find that tweets about SXSW are a clear
outlier in 2007 compared to those about other, considerably more popular festivals, such as
Burning Man, Coachella or Lollapalooza. We show that activity on Twitter grew rapidly in
the weeks following SXSW 2007, and disproportionately so in the home counties of SXSW
followers who signed up in March 2007.
In line with the literature on path dependence in technology adoption (e.g. Arthur, 1989,
1994; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1999; Arrow, 2000), this early expansion left its imprint on
the geographical distribution of social media usage in the United States. The locations of
Twitter’s early adopters at SXSW are a strong predictor of county-level Twitter usage today,
even after controlling for the locations of SXSW followers that had already signed up prior to
the festival. This result is also robust to using alternative control sets, e.g. using the locations
of Twitter users mentioning other major festivals in 2007 or those tweeting about SXSW
before the 2007 event. Similar to the strategy of Enikolopov et al. (2020), the identifying
assumption is that differences in the locations of SXSW followers in March 2007 relative to
earlier months are not related to unobserved county characteristics that explain the rise in
anti-Muslim sentiment with the 2016 presidential campaign. Because Twitter was largely
unknown before SXSW, and these counties do not systematically differ in many observable
characteristics, we believe this assumption is credible.
Instrumenting for Twitter usage with SXSW followers in March 2007, we confirm that
measures of anti-Muslim sentiments disproportionately increased in areas with higher social
media usage. We find that a one standard deviation higher exposure to social media is
associated with a 38% larger increase in hate crimes between 2010 and 2017. This increase in
hate crimes against Muslims is entirely accounted for by assaults. Exploiting heterogeneity
across counties, we further show that most of this effect is driven by areas with higher
32SXSW is an annual event, held since 1987, that comprises a number of festivals, conferences, trade shows,
and exhibitions. In 2019, more than 230,000 people attended the festivals, where almost 2,000 acts from all
over the world performed. More than 70,000 people attended the SXSW conference, which featured almost
4,800 speakers. Around 30,000 people attended SXSW Interactive, which focuses on emerging technology. For
simplicity, we refer to the event as “SXSW festival” or similar short forms throughout the paper.
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pre-existing anti-minority bias. These findings suggest that social media platforms may have
played a role in the recent spread of anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States by reinforcing
existing tensions.
We also find a similar but slightly weaker pattern for hate crimes targeting Hispanics,
the second minority group often targeted by Trump. While data from the FBI suggest that
the frequency of these incidents has been largely unchanged, our results point to a potential
role of social media in contributing to a geographical reallocation of these crimes.
To determine if Trump’s tweets contributed to the increase of anti-Muslim sentiment on
Twitter, we analyze Trump’s Twitter feed. We find a strong time series correlation between
Trump’s tweets on Islam-related topics and the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes after the
start of his presidential campaign, even after controlling for general attention paid to topics
associated with Muslims. There is no correlation between Trump’s tweets and hate crimes
with other motives (e.g. racial hate crime), which suggests that we are not merely capturing
waves of general anti-minority sentiment. We also find no such link for the period before the
time of Trump’s presidential campaign.
To establish causality, we leverage Trump’s well-documented golf habit. This analysis is
motivated by the fact that many commentators have argued that golfing shifts Trump’s state
of mind. In 2017 alone, Trump played golf on more than 90 days. In the data, we find a clear
pattern: Trump’s golf days coincide strongly with changes in the content, but not the number
of his tweets. In particular, Trump is more likely to send messages aimed at Muslims and the
media on his golf days, and fewer about policy, a fact we exploit in an instrumental variable
framework. One intuitive explanation of this finding is that day-to-day politics may be less
salient to the President when outside of Washington, DC. Additionally, there is anecdotal
evidence that Trump may be influenced by his social media director Dan Scavino – former
manager of Trump National Golf Club Westchester and Trump’s former caddie – who has
been linked to particularly inflammatory tweets (New York Times, 2018).
Using golf days as an instrument, we find evidence consistent with the idea that Trump’s
tweets about Muslims “trigger” waves of anti-Muslim sentiment. In particular, we find that
his instrumented tweets not only continue to predict the frequency of hate crimes, but also
measures of media attention paid to Muslim-related topics. Using transcript data on the
reporting of the major cable news networks Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC, we show a time
series correlation between Trump’s golf-induced tweets and mentions of Muslims. This link
seems to be largely driven by Fox News, which tends to support rather than oppose Trump’s
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rhetoric. Analyzing over 100 million tweets, we also find that Trump’s anti-Muslim tweets are
widely shared by his followers, who further produce their own anti-Muslim content.
Additionally, we investigate whether the transmission effects of Donald Trump’s tweets
are stronger in counties with more Twitter users in a panel regression setting. Interacting
county-level Twitter usage and Trump’s Twitter activity, we document that the spike in
anti-Muslim hate crime in the days after Donald Trump’s tweets is driven by counties with
higher Twitter penetration. These findings also persist when we estimate regressions in
reduced form and two-stage least squares using our SXSW instrumental variable strategy.
Taken together, our evidence is consistent with the interpretation that, with the start
of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, social media may have come to play a role
in the increase of anti-Muslim sentiments in the United States. The existing literature
broadly suggests three possible mechanisms to explain our findings: coordination capabilities,
persuasion, and changes in social norms. We discuss how our findings line up with these
three mechanism at the end of the paper. While all are likely at play, some of our results
suggest that social media may influence the perception of which beliefs about minorities are
socially acceptable. In other words, social media could have enabled changes in social norms
for people at the fringes of the political spectrum. Because Twitter users are predominately
male and more ideologically extreme than the general population (Barberá and Rivero, 2015),
this may explain how social media can contribute to an increase in hate crimes.33
Our paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between media consumption
and violence. Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), Adena et al. (2015), and DellaVigna et al. (2014)
find that traditional media can contribute to ethnic hatred and violence. Other research has
linked media such as television (Card and Dahl, 2011) and movies (Dahl and DellaVigna,
2009) to short-lived spikes (or decreases) in violence. Bhuller et al. (2013) document increases
in sex crime associated with the roll-out of broadband internet in Norway; Chan et al. (2016)
find a correlation between broadband availability and hate crimes in the US. Our findings
speak to the role of social media in the spread of violence against minority groups.
We most directly contribute to a growing literature on the influence of social media on
real life outcomes. Enikolopov et al. (2020) show that social media can increase participation
in protests in Russia by reducing coordination costs. Petrova et al. (2017) study whether
33These findings are also consistent with studies on the demographics of social media consumption. Guess
et al. (2018) and Guess (2018), for example, show that consumption of fake news articles and ideologically
extreme content is driven by relatively few people, which might overlap with the few potential perpetrators of
hate crimes.
103
adopting Twitter helps politicians attract donations. In previous work, we found evidence
that social media affects the propagation of anti-refugee incidents in Germany, using Facebook
and internet disruptions as a source of short-lived exogenous variation (Müller and Schwarz,
2018a). Here, we study the medium-term effects of social media and highlight a potential
social norms channel, based on the particularly salient case study of Trump’s presidency.
A separate related literature studies political polarization. While there is evidence that
polarization has increased over the past decades (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Gentzkow, 2016;
Draca and Schwarz, 2018), existing studies have found no or even a negative correlation with
social media use (Boxell et al., 2017; Barberá, 2014).34 One interpretation of our findings is
that social media may not necessarily affect average outcomes, but rather enable those with
extreme viewpoints to find sources of social legitimacy. A widely shared discriminatory tweet
by the President, for example, could signal to potential perpetrators of hate crimes that their
actions are more widely accepted than they really are.
In Section 2.2, we introduce the data sources and present descriptive evidence on hate
crimes since 1990. In Section 2.3, we discuss our empirical strategy and introduce our
instrument for Twitter usage based on the SXSW festival. Section 2.4 presents the main
empirical results. In Section 2.5 we discuss evidence for the link between Trump’s tweets
and anti-Muslim sentiment. In Section 2.6 we show that the relationship between Trump’s
tweets and anti-Muslim hate crime is driven by counties with high Twitter usage. Section 2.7
discusses plausible mechanisms behind our results and potential reporting biases. Section 2.8
concludes.
2.2 Data and Background
We create two datasets for our analysis. First, we build a county-level dataset for the US
containing information on hate crimes, Twitter usage, and numerous other variables. Second,
we construct a daily time series dataset that combines Trump’s daily Twitter activity, the
number of total hate crime incidents in the US, data on TV news coverage, and time series
control variables. The key sources we draw on are (1) hate crime data reported by the
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program; (2) a county-level measure of Twitter usage
based on 475 million tweets collected by Kinder-Kurlanda et al. (2017); (3) hand-collected
34A separate literature has analyzed the effects of the media on elections and other political outcomes.
See, among others, the work by Adena et al. (2015), DellaVigna et al. (2014), Stephens-Davidowitz (2014),
Gavazza et al. (2018), Gentzkow (2016), and Martin and Yurukoglu (2017).
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county-level data on the locations of early adopters of Twitter in 2006 and 2007; and (4)
information on Trump’s golf activity from his inauguration in early 2017 until the end of that
year. We describe these and all other data sources in more detail in the following subsections.
Table 2.18 and Table 2.19 in the online appendix present the full descriptive statistics.
2.2.1 FBI Hate Crime Data
The data on hate crime in the US come from the FBI and are available for the years 1990
until 2017.35 The data set contains all hate crimes in the US that are reported to the FBI as
part of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program. The FBI defines a hate crime as:
“[...] criminal offenses that are motivated, in whole or in part, by an offender’s
bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or
gender identity.” (FBI, 2015, p. 4)
To classify hate crimes, the FBI uses a two-tier decision making process. First, the law
enforcement officer recording an incident has to decide whether it might constitute a hate
crime. Second, the potential hate crime cases are forwarded to and evaluated by officers with
special training in hate crime matters. The FBI (2015) states (p. 35): “For an incident to be
reported as a hate crime, sufficient objective facts must be present to lead a reasonable and
prudent person to conclude that the offender’s actions were motivated, in whole or in part, by
bias.” For more information on the FBI classification procedure see appendix 2.9.1
Because considerable evidence needs to be available for an offense to be classified
as a hate crime, the numbers reported by the FBI have been criticized as underestimates
(ProPublica, 2017; News, 2017).36 Nonetheless, the FBI data constitute the most complete
record of hate crimes committed in the United States for which incident details are available.
Among others, they include information on the exact date of the crime, the type of crime (e.g.
vandalism, theft, assault), the number of victims, and the number of perpetrators. The data
further make it possible to assign hate crimes to counties using the county location of the
more than 32,000 original reporting agencies based on their Originating Agency Identifier
35Note that data for the year 2018 will only become available in November 2019.
36Note that time-invariant reporting bias across counties is unlikely to drive our results. First, the US-wide
trend of hate crimes reported to the FBI is likely to be highly correlated with the “true” hate crimes trend.
Second, we accommodate potential geographical reporting differences in our cross-sectional tests by estimating
our model in first-differences. In further robustness checks we restrict the sample to counties where at least
one hate crime is reported. We discuss the extent to which changes in reporting over time may explain our
results in the results section.
105
(ORI).37 Figure 2.2a plots the geographic distribution of hate crimes across the mainland
USA.38 The counties in grey never report any hate crime to the FBI.
The FBI differentiates hate crimes by motivating bias (e.g. anti-Muslim). Overall, they
report 34 bias motivations for the broad categories race, religion, sexual orientation, disability,
and gender/gender identity. We report all codes for the motivating bias in Table 2.12. We
use this classification to identify hate crimes against Muslims. The other categories used in
the paper are defined according to the codes listed in Table 2.11.
Presidents and Trends in Hate Crimes To motivate our analysis, we begin by inves-
tigating how the number of hate crime incidents has evolved over time. In particular, we
test for changes in anti-Muslim hate crimes since the commencement of Trump’s presidential
run. Panel A of Figure 2.1 plots the average number of weekly anti-Muslim hate crimes for
each president since George H. W. Bush; we also plot the 95% confidence interval around the
mean.39
We split the presidency of Barack Obama into two periods based on Trump’s official
campaign start. We use this time split because Trump’s presidential run does not only
mark a cesura for Trump’s presence in the media, but is also an important breaking point
in his Twitter reach. Figure 2.3a shows that the number of retweets Trump received grew
considerably with each month of his presidential campaign.
Over the 27-year period for which the FBI publishes data, the number of hate crimes
against Muslims in the United States has increased. Anti-Muslim hate crimes were somewhat
less common under Obama than under George W. Bush. Most strikingly, the period after
Trump’s presidential campaign commenced is a clear outlier by historical standards: the
average number of anti-Muslim hate crimes doubled compared to Obama’s presidency before
Trump’s campaign. This increase still stands out in comparison to George W. Bush’s
presidency, which included the largest recorded spike in anti-Muslim hate crimes in the wake
of the 9/11 terror attacks (Gould and Klor, 2016; Panagopoulos, 2006; Hanes and Machin,
2014).
37In the rare cases where an agency is located in more than one county we assign the hate crime to all
counties the agency is active in; this only applies to 0.08% of all incidents.
38The FBI hate crime data do not contain information on the US territories of Virgin Island, Puerto Rico,
Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and Guam.
39For Trump’s presidency, we only have information until December 31, 2017, since the FBI only publishes
hate crime data for the previous year in November. For the presidency of George H. W. Bush we only have
data from 1991 onward.
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Figure 2.1: Average Weekly Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Since 1990, by President



























































Notes: This figure plots the average weekly number of hate crimes reported by the FBI, by president.
We divide Barack Obama’s presidency into the period before and after Donald Trump’s campaign
start (“Obama (pre-Trump)” and “Trump pres. run”, respectively). Panel (a) shows the number
of anti-Muslim hate crimes. Panel (b) shows the total number of hate crimes. We also plot 95%
confidence intervals.
We plot the number of total hate crimes, for which we do not observe a similar increase,
in Panel B of Figure 2.1. While we still observe slightly higher numbers compared to Obama,
the frequency of hate crimes is lower under Trump than under Clinton or George W. Bush.
We show in Section 2.9.2 that this finding also holds true when we split the total number of
hate crimes into the underlying categories (e.g. hate crimes motivated by racial bias). We
conclude that the beginning of Trump’s presidential campaign appears to coincide with a rise
in anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States.
2.2.2 Measuring County-Level Twitter Usage
Twitter does not publish statistics on the number of active users per US county. We create an
approximate measure of Twitter usage in each US county using 475 million geo-located tweets
collected by Kinder-Kurlanda et al. (2017) made available through the Gesis Datorium. The
data were collected between June and November in 2014 and 2015 by repeatedly calling the
Twitter streaming API, restricted to US tweets. The streaming API provides a 1% sub-sample
of public tweets each time it is called. While the exact underlying sampling procedure is
unknown, this process should result in a good approximation of overall Twitter activity.
These tweets were assigned to counties based on the geographic location of each tweet.
Figure 2.2b visualizes the Twitter activity per capita. Unfortunately, the data do not contain
information for Alaska and Hawaii; our analysis therefore focuses on the continental US.
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Figure 2.2: Hate Crimes and Twitter Usage by US County













Notes: These maps plot the geographical distribution of the main variables of interest across the counties
in the mainland US. Panel (a) plots quintiles of the total number of hate crimes per capita between 1990
and 2017 as reported by the FBI. Counties in grey never reported any hate crime. Panel (b) plots our
measure of Twitter usage scaled by population.
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2.2.3 Measuring Trump’s Twitter Activity
To understand Trump’s Twitter activity, we collect the universe of his tweets from the Trump
Twitter Archive (Brown, 2018). Our version of this data set contains 35,137 tweets for the
time period of April 2009 to November 2018. The data contain the date, time, and text of
each tweet and the number of retweets a tweet received.
Identifying Trump’s anti-Muslim Tweets We use the text of Trump’s tweets to identify
tweets about Muslims or Islam-related topics. We start by hand-coding a random subsample
of 5000 tweets in which we tag anti-Muslim tweets. These 5000 tweets form the training
sample for a machine learning classifier. In preparation for machine learning we remove
stopwords from and reduce all words to their morphological routs, so called lemmas. We
then extract all unigram, bigrams and trigrams which appear in at least 3 tweets. The
extracted n-grams are reweighted using term frequency–inverse document frequency (tf-idf).
In this step the the frequency of a n-gram v in document d is replaces by tfidf(fd,v) =
(1 + ln(fd,v) · (ln( 1+D1+dv ) + 1), where dv is the number of documents n-gram v appears in.
Afterwards, we train a classifier based on a logistic regression model with L1 regularization.
We decide the optimal regularization strength using 5-fold cross-validation. The final model
achieves and out-of-sample F1 score of 0.97. In the total sample of Trump’s tweets the
classifier tags 266 anti-Muslim tweets.
As we use the words “muslim”, “islam”, “terror”, “mosque”, “refugee”, and ‘sharia” to
collect data on Google searches and news reports on Muslims, we add any tweet containing
these words to the set of potential anti-Muslim tweets. This process tags an additional 57
Tweets as anti-Muslim. To rule out that we are picking up unrelated topics by mistake and
change the coding of tweets if necessary. In the in the online appendix, we list examples of
anti-Muslim tweets (see Table 2.13) and the 25 tweets we removed in the hand-coding step
(see Table 2.14).
To further understand the topics of Trump’s tweets during his presidency, we use Amazon
Mechanical Turk (mTurk) and let three individuals code Trump’s tweets in 2017 into the
following categories: Media, Islam and Terrorism, Party Politics, Immigration, Foreign Policy,
Domestic Policy and Other. We also code the sentiment of each tweet. More specifically, the
same three individuals code the sentiment of each tweet either as “very negative”, “negative’,
“neutral”, “positive” or “very positive”. We recode these categories into a scale from -2 (very
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negative) to 2 (very positive). In our analysis we then use the modal topic and the average
sentiment coded by the three individuals.
Understanding Trump’s Twitter reach. Figure 2.3 shows that Trump has the Twitter
reach to potentially influence a considerable fraction of Americans. Figure 2.3a plots the
monthly number of retweets he received since joining Twitter. It is apparent that the number
of retweets increased with Trump’s presidential run (marked by the vertical line). This
suggests that a large number of people read his tweets. In Figure 2.14 in the online appendix
we additionally show that Trump’s tweets about Muslims are significantly more widely shared
than his tweets about other topics.
In Figure 2.3b, we plot the number of tweets using the hashtags #StopIslam and
#BanIslam, as well as the number of these tweets coming from Trump’s Twitter followers
(see section 2.2.6). To construct these counts, we obtained the Twitter user IDs of all people
who follow Trump on Twitter. The figure shows that the majority of the tweets using these
hashtags come from Trump’s followers. This lends credence to the idea that many people who
harbor anti-Muslim sentiments self-select into following Donald Trump on Twitter, which
exposes them to his tweets.
To provide direct evidence for the spillovers of Trump’s anti-Muslim tweets on his
followers, we collect the tweets for a random 1% sample of Trump’s followers. These over 115
million tweets allow us to investigate if Trump’s followers react to his content about Muslims.
2.2.4 Twitter Data for South by Southwest and Other Festivals
To construct our instrument we collect data using the Twitter application programming
interface (API). In particular, we collect the universe of people following the Twitter account
of SXSW Conference & Festivals (SXSW). This yields 658,240 unique user IDs. For each of
these users, we collect information on their location and the date the account was created. In
line with the findings of Takhteyev et al. (2012), around 75% of Twitter users in the sample
report their geographical location. Previous research suggests that these user locations yield
valid proxies for Twitter usage (e.g. Takhteyev et al., 2012; Haustein and Costas, 2014). As
an alternative measure, we also search for tweets containing the term “SXSW” in the year
2007. We do not search for hashtags, since Twitter only formally adopted these in July 2009.
In total, we find 5,933 tweets mentioning the SXSW festival.
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Figure 2.3: Trump’s Twitter Reach
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#Stopislam #Banislam
Notes: Panel (a) plots the number of monthly retweets (in millions) Trump’s Twitter account
received since he joined the site in 2009. The vertical line marks the start of his presidential
campaign in June 2015. Panel (b) plots the number of tweets containing the hashtags #StopIslam
or #BanIslam sent between 2010 and 2017, which we interpret as clearly expressing negative
sentiment towards Muslims. The orange proportion of the bar indicates the number of these tweets
posted by followers of Trump’s Twitter account.
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To compare Twitter activity at the 2007 SXSW festival to other festivals in the same
year, we additionally collect the tweets and user data for the Austin City Limited Festival,
Burning Man, Coachella, Electric Daisy Festival, New Orleans Jazz and Heritage Festival,
Lollapalooza, Pitchfork Music Festival and the West by Southwest Festival. The full list of
search terms for these festivals can be found in Table 2.15.
Since we are also interested in the impact of the SXSW festival on overall Twitter
activity, we create a proxy for the total number of tweets using the 100 most common English
words for January through March 2007 (the full list of words is reported in Table 2.16). While
this approach does not give us the universe of tweets in this time window, it should serve as a
valid proxy for how many people are using Twitter over time.
2.2.5 Information on Trump’s Golf Trips
Information on Trump’s golf outings was collected by the New York Times (NYT, 2019). The
information covers Trump’s travels and identifies sources indicating that he was in fact golfing
on any given trip. We cross-check these data using information from trumpgolfcount.com
and the official Presidential schedule from the White House. In this process we add a few
additional days of golf. Table 2.17 in the online appendix describes these sources in more
detail; Figure 2.23 graphs the days in 2017 Trump spent golfing, where the darker shade of
orange indicates golf outings longer than three days. More than two thirds of golf days are
on the weekend, although he has also golfed multiple times on all days of the week (also see
Table 2.32 in the online appendix).
2.2.6 Additional Data Sources
We construct a large number of additional variables, which mostly serve as controls. A more
detailed variable description and the relevant data sources can be found in Table 2.9.
County-level variables We collect demographic control variables at the county level from
the United States Census and the American Community Survey. In particular, we use
information on the yearly population, the share of the population by age group, the ethnic
composition of the population, the poverty rate and education levels. Information on a
county’s unemployment rate and industry level employment shares were obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. County-level election results are available from the webpage of
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the MIT Election lab. The number of Muslims in each US county is derived from the 2010
US Religious Census. Additionally, we make use of county-level crime statistics based on
the FBI’s UCR data. Information on TV viewership patterns was collected from Simply
Analytics.
We create proxies for anti-Muslim Twitter content by collecting tweets containing the
hashtags “#BanIslam” or “#StopIslam” from 2010 to 2017. We selected these hashtags
because they are both clearly anti-Muslim and commonly used on Twitter (Miller and Smith,
2017). Following the same procedure as for the SXSW tweets, we assign these tweets to
counties based on the location of the users.
Lastly, we study potential preexisting prejudices and xenophobic sentiments at the
county level based on data on hate groups from the webpage of the Southern Poverty Law
Center (SPLC). The data contain information on the name of the state and city a hate
group is active in. We use this information to assign the hate groups to counties. While the
classification of hate groups is subjective and subject to controversy, the information gathered
by the SPLC is widely used as a proxy for where hate groups are located.40
Time series variables To study the content of cable news, we collect TV news mentions
of Muslims from the TV News Archive of the Internet Archive. We scrape news mentions
for Fox News, CNN and MSNBC based on the same search terms we used for the initial
classification of Trump’s tweets (“sharia”, “refugee”,“mosque”, “muslim”, “islam”). In total
we collect 82,520 news mentions from the start of Trump’s presidential campaign to the end
of 2017.
We are also interested in the overall salience of Islam-related topics on the internet. We
use Google Trends to obtain daily trends for the above search terms for the US. Unfortunately,
Google trends only allows us to collect the daily search interest for a 90 day period. We
therefore separately collect the Google trends in 90 day intervals for the period since Trump’s
presidential campaign commenced. Since Google normalizes the search interest between 0-100
for each 90 day period, we use the weekly search interest, which is available for the period as
a whole to bring the daily search to the same scale. We describe this process in more detail
in Section 2.9.1.
40Note that, as long as the geography of potential misclassification of hate groups by SPLC is random, this
will bias our estimates towards zero.
113
Lastly, we compile information on terror attacks by Islamist from the Global Terrorism
Database. In particular, we calculate the daily number of Islamist terror attacks. We split
terror attacks by their location and consider terror attacks that occur in the US, Europe, or
other locations separately. For the years 2015-2017 our data contain 182 terror attacks.
2.3 Social Media and Anti-Muslim Sentiment
2.3.1 Introductory Correlations
Could social media play a role in the spread of anti-Muslim sentiments starting around the
time of the 2016 presidential campaign? If that were the case, we would expect the increase
in hate crimes documented in Figure 2.1 to be concentrated in areas where many people use





βτ=y · Twitter Usagec + X′cwγ
+ County FE +Week FE + εcw
(2.3)
where the outcome variable is the natural logarithm of anti-Muslim hate crimes in county
c and week w (with one added inside). Twitter Usage is the natural logarithm of the total
number of tweets in a county (also with one added inside). To simplify the interpretation of
the coefficients we standardized the variables to have a mean of zero and standard deviation
of one. The county fixed effects in the regression control for underlying differences in the
number of hate crimes per county, while week fixed effects absorb changes in such crimes that
affect all counties to the same extent. The main regressors of interest are βτ , which measure
the differential change in anti-Muslim hate crimes in counties with higher Twitter usage in
year τ .
Figure 2.4a plots the estimated coefficients of Equation (2.3). The figure reveals that
the increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes starting in 2015 appears to be concentrated in
areas with high Twitter usage. The coefficients for previous years are close to zero and not
significant, which suggests the counties followed similar trends in the pre-period. Given that
all coefficients have been standardized the magnitude of the coefficients indicate that a one
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Figure 2.4: Twitter Usage and the Increase in Anti-Muslim Sentiments
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Notes: These figures plot the coefficients from running event study regressions as in Equation (2.3).
The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of anti-Muslim hate crimes in panel (a) and the
number of posts containing #StopIslam and #BanIslam in panels (b) and (c). We standardized
the variables to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The omitted category is the
year leading up to Trump’s presidential run. The vertical line indicates the approximate start of
Trump’s presidential campaign in June 2015. The shaded area indicates 95% confidence intervals.
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standard deviation increase in Twitter usage is associated with an 0.1 standard deviation
increase in anti-Muslim hate crime.
As corroborating evidence for the spread of anti-Muslim sentiment via Twitter, we
repeat the event study regressions for the hashtags #StopIslam and #BansIslam. Figures
2.4b and 2.4c plots the estimates for these outcome variables. The figures suggest that not
only offline but also online sentiments about Muslims grew disproportionately more negative
in counties with higher social media penetration.
The evidence here suggests a potential connection between anti-Muslim sentiment and
Twitter usage. However, our proxy for Twitter usage is likely correlated with a host of
observable and unobservable factors that might also affect hate crimes. To overcome this
challenge, in the next section we develop an identification strategy to isolate the effect of
social media.
2.3.2 Identification Strategy
The evidence in the previous sections suggests that the increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes
around Trump’s presidential run has been concentrated in areas with high social media usage.
In this section, we address the concern that social media usage may be correlated with other
factors by developing an instrumental variable strategy based on the early diffusion of Twitter.
The starting point is a county-level first-difference model relating the shift in anti-Muslim
hate crimes in mid-2015 to a measure of social media usage:
∆Hate Crimesc = α + β · Twitter Usagec + X′cγ + State FE + εc. (2.4)
As a baseline, ∆Hate Crimes will refer to the log-change of hate crime incidents aimed
at Muslims or other groups (with one added inside) with Trump’s presidential run. The
pre-period is defined as the years from 2010 onward.41 Twitter Usage is the natural logarithm
of tweets sent from a given county, our measure of social media use. All regressions will
control for state fixed effects and dummies for each decile of the population distribution.
Xc is a vector of control variables that further includes demographic controls for
population growth and the share of the population in five-year age buckets; the linear distance
from each county centroid from Austin Texas, the location of the SXSW festival we will
41In further robustness checks we show that our results neither depend on the pre-period we use in the
first-difference nor on the specific functional form. The results also hold for the level of hate crimes after
Trump’s presidential run.
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describe in more detail below; controls for ethnic composition and the share of Muslims;
socioeconomic controls including the share of high school graduates or people with a graduate
degree, the poverty rate, the unemployment rate, local GINI index, the share of uninsured
individuals, the log median household income, the employment shares in eight sectors; media
controls for the viewership share of Fox News, the cable TV spending to population ratio,
and the prime time TV viewership to population ratio; and the county-level vote share of
the Republican party in 2012. Standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the state
level.42
When estimating equation (2) using OLS, the point estimates for β in Equation (2.4)
are likely biased because Twitter usage is not exogenous. In particular, one may be concerned
that the factors driving people to commit hate crimes are correlated with the decision to adopt
social media. This could give rise to alternative interpretations of the graph in Figure 2.4a
and the β estimate in Equation (2.4). To give one example, perhaps the potential perpetrators
of hate crimes live predominantly in areas with a sizable presence of minority groups, and
those areas are also more likely to use Twitter. In that case, the period around Trump’s
campaign start could still be interpreted as a trigger point for anti-Muslim sentiments, but it
is not clear whether or to what extent social media plays a role.
To circumvent this issue, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the early adoption
of Twitter in the United States. More precisely, we make use of the fact that Twitter’s
popularity reached a tipping point at the SXSW conference and festival in 2007. During the
event, the daily volume of tweets increased from around 20,000 to 60,000 (Gawker, 2007).
Figure 2.5a gives a first indication that SXSW may have led to a trend break in the success
of Twitter: we see a clear spike of tweets about the event during the SXSW conference in
mid-March 2007, followed by an upward shift in the growth of the total number of tweets.
While total tweets grew by 60% from February to March, this growth accelerated to over 240%
from March to April. March 2007 is also a clear outlier in the number of SXSW followers
that signed up to Twitter (see 2.21 in the online appendix).
A number of facts suggest that the early adopters at SXSW were key to Twitter’s rise.
As a first indication, in 2007 there were more tweets about SXSW than about other major
festivals (see Figure 2.5b).43 This is noteworthy because of the lower attendance at SXSW
42In Table 2.28 in the online appendix, we show that our results also hold using alternative ways to construct
standard errors.
43This pattern also holds when we consider tweets about the festivals for the whole of 2007 (see Figure 2.20).
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Figure 2.5: South by Southwest (SXSW) 2007 and the Spread of Twitter
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Notes: Panel (a) plot the total number of tweets and the number of tweets containing the term
SXSW over time, smoothed using a 7-day moving average. The number of tweets on a given day is
based on the 100 most common English words (see Table 2.16). Panel (b) plots the number of
tweets mentioning major festivals in 2007 in a 14 day window before and after the event.
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Interactive. We can also see that the spread of Twitter across counties followed the early
adopters. To show this, we run event study panel regressions to compare Twitter activity in
counties with and without new SXSW followers in March 2007. Figure 2.6 plots the results.
Areas with early adopters at SXSW did not exhibit a higher growth rate of Twitter activity
prior to SXSW Interactive 2007 but the growth rate increased in its aftermath. Quantitatively,
counties with a one standard deviation higher number of SXSW followers in March (1.91)
increased their local twitter activity by 10% of a standard deviation in April compared to
February 2007.































































































Notes: This figure plots the estimates of βτ from the panel event study regression Log(1 +
# of tweets) =
∑
βτSXSW followers,March 2007c×Weekτ +
∑
δτSXSW followers, Prec×
Weekτ + County FE + Week FE + εcw. The number of tweets in a given county and week is
based on the 100 most common English words. We standardize the variables to have a mean of
zero and standard deviation of one. Standard errors are clustered by state.
We exploit that this pattern of technology adoption persists until today. As we will show
below, the number of SXSW followers in a county who registered during the festival period
are predictive of Twitter penetration across US counties. This is in line with the literature on
the path dependence of technology adoption (e.g. Arthur, 1989, 1994; Liebowitz and Margolis,
1999; Arrow, 2000). Crucially, this is still true after controlling for the number of SXSW
followers in a county prior to the tipping point in March 2007, or alternatively for users
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tweeting about the much more popular festivals Coachella, Burning Man, and Lollapalooza in
the same year.
The historical diffusion of Twitter gives rise to a difference-in-difference instrumental
variable framework. We collapse the time dimension into an IV setting where the first stage
equation is given by:
Twitter Usagec = α + δ1 · SXSW followers, March 2007c
+ δ2 · SXSW followers, Prec
+ X′cψ + State FE + ξc,
(2.5)
where SXSW followers, March 2007 is the number of SXSW followers in county c that
joined Twitter in March 2007, which serves as the excluded instrument. SXSW followers, Pre
are followers that joined before the festival at any point in 2006. This controls allows us to
address the concern of inherent differences of counties with SXSW followers.44
Similar to Enikolopov et al. (2020), the identifying assumption underlying our empirical
strategy is that, conditional on a large number of county characteristics, the decision to
start following SXSW in March 2007 rather than in the months before drives increases in
anti-Muslim sentiments with the 2016 presidential campaign only through the diffusion of
Twitter usage.45 Three pieces of evidence suggest that this assumption is reasonable. First, as
shown above, counties with Twitter adopters around SXSW did not differ in Twitter adoption
prior to the festival. This suggests that these counties are not inherently different. Second, a
comparison of the Twitter profiles of users signing up for Twitter around SXSW with those
who signed up before suggests that they are highly similar. Table 2.21 shows that users’ first
names and the terms they use to describe themselves are almost indistinguishable between
these two groups. The correlation of words mentioned in the “bio” of these groups is 0.92.
Third, the home counties of SXSW followers who signed up during the 2007 event do not
systematically differ in observable characteristics from those of users who signed up before
(see Table 2.20).
Figure 2.13 in the online appendix plots the distribution of our proxy of new SXSW
followers in March 2007 across US counties. People from 155 counties were early adopters
44In the robustness section below, we consider a large range of alternative control sets based on different
time periods to hold selection into social media usage constant.
45With the alternative festival controls, the assumption is similar in that attending SXSW rather than
other festivals in 2007 should only affect outcomes through this social media adoption channel.
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of Twitter at or around the time of SXSW. Table 2.22, also in the online appendix, plots
the correlation coefficients between the county-level SXSW measures and those for the other
festivals. Although these variables are strongly correlated, as one would expect, there is
enough variation in the locations of SXSW followers we can exploit in our empirical strategy.
In robustness exercises, we consider a large range of alternative SXSW metrics, some of which
show a considerably lower correlation between “treatment” and “control” group.
Since our baseline outcome variable is differenced over time, we also require that the
parallel trends assumption holds. We already saw in Figure 2.4a above that hate crimes
against Muslims disproportionately increased in areas with high Twitter usage only after
Trump’s presidential campaign started. In the online appendix in Figure 2.16 and Figure 2.19,
we provide additional reduced form evidence in support of parallel trends when comparing
areas with and without users that likely attended SXSW in March 2007.
2.3.3 South by Southwest and Twitter Adoption: First Stage Re-
sults
To assess whether the initial diffusion of Twitter at SXSW still matters for social media use
today, we report the results of estimating the first stage Equation (2.5) in Table 2.1. We
can see that across the board the number of new Twitter users in March 2007 who followed
SXSW is highly predictive of Twitter usage today. The point estimates are always statistically
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for SXSW followers in the months prior to the 2007
event is not statistically significant as soon as we control for observable county characteristics.
Indeed, an F -test for the equality of coefficients suggests that the March 2007 and pre-period
estimates are also statistically different from each other. Importantly, the coefficient estimates
for March are highly stable and do not depend on the included covariates. Quantitatively,
the estimate of 0.362 in column 8 implies that a one standard deviation increase in the log
number of new SXSW followers in March (0.32) is associated with 12% higher Twitter usage
today. The estimated effect based on the pre-period estimate implies 1% more users, which is
not distinguishable from zero.
Based on these estimates and the event study plot in 2.6, we conclude that county-level
differences in the early adoption of Twitter spread through the 2007 SXSW conference and
festival are a reliable predictor of Twitter usage in the United States today. Because the
location of early adopters in the period before the festival does not predict Twitter usage, it is
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unlikely that this result is driven by selection into following the SXSW festival’s Twitter page.
In the next sections, we will conduct more robustness checks to test the validity of this insight
and will employ the strong first stage result to estimate the effect of social media propagation
on the recent rise in anti-minority sentiments, particularly those aimed at Muslims.
2.4 Main Results
2.4.1 Reduced Form Estimates
We next turn to the reduced form estimation results for the change in hate crimes against
Muslims around Trump’s presidential campaign start. Table 2.2 presents these results. Across
a large number of different specifications, we find that the early adoption of Twitter – measured
by the number of SXSW followers who joined Twitter in March 2007 – is associated with an
increase in hate crimes against Muslims. The estimates for the March coefficient are strikingly
similar irrespective of the included control variables. The estimates on new SXSW followers
in previous months are not statistically significant and considerably smaller.46
Figure 2.16 in the online appendix plots the reduced form estimates from difference-in-
difference panel regression of the type in Equation (2.3). Note that this regression also controls
for the locations of SXSW followers in previous months interacted with year fixed effects. As
above, we find that hate crimes against Muslims did not disproportionately increase in areas
with new SXSW followers in March 2007 prior to the period of Trump’s presidential campaign.
Afterwards, however, these counties experienced a large upward shift in such incidents.
Taken together, we interpret these results as first evidence that social media may play a
role in the propagation of hate crimes as a result of Donald Trump’s campaign. Because we
control for the number of SXSW followers in the months before SXSW 2007, these results
are unlikely to be driven by a selection of individuals from areas prone to hate crimes into
participation in that particular festival. In the next sections, we provide the formal two stage
least squares estimates and conduct further robustness checks in support of this interpretation.
2.4.2 IV Estimates
The results in the previous section can be interpreted as evidence that social media plays a
role in the recent increase in hate crimes in the United States. In this section, we use the
46Note that the standard deviation of these pre-SXSW users is around half that of the March 2007 variable.
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proxy for new SXSW followers in March 2007 as an instrument for Twitter usage across
the US today, while holding interest in SXSW prior to the key event constant to alleviate
selection concerns.
Table 2.3 provides two sets of results. In panel A, we plot the OLS results from
regressions of the change in hate crimes against Muslims on our measure of Twitter usage. In
panel B, we report the 2SLS results and a number of diagnostic tests. The results suggest
that social media penetration, measured by Twitter usage, is positively associated with the
increase in hate crimes against Muslims. The 2SLS estimates in column 8 imply that a one
standard deviation increase in Twitter usage (1.91) is associated with a 38% larger increase
in hate crimes after Trump’s presidential campaign launched.
A well-known concern with IV estimation is the weak instruments problem, which can
lead to biased point estimates. We believe that our estimation does not suffer from a weak
first stage for three reasons. First, the robust F -statistic for the excluded regressor ranges
between 41 and 68 in columns 1 through 8.47 Second, the values of the F -statistic are above
the critical values to reject the null hypothesis of a 5% potential bias with 5% statistical
significance derived in Olea and Pflueger (2013), which is 37.42. These authors extend the
well-known thresholds of Stock and Yogo (2005) to the case of heteroskedasticity-robust and,
relevant in our case, clustered standard errors.
We also assess the significance of our main estimates using confidence sets based on
test inversion that are valid whether or not instruments are weak. For the case of a single
instrument we study here, Andrews et al. (2019) recommend reporting Anderson-Rubin
(AR) confidence sets that are efficient and robust to weak identification (Anderson et al.,
1949). Andrews (2018) develops a two-step approach to construct these confidence sets that
is implemented in Stata by Sun (2018). Basing inference on this two-step approach sidesteps
the issue that the usually reported (Wald) confidence intervals for 2SLS estimates can exhibit
large coverage distortions. This is because AR confidence sets allow for inference without
assessing the strength of first-stage results in a separate initial step. As such, we can determine
whether our second stage coefficients are likely to be non-zero even if our instrument was
indeed weak. Reassuringly, the AR confidence sets reported below the (instrumented) Twitter
usage in panel B always exclude zero.
47Note that because the model is just-identified, the robust F -statistic (sometimes also called Kleibergen-
Paap) is equivalent to the effective F -statistic derived in Olea and Pflueger (2013).
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Because our estimations do not appear to suffer from a weak instrument problem, we can
use the comparison of the OLS and 2SLS estimates to assess whether the selection of individuals
into social media adoption is positively or negatively correlated with the incidence of hate
crimes. In other words, we can test whether the OLS estimates are upward or downward
biased. Across all specifications in Table 2.3, the OLS estimates are highly statistically
significant, but considerably smaller than those obtained using 2SLS. This difference suggests
negative selection into social media usage. To give one example, if people in particularly
xenophobic areas commit more hate crimes but are less likely to use Twitter, the OLS estimate
would be downward biased. This selection effect is also consistent with Enikolopov et al.
(2020): for the case of social media and protest participation in Russia, they find much larger
IV estimates compared to OLS.48
In Table 2.27 in the online appendix, we investigate which types of hate crimes increased
particularly in areas with higher social media usage. It turns out that our results seem to
be almost entirely driven by a rise in assaults. This makes it unlikely that we are capturing
changes in reporting rather than the actual incidence of hate crimes, since we have no reason
to expect reporting changes to be limited to particularly severe cases. We relegate a more
extensive discussion of reporting changes to Section 2.7
A conceptual question raised by these estimates is the extent to which any potential
causal effect of social media can be directly attributed to Twitter, rather than other platforms.
While the initial diffusion through SXSW in 2007 was probably specific to Twitter, there
were likely significant spillovers in the adoption of other social media platforms. Since we only
observe the equilibrium outcome of these spillovers today, our estimates might not identify
a pure “Twitter effect”. What matters for the interpretation of our estimates is that this
diffusion is limited to social media, which we believe is plausible.
2.4.3 Robustness
We consider a range of sensitivity checks to validate the robustness of our main findings. We
begin by reporting an additional set of results that test alternative ways to account for the
selection of users into events such as SXSW. In particular, we replace the control variables
for new followers of SXSW at any point in 2006 with users tweeting about other festivals in
2007 that are, in many respects, very similar to SXSW. We consider tweets about three of
48Another interpretation of the 2SLS estimate is that counties with more SXSW followers that signed up in
March 2007 have a higher local average treatment effect (LATE).
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the most popular festivals in the United States: Coachella, Burning Man, and Lollapalooza.
More precisely, we define control variables that capture the log number of users from each
county that tweeted about these festivals in the month of 2007 in which they were held.
Table 2.24 in the online appendix reports the results for the reduced form and 2SLS
estimations with these alternative controls in panel B and C, respectively. To aid comparison,
we again plot the OLS results in panel A. As before, we find that the impact of Twitter usage
on changes in anti-Muslim hate crimes is highly statistically significant throughout. Crucially,
the log number of users tweeting about the other festivals is statistically insignificant, which
is another indication that we are not merely capturing a selection of particular people into
areas with hate crimes and high Twitter usage. The estimates and F -statistics for the 2SLS
results are somewhat larger than the baseline findings in Table 2.3.
We also consider alternative transformations of the SXSW variables in Table 2.26 in the
online appendix. In column 1, we begin by showing that the results also hold when dropping
the SXSW control, which makes the results somewhat stronger. In columns 3 through 6, we
consider alternative time periods for the pre-period variable or alternatively control for the
individual months. Columns 7 through 11 replace the SXSW follower variables with dummies
for counties in which we can locate any tweet about SXSW in March 2007 or previous periods.
Importantly, these specifications vary widely in the number of “treatment” and “control”
counties, as well as the correlation between the treatment and control SXSW variables. Our
results are robust throughout, which suggests our findings are not driven by any particular
specification.
We also use alternative metrics of Twitter usage in Table 2.25 in the online appendix.
We consider two survey measures of Twitter usage provided by GfK Mediamark Research &
Intelligence (via SimplyAnalytics), as well as two alternative transformations of the GESIS
Twitter data (only tweets before June 2015 or the number of Twitter users, rather than the
number of tweets). All of these measures yield similar estimates.
In Table 2.4, we present additional robustness checks. In column 1, we drop state fixed
effects, which makes little difference to the point estimates. In column 2, we consider the
change in anti-Muslim hate crimes since 1990 (rather than 2010); this yields larger estimates
throughout. In column 3, we replace the change in hate crimes with the log number of hate
crimes after Trump’s presidential run as dependent variable. This also yields significant
estimates.
In columns 4 through 6 of Table 2.4, we address the concern that anti-Muslim hate
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crimes reported by the FBI mainly occur in a relatively small fraction of all counties. In
column 4, we begin by dropping all counties that report a zero change in anti-Muslim hate
crimes between 2010 and 2017. Because this applies to the majority of counties, the sample
size shrinks considerably. One way to think about this estimation is that it captures the
intensive margin of hate crimes. Despite the drop in observations, our estimates remain
statistically significant. In column 5, we next drop counties for which the FBI always reports
zero hate crimes. Reporting may be less reliable for these counties. As it turns out, this
exclusion makes little difference for our estimates. As a last exercise, we drop all counties
for which the (rounded) estimated share of Muslims in the total population is zero from the
sample in column 6.49 Again, the results we obtain in this sample are very similar to those in
the main sample.
In column 7, we weight all estimates by population, which makes little difference to
the results. In column 8, we restrict the sample to neighbouring counties where one has no
new SXSW followers in March 2007 and the other one has at least one. This is to purge the
estimates of potential unobserved local confounders. This yields similar estimates. At last,
in column 9, we transform the dependent variable into an index equal to 1 for increases in
anti-Muslim hate crimes, 0 for no change, and −1 for decreases; again, our findings remain
similar.
2.4.4 Social Media and Changes in Other Hate Crimes
Up to this point, we have focused on changes in anti-Muslim hate crimes, motivated by the
fact we found little change in the frequency of other types of hate crimes around the start
of Trump’s presidential campaign in the FBI data. However, one might expect Trump’s
presidential run to also affect other categories of hate crimes, in particular anti-Hispanic
incidents.50 If social media plays a role, such incidents may have become more common in
areas with high Twitter usage even if their total number remained unchanged.
In Table 2.5, we consider this possibility empirically by replacing the dependent variable
with the log change in hate crimes targeting on Hispanic ethnicity, other ethnicities, race,
49Although the Religious Census reports no Muslims living in these counties, this might be the artifact of a
very small number, rather than an actual zero.
50In his presidential campaign announcement speech, Trump infamously singled out Hispanics and Arab
Muslims: “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. ... They’re bringing drugs. They’re
bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. ... They’re sending us not the right
people. It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South and Latin America, and it’s
coming probably – probably – from the Middle East.”
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sexual orientation or religion (excluding anti-Muslim bias). We also consider hate crime data
from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) as an alternative data source in column 7. The
ADL only appear to report a large number of hate crimes from 2016 on, so we focus on the
level rather than the change in hate crimes.51
Overall, we also find a role for social media in explaining increases in the total number
of hate crimes and those targeting Hispanics, the other minority group frequently singled out
by Donald Trump. However, only anti-Muslim hate crimes show a consistent pattern across
the OLS and 2SLS estimates. There is little evidence for a reallocation of other hate crimes
towards areas with higher Twitter usage. In the 2SLS estimation, a one standard deviation
increase in Twitter usage is associated with a 35% larger increase in total hate crimes, and
a 33% larger increase for incidents targeting Hispanics.52 The difference of these estimates
compared to the OLS results likely arises because of selection: social media, and Twitter
in particular, is likely adopted more by areas with more technologically-savvy people who
are probably less likely to commit hate crimes. This creates a downward bias for the OLS
estimates.
2.4.5 Heterogeneous Effects: Social Media and Pre-Existing Bias
The results in the previous sections raise the question whether exposure to social media is
changing people’s beliefs about Muslims or if social media rather reinforces existing prejudices.
To address this question, we investigate whether the effect of Twitter usage is driven by
counties that are more likely to be susceptible to anti-Muslim messaging.
In particular, we repeat the event study regressions from Section 2.3.1 and split counties
by whether the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) identifies at least one hate group. Note
that these sample splits do not estimate whether anti-Muslim hate crimes increased in counties
with hate groups but rather whether Twitter usage has a different impact in these counties.
Figure 2.7 plots the estimated coefficients from this exercise.53 We find that higher
Twitter usage is only associated with more anti-Muslim hate crime in counties with hate
groups. In contrast, counties with high Twitter usage but no hate group continue to follow
the same trajectory as low Twitter usage counties. Quantitatively, among the counties with
51In unreported results, we find similar results using a measure of the change in local hate crimes as reported
by ADL.
52Figure 2.17 and Figure 2.18 in the online appendix plot the OLS and reduced form event study graphs.
53To reduce clutter, the figures report the estimated coefficients without confidence bands. We report the
full regression results with standard errors in Table 2.29 in the online appendix.
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at least one hate group a one standard deviation increase in Twitter usage is associated
with a 0.6 standard deviation increase in anti-Muslim hate crime. In Panel (b), we provide
similar evidence for counties that are above the 90th percentile of hate crime per capita (all
motivating biases) in the pre-period. We again observe that the increase in anti-Muslim hate
crimes is driven by counties with high Twitter usage and pre-existing biases.
Taken together, the findings are at least some evidence that social media did not
necessarily change people’s beliefs, but rather triggered existing negative attitudes towards
Muslims around the time Trump started his presidential run. This is consistent with the
view that people infer information about the social acceptability of viewpoints and actions
based on what they see online. As such, it appears possible that after observing increased
anti-Muslim rhetoric on Twitter (as documented above), already radicalized individuals might
have become more willing to commit violent acts against Muslims in real life. If this is the
case, spikes in anti-Muslim sentiment on social media might work as “triggers”, a possibility
we investigate in the next section.
It is also worth noting that the sample splits are another indication that we are unlikely
to capture changes in the propensity to report hate crimes rather than an actual increase in
incidents. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 2.7.
2.5 Trump’s Tweets and Anti-Muslim Sentiment
The previous section suggests that social media may have played a role in the spread of
anti-Muslim sentiment associated with the start of the Trump campaign. An often-voiced
hypothesis is that Trump actively contributes to anti-Muslim sentiment through his incendiary
comments on Twitter. Indeed, there is some existing evidence that influential individuals can
have a disproportionate effect on public opinion (e.g. Beaman et al., 2009; Bursztyn et al., c;
Alatas et al.).
We attempt to shed some light on this mechanism by analyzing the time series relationship
between Trump’s tweets about Muslims, anti-Muslim hate crimes, and media attention. We
attempt to get at the issue of causality by again leveraging an instrumental variable. The
main purpose is to provide evidence for a channel through which social media could contribute
to a climate that enables hate crimes and investigate the importance of prominent only figures.
Table 2.31 and Table 2.37 plot the summary statistics.
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Figure 2.7: Heterogenous Effects of Twitter Usage
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Notes: These figure plot the coefficients of running panel event study regressions as in Equation (2.3).
We again standardized the variables to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
Equation (2.3) is estimated separately for counties with and without at least one hate group as
defined by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). In panel (b) we split counties at the 90th
percentile of the number of hate crimes per capita in the pre-period.
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2.5.1 Trump Tweets and Hate Crimes
If there is a relationship between Trump’s Twitter activity and physical hate crimes, the
timing of both should coincide. We thus begin by plotting the number of Trump’s tweets
about Islam-related topics and anti-Muslim incidents over time in Figure 2.8. We define these
tweets based on a careful reading of Trump’s Twitter feed, combined with a machine learning
algorithm; see the data section and online appendix Table 2.16 for more details. Since the
daily number of tweets is highly volatile, we plot the 14-day moving average of the series;
collapsing the data on the weekly level looks very similar (unreported).
It is immediately apparent that Trump’s tweets about Muslims and anti-Muslim hate
crimes are highly correlated. This correlation could reflect that Trump reacts to US-wide
anti-Muslim sentiments driven by observable and unobservable factors, e.g. terrorist attacks.
It could also be that Trump’s tweets themselves contribute to a climate that enables hate
crimes. Clearly, we cannot disentangle these possibilities using the graphical evidence from
the data nor using a simple OLS regression of hate crimes on tweets.
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Notes: This figure plots the daily time series of anti-Muslim hate crime and Trump’s tweets about
Muslims, smoothed using a 14-day moving average. The time period covers the start of Trump’s
presidential campaign in June 2015 until the end of 2017.
We propose an instrumental variable strategy to get around the most obvious reverse
causality concerns. In particular, we leverage Trump’s passion for golf: in 2017 alone, Trump
likely golfed on 92 days. As it turns out, the data suggest a strong link between Trump’s
golf outings and his Twitter feed: Figure 2.9 shows that while the total number of tweets he
sends are unchanged on golf days, the content of his tweets sharply tilts towards negative,
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Muslim-related rhetoric. In 2017, 15 out of the 34 tweets we classify as negatively mentioning
Muslims were sent on golf days. In Figure 2.25 in the online appendix, we show that the
topic shift is explained by a drop in policy-related tweets and more frequent mentions of
Muslims and the media. Figure 2.26 shows that his tweets also become more negative in
sentiment. One intuitive explanation for this pattern is that once Trump is away from the
White House, his attention shifts away from policy issues. Another influence on Trump’s social
media activity that is likely stronger on golf days is his social media manager Dan Scavino,
who is know to have suggested tweets and topics to Trump (Edwards, 2018). Figure 2.27 in
the online appendix provides additional evidence that Trump’s daily schedule influences the
content of his tweets. In particular, we show that Trump is more likely to tweet about foreign
politics when he is abroad and more likely to tweet about domestic and party politics on days
he receives a policy briefing.
Figure 2.9: Trump’s Twitter Activity, Split by Golf Days





















































Notes: These figures plot the average daily number of Trump’s tweets, split by whether he plays
golf on a given day in 2017. Panel (a) reports the average number of tweets about Muslims, panel
(b) reports the total number of tweets.
Because the President’s schedule is to some extent predetermined to accommodate
security concerns and meetings, it is plausibly exogenous with respect to hate crimes against
Muslims. What matters for our identification strategy is that Trump’s golf outings are not
systematically correlated with unobservable anti-Muslim sentiment. One disadvantage of this
strategy is that we can only analyze 2017, for which we have both details about Trump’s
schedule and data on hate crimes. We also present OLS regressions for the IV sample and
using the full time period since Trump joined Twitter in 2009 below.
More formally, we run time series regressions using the following framework:
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Hate Crimest+h = α + β ·Muslim Trump Tweetst + X′tγ + εt (2.6)
Muslim Trump Tweetst = α + δ · I[Trump golfs]t + X′tψ + ξt (2.7)
The dependent variable in equation (4) is the natural logarithm of US-wide hate crimes
against Muslims at day t+ h (with one added inside). The main regressor of interest is the
natural logarithm of the number of Donald Trump’s Muslim tweets (again with one added
inside). In the baseline specification, the vector Xt includes time trends and a full set of
day-of-week as well as year-month fixed effects.
Naively estimating equation (4) would not be informative about whether Trump’s
Twitter activity might contribute to driving sentiments because his tweets cannot be re-
garded as random. We will thus instrument for tweets about Muslims in equation (5) using
I[Trump golfs]t, an indicator variable that is 1 for days on which Trump plays golf (see
Section 2.2 for more details). We base inference on Newey-West standard errors that allow
for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
The appropriate choice of the prediction horizon h depends on the lead-lag relationship
between Trump’s tweets and real-life hate crimes. We plot the result from estimating equation
(4) with OLS using values for h from −4 to 4 in panel (a) of Figure 2.10. As we can see,
the log number of anti-Muslim hate crimes is essentially flat prior to Trump’s tweets and
subsequently rises to its peak in T+2. In our baseline regressions, we will thus set h to 2.
We repeat the baseline estimations for different time windows in Table 2.35 in the online
appendix. Panel (b) also plots the dynamic relationship between Trump’s golf outings and
tweets about Muslims. We can see that his tweets only increase on the days he golfs, with no
similar spikes before and after.
Table 2.6 presents the regression results of this exercise. We plot the OLS coefficients in
panel A, first stage coefficients in panel B, reduced form coefficients in panel C, and the 2SLS
estimation in panel D. Across the different specifications, the estimations suggest a clear link
between Trump’s tweets about Muslims and subsequent real-life hate crimes. Notably, the
reduced form and 2SLS coefficients are almost fully unchanged when we include controls for
measures of the salience of Muslim-related topics based on Google searches and the number
of mentions on the big three TV networks (Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC). Taken at face
value, this indicates that his golf outings are indeed not timed to coincide with periods of
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Figure 2.10: Time Series Correlations
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Notes: These figures plot the dynamic correlations for equations 4 and 5 for values of h ranging
between −4 and 4. Panel (a) plots the correlation of Trump’s tweets about Islam-related topics and
anti-Muslim hate crimes (both in natural logarithm). Panel (b) plots the correlation of Trump’s
golf outings with the log number of his Islam-related tweets. T indicates the date of tweets about
Muslims or golfing (h = 0). All regressions include time trends; a full set of day of week and
year-month dummies; and four lags of dummies for the incidence of terror attacks in the US,
Europe, and the rest of the world. The sample is 2017. The shaded areas are 95% confidence
intervals based on Newey-West standard errors.
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high Muslim salience.
As mentioned above, a concern with instrumental variable estimation is the weak
instruments problem. Because we only have one year of data to work with, this is a particular
challenge in our setting. However, two pieces of information suggest that our estimates are
meaningful. First, the robust F -statistics we find are consistently above the widely used linear
IV rule of thumb of 10. Most of them are above the critical value for a worst case bias of
30% (at 5% statistical significance) using the cutoffs from Olea and Pflueger (2013). Second,
the Anderson-Rubin confidence sets constructed using the two-step approach proposed in
Andrews (2018) always exclude a zero estimate even if we assume that the instrument is
weak. The reduced form and 2SLS results thus suggest that Trump’s tweets could indeed be
a contributing factor triggering potential perpetrators to commit real-life hate crimes.
To get a sense of the implied magnitudes, consider the estimate in column 7 of panel
D Table 2.6. The coefficient of 1.659 implies that a one standard deviation increase in the
log number of tweets about Muslims (0.25) is associated with a 41 log-point increase in hate
crimes. This effect is large and, importantly, much larger than the OLS estimate of 0.116. An
obvious explanation for this difference would be the presence of a weak instrument. However,
given that the diagnostic tests discussed above are relatively encouraging, another possibility
is that unobserved third factors lead to a downward bias of the OLS estimates. For example,
Trump’s tweets about Muslims might coincide with periods of low pre-existing anti-Muslim
sentiment. In that case, the relationship between his tweets and hate crimes estimated via
OLS would be downward biased because it conflates the true Trump effect with low general
anti-Muslim sentiment. This explanation is also consistent with the finding that controlling
for general attention paid to Muslims or terror attacks in columns 4 through 6 increases the
point estimates relative to the baseline specification.
A limitation of these findings is that they are limited to the year 2017. In Table 2.38
in the online appendix, we re-run the OLS estimation for the entire period since Trump’s
first tweet in 2009 and split the sample into the period before and after the launch of his
presidential run on June 16, 2015. We find very similar OLS estimates on his tweets about
Muslims, but only after the start of his presidential campaign. For the much longer period
from 2009 to mid-2015, his tweets seem to be uncorrelated with anti-Muslim hate crimes.
While many factors may explain this finding, it is at least some indication that we are not
capturing a phenomenon that is limited to a single year.
In Table 2.33 in the online appendix, we report more robustness results. Our results
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remain largely unchanged when we control for more lags of the dependent variable to capture
stronger serial correlation in hate crimes. We further experiment with additional controls
for the total length of Trump’s golf outings in column 3, a control if Trump golfed in the
previous week (column 4), or alternative definitions of the golf dummy in columns 6 and 7.
Our results are also robust to using a dummy for days with any Islam-related tweet from
Trump (column 5).
Given the relatively short sample period, how likely would it be to find an effect if we
picked golf days at random? Figure 2.24 reports the results of a randomization test for the
first stage regression of Trump’s tweets about Muslims on a golf dummy, where we randomly
pick 92 golf days in 2017 (except the ones used in the actual variable). The distribution of
the resulting t-statistics of the golf day dummy suggests that none of the placebo coefficients
are close to our estimate.
We further investigate which type of anti-Muslim hate crimes drive our results. Based
on the most common criteria in the FBI data, we divide anti-Muslim incidents into vandalism,
theft, burglary, robbery, and assault. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 2.34
in the online appendix. Our high-frequency results appear to be mainly driven by cases of
vandalism.54
As a simple validation exercise, we also investigate whether Trump’s messages about
Muslims are also correlated with hate crimes against other minorities. In particular, we
consider incidents motivated by ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, or religions other than
Islam. Table 2.39 plots the predictive ability of Trump’s tweets about Islam-related topics for
these different types of hate crimes. We only find clear-cut correlations with crimes against
Muslims, not other hate crimes. This suggests that we are not merely capturing anti-minority
sentiment, but rather something Muslim-specific. We also replicate this finding using simple
OLS regressions for the full sample in Table 2.40. Again, we find that only hate crimes
targeting Muslims are correlated with Trump’s anti-Muslim tweets; the correlation with other
types of hate crimes is close to zero, both before and after the start of his presidential run.
54Note that this does not stand in contradiction to our cross-sectional results, for which we find the largest
role for assault. The daily variation we exploit here likely picks up more spontaneous anti-Muslim incidents
relative to the medium-term effects in the cross-section.
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2.5.2 Trump Tweets and Twitter Spillovers
We next provide evidence for the fact that Trump’s negative tweets about Muslims have a
direct effect on his followers. In particular, we analyze if Trump’s followers become more
willing to express anti-Muslim content. For this analysis we use more than 115 million tweets
drawn from a random 1% sample of Trump’s followers (around 630,000 users). In this dataset,
we identify tweets that are retweets of Trump’s negative content about Muslims, tweets that
refer to Muslim-related topics but are not retweets of Trump, and tweets that contain the
hashtag #BanIslam.
We continue to run time series regressions of the type in equation (4). To start, we plot
dynamic correlations in Figure 2.11, where the dependent variables are different measures
of tweets (in natural logarithm). The results show a clear pattern. Trump’s negative tweets
about Muslims are not only widely shared by his followers over the next days but also
systematically followed by a spike in new content about Muslims. The time series pattern
suggests no increase of anti-Muslim sentiment before Trump’s tweets.
Columns 1 through 3 in Table 2.7 provide evidence that these patterns also hold when
we instrument for the tweets using golf days. We focus on contemporaneous correlations, as
suggested by the pattern in Figure 2.11. The reduced form and 2SLS specifications are highly
statistically significant, and the weak IV confidence sets always clearly exclude zero. The
2SLS estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in Trump’s Muslim tweets
(0.25) is followed by a doubling of retweets and an almost 30% increase in new messages about
Muslims that do not mention Trump. They are also followed by a 58% increase in the use of
the hashtag #BanIslam by Trump followers.
These results lend credence to the idea that Trump’s tweets are trigger points for
anti-Muslim sentiment among his followers. The willingness of Trump’s followers to produce
their own anti-Muslim messages speaks to changes in the perceived acceptability of such
content after a tweet by the president.
2.5.3 Trump Tweets and the News Cycle
As a last time series exercise, we ask whether Trump’s tweets about Muslims may have the
ability to affect the news cycle. This is important to understand because, unlike for the social
media channel we study here, there is ample evidence that other types of media can persuade
people to participate in spontaneous, potentially violent outbursts (see e.g. DellaVigna and
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Figure 2.11: Spillovers of Trump’s Tweets to His Followers






-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Days since Trump's tweet about Muslims






-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Days since Trump's tweet about Muslims
Notes: These figures plot the dynamic correlations for equations 4 and 5 for values of h ranging
between −4 and 4. Panel (a) plots the correlation of Trump’s tweets about Islam-related topics
and the retweets this tweets by Trump’s followers (both in natural logarithm). Panel (b) plots the
correlation of Trump’s tweets about Islam-related topics and the self-produced anti-Muslim tweets
by Trump’s followers. T indicates the date of tweets about Muslims (h = 0). All regressions include
a full set of day of week and year-month dummies; and four lags of dummies for the incidence of
terror attacks in the US, Europe, and the rest of the world. The sample is 2017. The shaded areas
are 95% confidence intervals based on Newey-West standard errors.
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Gentzkow, 2010; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). As such, one obvious channel through which social
media may affect offline outcomes is through influencing what other media report on. Indeed,
it has been widely recognized that Twitter has become an important dissemination channel
for journalists (Willnat et al., 2019); some estimates suggest that up to a quarter of Twitter
users may be working for media outlets (Kamps, 2015).
We investigate the effect of Trump’s tweets on media coverage using transcript data
from the TV News Archive. In particular, we replace the dependent variable in equation (4)
with the log number of mentions of Muslim-related topics on a given day by the three major
cable news stations Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC. Columns 4 through 7 in Table 2.7 present
the results of this exercise. Because we find a more immediate correlation between Trump’s
Twitter activity and news coverage, we report specifications with h = 0 as the prediction
horizon.
Trump’s tweets about Muslims are highly correlated with TV mentions in the OLS,
reduced form, and 2SLS regressions. While the 2SLS estimates are still considerably larger
than those obtained from OLS, they are less so than for the hate crime estimates. For overall
news coverage in column 2, for example, we find that a one standard deviation increase in
Muslim Trump tweets (0.25) is associated with a 74% increase in news coverage.
However, we urge caution in interpreting these results due to the short sample period.
Nevertheless, the F -statistics are almost uniformly above the rule-of-thumb of 10, and
mostly above the 12.04 threshold for a maximum 30% coefficient bias with 5% statistical
significance derived in Olea and Pflueger (2013). Perhaps more importantly, the Anderson-
Rubin confidence sets always clearly exclude zero.
We also consider heterogeneity across news stations. The correlation of instrumented
Trump tweets with TV mentions appears to be strongest for Fox News (see column 5). Indeed,
for CNN and MSNBC (columns 6 and 7), a zero effect is well within the AR confidence sets.
This is interesting because Fox News is well-known to be supportive of Trump, following
a longer term move towards more Republican-friendly reporting (Martin and Yurukoglu,
2017). This might allow Trump’s comments to be broadcast uncritically and even more widely
through the channel’s considerable reach. Taken together, this suggests that social media may
affect the news cycle, which could be one potential trigger point for potential perpetrators of
hate crimes.
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2.6 Panel Evidence: Trump’s Tweets and Twitter Us-
age
As the last part of our analysis, we combine the cross sectional and time series evidence. If
Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric spreads through Twitter, we should observe large increases in
anti-Muslim hate crime in counties with higher Twitter usage. We investigate this hypothesis
with the following regression specification:
Hate Crimescd = β · Twitter Usagec ×Muslim Trump Tweetsd
+ X′cdγ + County FE +Day FE + εcd
(2.8)
where Hate Crimescd is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of hate crimes
in county c on day d. The main coefficient of interest β is the interaction of county-level
Twitter usage with Trump’s tweets about Muslims. The coefficient measures if there are
disproportionate changes in anti-Muslim hate crimes in counties with high Twitter usage
on days Trump tweets about Muslims. To simplify the interpretation of the coefficients,
we standardize all variables to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The
specification additionally controls for a vector of control variables Xcd and includes a full set
of county and day fixed effects. We also allow for models that include lags of the dependent
variable.55 We cluster standard errors at the state level.
The setup in equation 2.8 is akin in spirit to a shift-share design, where Twitter Usage
measures the local exposure to aggregate shocks Muslim Trump Tweets. Because we are
interested in estimating the effect of social media, the main concern with this empirical
strategy is that the local exposure measure is co-determined with latent factors that may also
lead to changes in outcomes when Trump tweets (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). Apart
from estimating equation 2.8 using OLS, we thus also present results based on 2SLS, where
we again instrument for local Twitter usage using temporal fluctuations in when users started
following SXSW around the 2007 festival. The exclusion restriction in this setting is that
Trump’s tweets about Muslims only affect areas with SXSW followers who joined in March
2007, compared to those who joined before, through its impact on Twitter usage. In support
55Estimates of dynamic panel models with fixed effects have an asymptotic bias of order 1/T (Nickell, 1981).
Because we have a large T (930 days), this bias is likely negligible. Estimating the model with the GMM
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) is not feasible because the number of moment conditions is of order T 2.
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Notes: These figures plot the dynamic correlations for equation 2.8 time periods ranging between
−4 and 4 days around Trump’s tweets in counties with high Twitter usage. The dependent variable
is the log number of anti-Muslim hate crimes in county c on day d, which we standardized to have a
mean of zero and standard deviation of one. T indicates the date of tweets about Muslims (h = 0).
All regressions include population controls and county times month, day and county times day
of month fixed effects. The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors
clustered at the state level.
of this, we find that the interaction of Trump’s tweets with SXSW followers who joined prior
to March does not predict hate crimes.56
We first investigate the timing of Trump’s tweets with real outcomes in this panel setting.
To do so, we include interactions of local Twitter usage with leads and lags of Trump’s tweets
about Muslims. Figure 2.12 presents the estimates of this exercise. The graph indicates that
we observe differential increases in anti-Muslim hate crime in counties with high Twitter
usage one day after Donald Trump’s tweets. This is similar to the one we observe in the time
series regression. In the online appendix in Table 2.41 we report the full set of estimated
coefficients from this regressions in OLS and in reduced form.
Next, we test whether this finding is robust to the inclusion of additional fixed effects
and compare the importance of Twitter usage relative to other cross-sectional predictors. In
56Note that these regressions are highly demanding because hate crimes are relatively rare. In these
specifications, less than 1,000 of the close to three million observations are non-zero. The results should thus
be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, we believe they are insightful because they provide an additional
plausibility check for the evidence presented above.
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particular we analyze if exposure to Fox News or ideological alignment with Trump (measured
by a high Republican vote share) are additional mediating factors.57
The results of these exercises can be found in Table 2.8. Overall the findings are
remarkable robust to including interactions with these other cross-sectional exposure variables.
The magnitude of the coefficients remains quantitatively unchanged, even when we include
state × day, county × day of week and county × day of month fixed effects in columns
1-3. In the following two columns we show that the inclusion of Fox News exposure and the
Republican vote share – both of which we interact with Trump’s tweets – have less robust
and quantitatively smaller predictive power for increases in anti-Muslim hate crime.
Overall the findings in this section are again in line with the hypothesis that, when
triggered by a shock such as Trump’s tweets about Muslims, social media may contribute to
anti-Muslim incidents in real-life.
2.7 Discussion
2.7.1 Potential Mechanisms
The evidence provided in the previous sections all support the hypothesis that social media
began to play a role in the of the expression of anti-Muslim sentiment and the spread of
anti-Muslim hate crimes with the 2016 presidential campaign. The existing literature suggests
that our findings could be driven by coordination, persuasion or social norms. While all
mechanism are likely at play to some extent in our setting, some findings are more consistent
with a role for social norms.
To begin, our findings are unlikely to be driven by lower coordination costs due to social
media. The main reason is that neither the 2016 presidential campaign period nor Trump’s
tweets sharply improved the coordination capabilities of perpetrators of anti-Muslim hate
crimes. Further, because most content on Twitter is entirely public, one would not expect it
to be the most likely place for plotting anti-Muslim attacks but rather a place to spread ideas.
Another hypothesis is that our findings are driven by the persuasiveness of Twitter
content, and Trump’s tweets in particular (see DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010, for a review
of the literature on persuasion). The short-lived spikes in anti-Muslim hate crime we are
57Note that we focus on additional cross-sectional exposure variables because we are interested in the effect
of social media per se. As we show above, measures of anti-Muslim sentiment (e.g. Fox News reports) are at
least partially outcomes of Trump’s tweets.
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observing in the time series are perhaps most in line with a persuasion story. But while
persuasion can explain some of our findings, there are some pieces of evidence that are not
easily rationalized in a belief-based persuasion model. First, in most persuasion models, the
updating of beliefs depends on the credibility of the receiver as well as the information provided
(Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). However, Trump’s tweets for the most part do not contain
hard information. This makes it less likely that people are persuaded to commit hate crimes
against Muslims compared to the possibility that Trump’s tweets trigger people with existing
anti-Muslim biases. Second, belief-based models of persuasion would suggest that people with
weaker priors adjust their attitudes more strongly. In contrast, we find that the effects of
Twitter usage are driven by areas with higher pre-existing prejudice. This is also in line with
existing evidence of media persuasion: in the case of Nazi radio propaganda, Adena et al.
(2015) show that it predominantly activated existing sentiments (also see Voigtlander and
Voth, 2012). Third, most persuasion models would predict increases in average anti-Muslim
hostility. Panel survey evidence in Hopkins and Washington (2019), however, suggests that
white Americans’ anti-minority prejudice, if anything, declined after Trump’s political rise.
We also provide some additional evidence that is difficult to square with the idea that
social media affects violence by making people more xenophobic, at least in our setting.
Table 2.30 reports the results from regressions of the type in 2.4, where the dependent variable
is now the change in a measure of implicit bias against Muslims around Trump’s presidential
campaign start. This measure is based on mean scores on implicit association tests (IAT)
from Project Implicit, which are based on the difference in an individual’s ability to assign
positive or negative words to Muslims or other people.58
We consider a range of specifications and sub-samples, including test scores restricted
to whites or conservative, and find no evidence of an increase in implicit bias. In fact, both
the time series mean and the estimates based on SXSW suggest that, if anything, people
became less biased towards Muslims between 2000 and 2017. The estimates suggest that we
can reject even small increases in implicit bias due to social media. The weak IV confidence
set for the baseline estimate in column 1 is bounded at 0.03, which suggests we can likely rule
out that a one standard deviation increase in Twitter usage increases implicit bias by more
58We follow Chetty et al. (2018) and calculate mean IAT scores on the county-level. Participation in the
IAT is online and largely voluntary, which may give rise to selection biases. While we cannot fully rule out
such biases, we also consider a measure of implicit bias based on individuals who were obligated to take these
tests, e.g. as part of a work program, and find similar results.
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than 17% of a standard deviation.59 This conclusion is also supported by the pattern of the
event study in Figure 2.22.
A perceived shift in social norms among people who already harbor extreme viewpoints
may be an alternative mechanism to explain why we observe an effect of social media on
hate crime and expressed xenophobia, but no effect on implicit biases. The channel we have
in mind is the following. A key feature of social norms is that they are based on people’s
perceptions of everyone else’s beliefs. These perceptions, in turn, are shaped by the “sample”
of beliefs that are most salient to an individual (e.g. Bursztyn and Jensen, 2015; Perez-Truglia
and Cruces, 2017; Enikolopov et al., 2020). But the people are systematically wrong in their
perception of what others believe, particularly when it comes to political topics (e.g. Westfall
et al., 2015; Bordalo et al., 2016).60
By enabling relatively few but particularly visible individuals to affect the aggregate
discourse, social media could shift beliefs about what is socially acceptable and make people
more susceptible to extreme viewpoints. Such effects could be re-enforced by what has often
been called “echo chambers” (e.g. Bessi et al., 2015; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Schmidt et al.,
2017; Sunstein, 2017). This, in turn, could affect the willingness of a small set of potential
perpetrators to take hateful actions online or offline.61
This interpretation is in line with the findings of Bursztyn et al. (c), who show in a
range of experiments that Donald Trump’s 2016 election victory increased people’s willingness
to publicly express xenophobic views, as well as the tolerance towards such views. While
our setting does not allow for a controlled experiment, our findings suggest that social media
could contribute to such an unraveling of social norms.62
59To see this, consider that the standard deviation of Log(Twitter usage) in this sample is around 1.80. The
standard deviation of the change in IAT scores is 0.313. That means the largest effect of a one standard
deviation increase in social media usage in the confidence set is (0.03× 1.80)/0.313 ≈ 0.17. In other words,
1% higher social media usage is unlikely to increase implicit bias against Muslims by more than 0.17%.
60See Bénabou (2008) for a model of how belief distortions can give rise to a persistence of ideologies in
equilibrium; Bénabou (2013) studies “groupthink” more broadly. False beliefs can also result in an aggregate
misperception, termed “pluralistic ignorance” (see Miller and Prentice, 1994; Kuran, 1995). In Saudi Arabia,
for example, most men privately approve of women in the labor force but drastically underestimate approval
among their peers (Bursztyn et al., d).
61This is related to Ali and Bénabou, where the visibility of individuals makes aggregate behavior (descriptive
norms) less informative about societal preferences (prescriptive norms). It is also related to Mukand and
Rodrik, where “political entrepreneurs” can change individuals’ perception of whom they are, by increasing
the salience of particular parts of their identity (e.g. a “true American”). Matz et al. (2017) provide evidence
for the effectiveness of social media targeting based on psychological traits.
62For theoretical models of social norms see, for example, Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Bénabou and Tirole,
Ali and Lin (2013), and Ali and Bénabou. Daughety and Reinganum (2010) study how agents adjust their
actions if they are observable by others, which creates a costly social distortion. For empirical evidence on
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2.7.2 Reporting Changes in Hate Crimes
A potential concern for interpreting our findings with regard to hate crimes could be reporting
bias in the FBI data. We believe it is highly unlikely that our findings are solely driven by
changes in the reporting rather than actual incidents of hate crimes.
First, our cross-sectional empirical strategy makes the most obvious types of reporting
changes unlikely. We focus on within-county changes of hate crime after taking out state-level
averages. This rules out any persistent differences in the propensity to report hate crimes, as
well as dynamic changes across states. In our instrumental variable estimation, we exploit
variation in the locations of SXSW followers who joined in March 2007, compared to those
of SXSW followers from previous months. It is not clear why changes in reporting, without
changes in actual hate crime incidents, would exhibit this particular correlation with early
Twitter adoption. To the best of our knowledge, social media activity is not a major input in
the two-tier process for the identification of hate crimes by the FBI.
Second, the heterogeneous patterns we find in the data are inconsistent with those one
would expect for changes in hate crime reporting. The cross-sectional results are entirely
driven by one crime category, assault. If social media only increased reporting, we would
expect to see more reports on hate crimes of lower significance, such as minor cases of
vandalism, which is not the case in the data. Reporting also does not explain why there
should be larger effects in counties with pre-existing hate groups. If anything, one would
expect reporting changes with the start of Trump’s presidential run to be concentrated in
more liberal counties. Further, Hobbs and Lajevardi (2019) find that the 2016 presidential
election was associated with a partial withdrawal of Muslims from public life. In that case,
changes in reporting would further bias our estimates downwards.
Third, the precise timing in our time series results speaks against reporting changes.
While people might report more hate crimes after Trump’s negative tweets about Muslims,
they should also become more likely to report past hate crimes. This would lead to a very
different time series pattern: increases in reporting should should translate into a larger
number of hate crimes not only after but also before Trump’s tweets. However, the data
only shows a spike after the tweets. It also seems unlikely that the time series findings are
driven by changes in the way the FBI classifies hate crimes, because the incident date rarely
corresponds to the date a hate crime is reviewed by the FBI as part of the two-tier process.
persuasion and social norms, see e.g. Cialdini et al. (2006), Gerber et al. (2008), DellaVigna and Gentzkow
(2010), and DellaVigna et al. (2016).
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If Trump’s tweets change the behavior of FBI analysts, this would again lead to increases in
hate crimes before Trump’s tweets, which we do not observe in the data.
Taken together, we believe our evidence to be more in line with changes in the actual
number of hate crimes. This is also consistent with evidence using the alternative data from
the Anti-Defamation League we use in robustness exercises.
2.8 Conclusion
Social media has recently come under scrutiny for its oft-alleged potential to increase citizen
polarization by creating informational “echo chambers” (Sunstein, 2009, 2017). Yet, the
empirical evidence on this question is limited and has led to widely differing conclusions
(Boxell et al., 2017). Consistent with evidence that social media can motivate real-life
action (Enikolopov et al., 2020; Müller and Schwarz, 2018a), we find a tight link between
Twitter usage, Donald Trump’s tweets about Muslims, and different measures of anti-minority
sentiment.
Using an instrumental variable strategy, we attempt to identify the causal effect of
social media on anti-Muslim sentiment around the time that then-candidate Trump launched
his campaign. We exploit the unique history of the diffusion of Twitter prompted by the
service’s surge in popularity at the SXSW conference in March 2007. This fact allows us to
instrument for social media usage today using the locations of Twitter’s early adopters while
holding constant the locations of people following SXSW prior to the 2007 event or other
events similar to SXSW. By identifying the effect through the time dimension, this approach
allows us to abstract from endogenous selection into Twitter penetration under relatively
mild identifying assumptions.
Our findings are consistent with a role for social media in the normalization of anti-
minority sentiments. In line with this hypothesis, we find that Trump’s tweets about Muslims
are highly correlated with the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes, but only for the time
period after the start of his presidential campaign. This correlation also persists using an
instrumental variable strategy that leverages the fact that Trump tweets more about Muslims
on days when he golfs. This is at least suggestive of the idea that social media, and Trump’s
tweets in particular, may contribute to a climate that reduces the social sanctions against
and increases the incidence of hate crimes.
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While this paper focused on particularly negative outcomes – hate crimes targeting
minorities and other measures that broadly reflect xenophobia – social media may well have a
positive impact in other areas. We would also like to caution against using our findings as a
basis for policies directed at restricting online communication. History is ripe with cautionary
tales of how excessive state power over the media can abet or enable authoritarian rule. The
complex trade-offs that policy makers face in this regard thus require nuanced discussion and,
above all, more evidence. Notwithstanding, our results suggest that social media can affect






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FBI Hate Crime Data
As described in the Section 2.2, the FBI uses a two-tier decision making process for classifying
hate crimes. FBI (2015) describes the decision making process in the following way:
“Once the development of this collection was complete, the FBI UCR Program
surveyed state UCR Program managers on hate crime collection procedures used
at various law enforcement agencies which collected hate crime data employing a
two-tier decision-making process. The first level is the law enforcement officer who
initially responds to the alleged hate crime incident, i.e., the “responding officer”
(or “first-level judgment officer”). It is the responsibility of the responding officer
to determine whether there is any indication that the offender was motivated
by bias. If a bias indicator is identified, the officer designates the incident as a
“suspected bias-motivated crime” and forwards the case file to a “second-level
judgment officer/unit.” (In smaller agencies this is usually a person specially
trained in hate crime matters, while in larger agencies it may be a special unit.)
It is the task of the second-level judgment officer/unit to review the facts of the
incident and make the final determination of whether a hate crime has actually
occurred. If so, the incident is to be reported to the FBI UCR Program as a
bias-motivated crime.” (FBI, 2015, pp. 2-3)
As indicated, all decisions by the responding officer will be passed on for review to a
second examiner. The FBI manual also outlines criteria that have to be full-filled for a crime
to be classified as a hate crime:
“An important distinction must be made when reporting a hate crime. The mere
fact the offender is biased against the victim’s actual or perceived race, religion,
disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, and/or gender identity does not
mean that a hate crime was involved. Rather, the offender’s criminal act must have
been motivated, in whole or in part, by his or her bias. Motivation is subjective,
therefore, it is difficult to know with certainty whether a crime was the result
of the offender’s bias. For that reason, before an incident can be reported as a
hate crime, sufficient objective facts must be present to lead a reasonable and
prudent person to conclude that the offender’s actions were motivated, in whole
158
or in part, by bias. While no single fact may be conclusive, facts such as the
following, particularly when combined, are supportive of a finding of bias:
1. The offender and the victim were of a different race, religion, disability,
sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, and/or gender identity. For example,
the victim was African American and the offender was white.
2. Bias-related oral comments, written statements, or gestures were made by
the offender indicating his or her bias. For example, the offender shouted a
racial epithet at the victim.
3. Bias-related drawings, markings, symbols, or graffiti were left at the crime
scene. For example, a swastika was painted on the door of a synagogue,
mosque, or LGBT center.
4. Certain objects, items, or things which indicate bias were used. For example,
the offenders wore white sheets with hoods covering their faces or a burning
cross was left in front of the victim’s residence.
5. The victim is a member of a specific group that is overwhelmingly outnum-
bered by other residents in the neighborhood where the victim lives and the
incident took place.
6. The victim was visiting a neighborhood where previous hate crimes had been
committed because of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity,
gender, or gender identity and where tensions remained high against the
victim’s group.
7. Several incidents occurred in the same locality, at or about the same time, and
the victims were all of the same race, religion, disability, sexual orientation,
ethnicity, gender, or gender identity.
8. A substantial portion of the community where the crime occurred perceived
that the incident was motivated by bias.
9. The victim was engaged in activities related to his or her race, religion,
disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity. For
example, the victim was a member of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) or participated in an LGBT pride
celebration.
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10. The incident coincided with a holiday or a date of significance relating to
a particular race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender,
or gender identity, e.g., Martin Luther King Day, Rosh Hashanah, or the
Transgender Day of Remembrance.
11. The offender was previously involved in a similar hate crime or is a hate
group member.
12. There were indications that a hate group was involved. For example, a hate
group claimed responsibility for the crime or was active in the neighborhood.
13. A historically-established animosity existed between the victim’s and the
offender’s groups.
14. The victim, although not a member of the targeted racial, religious, disability,
sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity group, was a member
of an advocacy group supporting the victim group.”
(FBI, 2015, pp. 6-7)
We report the full list of FBI bias motivation categories in Table 2.12. The hate crime
categories we use in the paper are defined as follows:
Table 2.11: FBI Hate Crimes Codes




Racial 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
Sexual orientation 41, 42, 43, 44, 45
Religious (excluding Muslim) 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85
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Table 2.12: Full List of FBI Bias Motivation Categories
Bias category Bias motivation and code
Race/Ethnicity/Ancestry
Anti-American Indian or Alaska Native (13)
Anti-Arab (31)
Anti-Asian (14)
Anti-Black or African American (12)
Anti-Hispanic or Latino (32)
Anti-Multiple Races, Group (15)

































Notes: This table reports the complete list of hate crime bias motivations as classified by the FBI.




Table 2.13: Examples of Trump’s Negative Tweets about Muslims
Date Text Retweets
12/10/2015 ”mimi saulino: seanhannity @FoxNews Syrian Muslims escorted into U.S. through Mexico. Now arriving to
Oklahoma and Kansas! Congress?”
1223
14/11/2015 Why won’t President Obama use the term Islamic Terrorism? Isn’t it now, after all of this time and so much
death, about time!
6924
15/11/2015 ”thewatcher23579: One of Paris terrorist came as Syrian refugee. Donald Trump is right again. BOMB
THEIR OIL - TAKE AWAY THEIR FUNDING”
2165
17/11/2015 Refugees from Syria are now pouring into our great country. Who knows who they are - some could be ISIS.
Is our president insane?
16285
22/11/2015 We better get tough with RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISTS, and get tough now, or the life and safety of
our wonderful country will be in jeopardy!
5172
25/11/2015 I LIVE IN NEW JERSEY; @realDonaldTrump IS RIGHT: MUSLIMS DID CELEBRATE ON 9/11 HERE!
WE SAW IT! https://t.co/1SksZU9qlj
2252
07/12/2015 Obama said in his speech that Muslims are our sports heroes. What sport is he talking about, and who? Is
Obama profiling?
9600
07/12/2015 Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration: https://t.co/HCWU16z6SR https://t.co/d1dhaIs0S7 4716
10/12/2015 The United Kingdom is trying hard to disguise their massive Muslim problem. Everybody is wise to what
is happening, very sad! Be honest.
6028
10/12/2015 In Britain, more Muslims join ISIS than join the British army. https://t.co/LQVNz7b2Eb 4325
17/01/2016 Far more killed than anticipated in radical Islamic terror attack yesterday. Get tough and smart U.S., or we
won’t have a country anymore!
4126
27/03/2016 Another radical Islamic attack, this time in Pakistan, targeting Christian women &amp; children. At least
67 dead,400 injured. I alone can solve
11353
22/05/2016 Crooked Hillary wants a radical 500% increase in Syrian refugees. We can’t allow this. Time to get smart
and protect America!
9758
12/06/2016 Appreciate the congrats for being right on radical Islamic terrorism, I don’t want congrats, I want toughness
&amp; vigilance. We must be smart!
27146
13/06/2016 In my speech on protecting America I spoke about a temporary ban, which includes suspending immigration
from nations tied to Islamic terror.
13026
25/06/2016 We must suspend immigration from regions linked with terrorism until a proven vetting method is in place. 11726
28/07/2016 Hillary’s refusal to mention Radical Islam, as she pushes a 550% increase in refugees, is more proof that she
is unfit to lead the country.
20106
18/10/2016 Thank you Colorado Springs. If I’m elected President I am going to keep Radical Islamic Terrorists out of
our count. . . https://t.co/N74UK73RLK
12904
19/10/2016 ISIS has infiltrated countries all over Europe by posing as refugees, and @HillaryClinton will allow it to
happen h. . . https://t.co/MmeW2qsTQh
16130
11/02/2017 Our legal system is broken! ”77% of refugees allowed into U.S. since travel reprieve hail from seven suspect
countries.” (WT) SO DANGEROUS!
23082
17/08/2017 Study what General Pershing of the United States did to terrorists when caught. There was no more Radical
Islamic Terror for 35 years!
30534
18/08/2017 Radical Islamic Terrorism must be stopped by whatever means necessary! The courts must give us back our
protective rights. Have to be tough!
37669
15/09/2017 Loser terrorists must be dealt with in a much tougher manner.The internet is their main recruitment tool
which we must cut off &amp; use better!
21411
20/10/2017 Just out report: ”United Kingdom crime rises 13% annually amid spread of Radical Islamic terror.” Not
good, we must keep America safe!
29854
01/11/2017 NYC terrorist was happy as he asked to hang ISIS flag in his hospital room. He killed 8 people, badly
injured 12. SHOULD GET DEATH PENALTY!
43455
Notes: This table reports examples of Trump’s negative tweets about Muslims, including the date of the tweet and the number of retweets
the tweet received.
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Table 2.14: Misclassified Trump’s Anti-Muslim Tweets
Date Text Retweets
12/12/2012 Watching Pyongyang terrorize Asia today is just amazing! 77
26/03/2013 The Scottish windfarm was conceived by the same mind that released terrorist al-Megrahi for humanitarian
reasons. ..
101
23/04/2013 Did the Boston terrorists register their guns? No. Another example of why gun control legislation is not the
answer!
1192
22/09/2013 ”@LebaneseKobe: @realDonaldTrump as a Muslim and as an American, i know for a fact that you Mr.
Trump respect all people!
33
22/09/2013 ”@mandem3: realDonaldTrump you hate muslims.” Wrong 48
10/10/2013 Obama has called @GOP terrorists during this showdown. It’s a shame he really doesn’t think it because
then he would meet all @GOP demands.
432
29/01/2014 Remember when ”comedian” Bill Maher openly praised the disgusting terrorists who destroyed the World
Trade Center-then got canned by ABC?
117
26/01/2015 ”tomtumillo: What is worse, Geraldo screaming ’screw the terrorists’ or Kenya feeling she’s ’fabulous’?
#CelebrityApprentice
56
15/08/2015 ”javonniandjeno: realDonaldTrump AP nbc Donald Trump is Clint Eastwood, the perfect hero not scared
of American terrorists. Vote Trump!”
1742
27/08/2015 ”jp sitles: realDonaldTrump HillaryClinton: she compared republicans to terrorist but will not call terrorists
, terrorists. #OhMe”
2869
06/09/2015 ”jasonusmc2017: blayne troy @realDonaldTrump: He was right when he called Obama the 5 for 1 president.
5 terrorist for one no good traitor
1016
21/09/2015 ”TheBrodyFile: On the Muslim issue: It might help @BarackObama if he actually supported Christians
religious liberty rights.
1242
21/09/2015 ”TheBrodyFile: On the Muslim issue: It might help @BarackObama if he didn’t take five years to visit
Israel”
818
21/11/2015 ”WayneDupreeShow: ”It’s clear that Donald Trump was NOT even talking about a Muslim Database!”
https://t.co/3tLDZj2WGV”
1020
31/12/2015 ”SenSanders: I have a message for Donald Trump: No, we’re not going to hate Latinos, we’re not going to
hate Muslims.” I fully agree!
1250
23/03/2016 Just watched Hillary deliver a prepackaged speech on terror. She’s been in office fighting terror for 20 years-
and look where we are!
11115
23/03/2016 I will be the best by far in fighting terror. I’m the only one that was right from the beginning, &amp; now
Lyin’ Ted &amp; others are copying me.
7224
15/06/2016 I will be meeting with the NRA, who has endorsed me, about not allowing people on the terrorist watch list,
or the no fly list, to buy guns.
13903
21/05/2017 Speech transcript at Arab Islamic American Summit https://t.co/eUWxJXJxbe nReplay
https://t.co/VtmlSqciXx #RiyadhSummit #POTUSAbroad
11498
26/05/2017 Getting ready to engage G7 leaders on many issues including economic growth, terrorism, and security. 11322
27/05/2017 Big G7 meetings today. Lots of very important matters under discussion. First on the list, of course, is
terrorism. #G7Taormina
9489
18/08/2017 Today, I signed the Global War on Terrorism War Memorial Act (#HR873.) The bill authorizes....cont
https://t.co/c3zIkdtowc https://t.co/re6n0MS0cj
14892
07/09/2017 During my trip to Saudi Arabia, I spoke to the leaders of more than 50 Arab &amp; Muslim nations about
the need to confront our shared enemies.[...]
10156
11/11/2017 When will all the haters and fools out there realize that having a good relationship with Russia is a good
thing, not a bad thing.[...]
39627
Notes: The table lists the tweets we excluded by hand from the set of negative Muslim tweets.
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Geocoded Twitter Data
Table 2.15: Search Terms Used to Identify Users Tweeting about Other Festivals
Festival Search Term
Austin City Limited Festival









New Orleans Jazz and Heritage Festival







South by Southwest Festival
South by Southwest
SXSW




Table 2.16: Search Terms Used to Create a
Proxy for Total Tweets
0 but his one these would
1 by how only they year
2 can if or think you
3 come in other this your
4 could into our time
5 day it out two
6 do its over up
7 even just people us
8 first know say use
9 for like see want
I from look she way
about get make so we
after give me some well
all go most take what
also good my than when
any have new that which
as he no their who
at he not them with
back her now then with
because him on there work
Notes: This table list the search terms we used to
collect a proxy of all tweets sent from a given county.
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Rescaling of Google trends
As described in Section 2.2, we use the weekly Google trends data to rescale the daily Google
trend values. The daily Google trends data are scaled between 0-100 for each 90 day period,
while the weekly Google trends data have a consistent scaling for the entire time period.
To arrive at consistent values, we use the following process. First, we create a scaling
factor by dividing the weekly interest by the daily interest. We then multiply the daily interest
data with the scaling factor. If the weekly interest is 100 and the daily interest is 25, the
scaling factor will be 4 and values will be scaled up. On the other hand, if the weekly interest
is low, for example 10, a daily interest of 25 would be scaled down. This way, the adjustment
guarantees that daily interest will be on the same scale and thus comparable over time.
As a final step, we divide the rescaled values by their maximum and multiply them by
100. This is to re-normalize the Google trend values to take on values between 0 and 100.
Sources for Trump’s golf activity
Table 2.17: Sources for Golf Data
Source Description
New York Times The NYT tracks visits by Trump to his own properties. The data also
track how often Trump visited a golf club.
trumpgolfcount.com This website lists Trump’s visits to golf clubs since his inauguration. It
also provides additional analysis during which visits Trump likely played
golf.
Presidential Schedule The presidential schedule lists all past presidential journeys.
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Figure 2.13: Identifying Variation
Pure SXSW Treatment
Pure SXSW Control
SXSW Treat & Control
No SXSW Follower
Notes: This map plots counties with SXSW followers who joined Twitter in March 2007 in orange;
counties with SXSW followers who joined prior to the 2007 event in blue; and counties in both
categories in green.







All other tweets Muslim tweets
Notes: This figure plots the average number of retweets Donald Trump received on his tweets
about Muslims compared to all other tweets. We also show 95% confidence intervals.
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2.9.2 Appendix 2: Details on Trends in Hate Crimes by President
In this section, we provide some additional evidence on time series trends in hate crimes across
US presidencies since 1990. A potential issue with the hate crime numbers we presented in
Figure 2.1 might be that we consider all hate crimes jointly, which could hide underlying
heterogeneous hate crime trends across groups. We thus reproduce the bar graphs using the
other main categories of hate crimes in the FBI data (see Figure 2.15). Overall, the results
yield a qualitatively similar conclusion. Trump does not appear to be an outlier for any of
the main categories except Muslims.
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Notes: This figure plots the average weekly number of hate crimes, by president and type of hate
crime (as defined by the FBI). The headings indicate which type of hate crime is plotted. The
whiskers indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
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2.9.3 Appendix 3: Additional Cross-sectional Evidence



































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Notes: This figure plots the coefficients from running panel event study regressions as in Equa-
tion (2.3), where log(Twitter Usage) is replaced by log(SXSW followers,March 2007. The
dependent variable is the log number of hate crimes in a county. We standardized the variables to
have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The vertical line indicates the start of Trump’s
presidential campaign start. The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 2.18: Descriptive Statistics (Main Variables)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. N
Hate crime and Twitter variables
∆ Log(Hate crimes against Muslims) 0.02 0.13 -0.71 0.00 1.26 3108
Log(Twitter usage) 10.03 1.91 3.33 9.94 16.90 3108
Log(SXSW followers, March 2007) 0.06 0.32 0.00 0.00 4.98 3108
Log(SXSW followers, Pre) 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.00 3.61 3108
Demographic controls
% aged 20-24 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.27 3108
% aged 25-29 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.15 3108
% aged 30-34 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.12 3108
% aged 35-39 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.11 3108
% aged 40-44 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.10 3108
% aged 45-49 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.09 3108
% aged 50+ 0.39 0.07 0.11 0.39 0.75 3108
Population growth, 2000-2016 0.06 0.18 -0.43 0.03 1.32 3108
Geographical controls
Population density 261.27 1733.47 0.10 45.60 69468.40 3108
Log(County area) 6.53 0.86 0.69 6.47 9.91 3108
Distance from Austin, TX (in miles) 1450.64 612.61 5.04 1464.66 3098.88 3108
Race and religion controls
% white 0.77 0.20 0.03 0.84 0.98 3108
% black 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.85 3108
% native American 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.90 3108
% Asian 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.37 3108
% Hispanic 0.09 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.96 3108
% Muslim 0.23 1.08 0.00 0.00 30.35 3108
Socioeconomic controls
% below poverty level 16.74 6.58 1.40 16.00 53.30 3108
% unemployed 5.50 1.94 1.80 5.30 24.10 3108
Gini index 0.44 0.03 0.33 0.44 0.65 3108
% uninsured 13.32 5.28 1.80 12.80 49.00 3108
Log(Median household income) 10.72 0.24 9.87 10.71 11.72 3107
% employed in agriculture 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.58 3108
% employed in IT 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.21 3108
% employed in manufacturing 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.72 3108
% employed in nontradable sector 0.29 0.11 0.00 0.28 1.00 3108
% employed in construction/real estate 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.06 1.00 3108
% employed in utilities 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 1.00 3108
% employed in business services 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.15 0.95 3108
% employed in other services 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.24 1.00 3108
% adults with high school degree 34.77 7.07 7.50 35.20 54.80 3108
% adults with graduate degree 7.05 4.12 0.00 5.80 44.40 3108
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Figure 2.17: Change in Other Hate Crimes, by Twitter Usage (OLS)
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Notes: These figures plot the coefficients of running panel event study regressions as in Equation (2.3)
for different types of hate crimes. We standardized the variables to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one. The vertical line indicates the start of Trump’s presidential campaign.
The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals. The excluded category is the year 2014.
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Figure 2.18: Change in Other Hate Crimes, by Twitter Usage (Reduced Form)
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Notes: These figures plot the coefficients of running panel event study regressions as in
Equation (2.3) for different types of hate crimes, where log(Twitter usage) is replaced with
log(SXSW followers,March 2007. We standardized the variables to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one. The vertical line indicates the start of Trump’s presidential campaign.
The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals. The excluded category is the year 2014.
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Table 2.19: Descriptive Statistics (Main Variables, Continued)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. N
Media controls
% watching Fox News 0.26 0.01 0.23 0.26 0.30 3107
% watching prime time TV 0.43 0.01 0.40 0.43 0.47 3107
Election control
Republican vote share, 2012 0.60 0.15 0.06 0.61 0.96 3108
Crime controls
Violent crime rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 3108
Property crime rate 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.10 3108
Other hate crime variables
∆ Log(Total hate crimes) -0.01 0.36 -2.28 0.00 2.04 3108
∆ Log(Hate crimes against Hispanics) -0.01 0.17 -1.65 0.00 1.21 3108
∆ Log(Other ethnicity-based hate crimes) -0.02 0.16 -2.60 0.00 1.09 3108
∆ Log(Racially motivated hate crimes) -0.01 0.31 -1.69 0.00 1.74 3108
∆ Log(Hate crimes based on sexual orientation) -0.03 0.22 -1.46 0.00 1.20 3108
∆ Log(Hate crimes against other religions) 0.00 0.21 -1.58 0.00 1.59 3108
Log(Total hate crimes, ADL data) 0.23 0.63 0.00 0.00 5.38 3108


















































































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Notes: These figures plot the coefficients of running panel event study regressions as in Equa-
tion (2.3). The dependent variables are the log number of tweets containing the terms #BanIslam
in panel (a) and #StopIslam in panel (b). We standardized the variables to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one. The vertical line indicates the start of Trump’s presidential campaign.
The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals. The excluded category is the year 2014.
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Table 2.20: Comparing Counties with SXSW Followers, March 2007 vs. Pre
March 2007 March 2007 Pre Difference
and Pre only only in means
(1) (2) (3) (2) - (3) t-stat
Demographic controls
% aged 20-24 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.13
% aged 25-29 0.09 0.07 0.07 -0.00 -0.57
% aged 30-34 0.08 0.07 0.07 -0.00 -0.45
% aged 35-39 0.07 0.06 0.06 -0.00 -0.21
% aged 40-44 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.25
% aged 45-49 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.14
% aged 50+ 0.32 0.35 0.35 -0.00 -0.03
Population growth, 2000-2016 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.67
Race and religion controls
% white 0.50 0.65 0.67 -0.02 -0.53
% black 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.04 2.04**
% native American 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -1.03
% Asian 0.10 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.44
% Hispanic 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.32
% Muslim 1.31 0.81 0.75 0.05 0.20
Socioeconomic controls
% below poverty level 15.71 15.82 13.69 2.14 1.94*
% unemployed 4.86 5.05 4.51 0.54 1.76*
Gini index 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.01 1.22
% uninsured 12.87 12.40 11.21 1.19 1.08
Log(Median household income) 11.00 10.91 10.99 -0.09 -1.57
% employed in agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.99∗
% employed in IT 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.02
% employed in manufacturing 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.55
% employed in nontradable sector 0.23 0.26 0.27 -0.01 -0.62
% employed in construction/real estate 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.01 1.02
% employed in utilities 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.53
% employed in business services 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.01 0.35
% employed in other services 0.27 0.26 0.28 -0.02 -0.94
% adults with high school degree 21.76 25.99 25.77 0.22 0.13
% adults with graduate degree 16.15 13.08 14.34 -1.26 -0.64
Media controls
% watching Fox News 0.25 0.26 0.26 -0.00 -0.13
% watching prime time TV 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.00 0.11
Election control
Republican vote share, 2012 0.33 0.46 0.47 -0.02 -0.43
Crime controls
Violent crime rate 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Property crime rate 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 1.09
Geographical controls
Population density 5192.27 1021.39 1998.35 -976.96 -0.91
Log(County area) 6.30 6.63 6.54 0.09 0.31
Distance from Austin, TX (in miles) 1775.99 1749.38 1626.64 122.74 0.68
Notes: This table plots the mean values of the control variables for the three types of counties relevant for the
cross-sectional results: (1) counties with new SXSW followers in March 2007 and the pre-period; (2) counties
with new SXSW followers in March 2007 but no new followers in the pre-period; and (3) counties with new
SXSW followers in the pre-period but no new followers in March 2007. t − stat reports the result from a
simple t-test for the equality of means between the counties with the key identifying variation. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.21: Balancedness SXSW Counties Individual Characteristics
First names (Corr. = 0.69) Terms used in bio (Corr. = 0.92)
Pre-Period Treatment Period Pre-Period Treatment Period
michael michael http http
mike john founder com
paul chris com digital
chris jeff co founder
ryan matt tech medium
eric brian design director
david david director tech
matthew alex product music
john jason digital social
jeff kevin designer marketing
robert paul medium design
mark mike music co
andrew dan social writer
daniel andrew love love
james peter marketing lover
kevin jim web dad
jay tom geek creative
jonathan jennifer writer tweet
rob steve technology author
rachel todd dad designer
Notes: This table plots the ranking of the most common first names and
terms used in a Twitter user’s “bio” among users who follow “South by
Southwest” on Twitter, depending on whether they signed up during the
SXSW 2007 event or in the pre-period.





















































































































Attendees (right axis, in thousands)
Notes: This figure plots the number of tweets mentioning major festivals in 2007.
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Table 2.22: Correlation of Log(Twitter Users) across Events
SXSW SXSW Coachella Burning Man Lollapalooza
March 2007 Pre April 2007 August 2007 August 2007
SXSW followers, March 2007 1
SXSW followers, Pre 0.77 1
Coachella users, April 2007 0.44 0.48 1
Burning Man users, August 2007 0.52 0.56 0.54 1
Lollapalooza users, August 2007 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 1
Notes: This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the main measure of interest (SXSW
followers, March 2007 ) and different control variables. “Followers” are based on the locations of people
who started following SXSW in a given month; “users” are based on people who tweeted at least once
about a festival. We take the natural logarithm of these numbers with one added inside.
Table 2.23: Number of Counties With Any Twitter Users at SXSW or Other
Festivals
SXSW SXSW Coachella Burning Man Lollapalooza
March 2007 Pre April 2007 August 2007 August 2007
No followers 2953 2987 3091 3098 3105
At least 1 follower 155 121 17 10 3
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Notes: This figure plots the number of SXSW followers who joined Twitter each month running up











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.25: Robustness - Alternative Measures of Twitter Usage
Survey Survey GESIS GESIS
# households % households Tweets Twitter
using Twitter using Twitter (Pre-Trump) users
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS - Hate crimes against Muslims
Twitter usage measure 0.059*** 0.024** 0.017*** 0.003**
(0.020) (0.010) (0.006) (0.001)
Panel B: First stage - Twitter usage
Log(SXSW followers, March 2007) 0.440*** 0.080*** 0.443*** 0.634***
(0.041) (0.018) (0.061) (0.157)
Panel C: 2SLS - Hate crimes against Muslims
Twitter usage measure 0.169** 0.926** 0.167** 0.117**
(0.067) (0.387) (0.072) (0.057)
Weak IV 95% AR confidence set [0.04; 0.29] [0.28; 1.87] [0.04; 0.31] [0.03; 0.27]
Log(SXSW followers, Pre) 0.014 -0.021 0.008 -0.014
(0.062) (0.090) (0.070) (0.077)
Observations 3106 3106 3107 3107
Mean of DV 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
Robust F-stat. 114.10 20.59 53.15 16.35
Notes: This table presents county-level OLS, reduced form, and IV regressions where the depen-
dent variable is the log change in hate crimes against Muslims between 2010 and 2017. Twitter
usage measure is the measure listed in the top row, instrumented using the number of users who
started following SXSW in March 2007 (in log with 1 added inside). SXSW followers, Pre is the
number of SXSW followers who registered at some point in 2006 (in log with 1 added inside). All
regressions control for population deciles and state fixed effects, as well as demographic controls
including population growth between 2000 and 2016 as well as age cohort controls for the share of
people aged 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, and those over 50. Weak IV 95% Anderson-
Rubin (AR) confidence sets are calculated using the two-step approach of Andrews (2018) using
the Stata package from Sun (2018). For the just-identified case we study here, the “robust” F -stat.
is equivalent to the “Kleibergen-Paap” or the “effective” F -statistic of Olea and Pflueger (2013).


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.27: Social Media and Types of Hate Crimes
Any Vandalism Theft Burglary Robbery Assault
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS - Hate crimes against Muslims
Log(Twitter usage) 0.019*** 0.008 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.018***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Panel B: Reduced form - Hate crimes against Muslims
Log(SXSW followers, March 2007) 0.074** 0.031 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.067**
(0.030) (0.022) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.029)
Panel C: 2SLS - Hate crimes against Muslims
Log(Twitter usage) 0.161** 0.068 0.007 0.014 0.001 0.146**
(0.069) (0.047) (0.011) (0.021) (0.008) (0.066)
Weak IV 95% AR confidence set [0.04; 0.30] [0.01; 0.15] [0.01; 0.03] [0.02; 0.05] [0.01; 0.01] [0.03; 0.28]
Log(SXSW followers, Pre) 0.008 0.036 -0.004 -0.016 0.017 0.016
(0.069) (0.051) (0.008) (0.017) (0.021) (0.060)
Observations 3107 3107 3107 3107 3107 3107
Mean of DV 0.019 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.014
Robust F-stat. 58.04 58.04 58.04 58.04 58.04 58.04
Notes: This table presents county-level OLS and IV regressions where the dependent variable is the log change in
hate crimes against Muslims of the type in the top row between 2010 and 2017. Log(Twitter usage) is instrumented
using the number of users who started following SXSW in March 2007. SXSW followers, Pre is the number of SXSW
followers who registered at some point in 2006. All regressions control for population deciles and state fixed effects (not
shown). Demographic controls include population growth between 2000 and 2016 as well as age cohort controls for the
share of people aged 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, and those over 50. Race and religion controls contains
the share of people identifying as white, African American, Native American or Pacific Islander, Asian, Hispanic, or
Muslim. Socioeconomic controls include the poverty rate, unemployment rate, local GINI index, the share of uninsured
individuals, log median household income, the share of highschool graduates, the share of people with a graduate degree,
as well as the employment shares in agriculture, information technology, manufacturing, nontradables, construction and
real estate, utilities, business services, or other sectors. Media controls include the viewership share of Fox News, the
cable TV spending to population ratio, and the prime time TV viewership to population ratio. Election control is the
county-level vote share of the Republican party in 2012. Crime controls are the rates of violent or property crime from
the FBI. Geographical controls include the linear distance from the SXSW festival location (Austin, Texas), population
density, and the natural logarithm of county size. Weak IV 95% Anderson-Rubin (AR) confidence sets are calculated
using the two-step approach of Andrews (2018) using the Stata package from Sun (2018). For the just-identified case
we study here, the “robust” F -stat. is equivalent to the “Kleibergen-Paap” or the “effective” F -statistic of Olea and
Pflueger (2013). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.28: Social Media and Hate Crimes – Alternative Standard Errors
Bootstrap Bootstrap
Robust robust state cluster Spatial
SE SE SE SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS - Hate crimes against Muslims
Log(Twitter usage) 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Panel B: Reduced form - Hate crimes against Muslims
Log(SXSW followers, March 2007) 0.074*** 0.074** 0.074*** 0.074***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.027) (0.028)
Panel C: 2SLS - Hate crimes against Muslims
Log(Twitter usage) 0.161** 0.161** 0.161** 0.161**
(0.066) (0.069) (0.071) (0.067)
Weak IV 95% AR confidence set [0.05; 0.30]
Log(SXSW followers, Pre) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.057) (0.057) (0.077) (0.064)
Observations 3107 3107 3107 3107
Mean of DV 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
Robust F-stat. 39.37 39.37 57.15 52.14
Notes: This table presents county-level OLS and IV regressions where the dependent vari-
able is the log change in hate crimes against Muslims between 2010 and 2017. Log(Twitter
usage) is instrumented using the number of users who started following SXSW in March
2007. SXSW followers, Pre is the number of SXSW followers who registered at some point
in 2006. All regressions control for population deciles and state fixed effects (not shown).
Demographic controls include population growth between 2000 and 2016 as well as age
cohort controls for the share of people aged 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, and
those over 50. Spatial standard errors are based on the method proposed in Colella et al.
(2019), implemented in Stata as acreg, using a 200 miles cutoff. For the just-identified case
we study here, the “robust” F -stat. is equivalent to the “Kleibergen-Paap” or the “effective”
F -statistic of Olea and Pflueger (2013). Standard errors are computed as indicated in the
top row. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.29: Heterogeneous Effects – Hate Groups and Hate Crimes
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Anti-Muslim hate crimes) No hate groups Any hate group Few hate crimes Many hate crimes
Panel A: OLS
Log(Twitter Usage) x Year=2010 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.07
(0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.11)
Log(Twitter Usage) x Year=2011 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.13)
Log(Twitter Usage) x Year=2012 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.15)
Log(Twitter Usage) x Year=2013 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.04
(0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.13)
Log(Twitter Usage) x Year=2015 0.01 0.45*** 0.00 0.52***
(0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.15)
Log(Twitter Usage) x Year=2016 0.01 0.58*** 0.01** 0.63***
(0.01) (0.17) (0.00) (0.18)
Log(Twitter Usage) x Year=2017 -0.01 0.38 0.00 0.34
(0.01) (0.23) (0.00) (0.25)
Panel B: Reduced form
Log(SXSW followers) x Year=2010 -0.07** -0.01 -0.00 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03)
Log(SXSW followers) x Year=2011 -0.04* 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
Log(SXSW followers) x Year=2012 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Log(SXSW followers) x Year=2013 -0.05* 0.02 -0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
Log(SXSW followers) x Year=2015 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.10***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
Log(SXSW followers) x Year=2016 0.02 0.09* -0.01 0.14***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
Log(SXSW followers) x Year=2017 -0.01 0.06* -0.00 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop. deciles x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1145248 147680 1156896 136032
Notes: This table presents panel event study regressions where the dependent variable is the log number of hate
crimes against Muslims (with one added inside). We standardized the variables to have a mean of zero and standard
deviation of one. The sample period is 2010 to 2017. 2014 is the excluded period. Log(SXSWfollowers) is the
number of local SXSW followers that joined Twitter in March 2007. The existence of hate groups is based on data
from the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). The number of hate crimes in the pre-period is based on the total
number of hate crimes per capita the FBI registered in a county from 2010 until 2015, split at the 90th percentile.
All regressions control for the interaction of population deciles with year dummies. Standard errors in parentheses














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.22: Change in Implicit Bias (Reduced Form)
Notes: These figures plot the coefficients of running a panel event study regression as in Equa-
tion (2.3). The dependent variable is the mean county-level IAT score that measures implicit bias
against Muslims. We standardize the variables to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of
one. The vertical line indicates the start of Trump’s presidential campaign. The shaded areas are
95% confidence intervals. The excluded category is the year 2014.
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2.9.4 Appendix 4: Additional Time Series Evidence
Figure 2.23: Trump’s Golf Days in 2017
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Golf (short) Golf (long)
Notes: This figure plot the days in 2017 when Donald Trump played golf. Golf (long) indicates
three or more consecutive days of golf.
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T−Stat
Notes: This figure visualizes the distribution of t-statistics from a randomization test of the first
stage regression of Trump’s tweets about Muslims on placebo golf days. In particular, we create
1,000 placebo sets of 92 golf days, which is the number of times Trump golfed in 2017. We then
regress the log number of Trump’s tweets about Muslims on these dummies using the baseline
specification in Equation (2.6) and report the distribution of the resulting t-statistics. The orange
line marks our baseline point estimate.
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Notes: This figure shows how the content of Trump’s tweets changes on days when he plays golfs.
These topics were hand-coded using Amazon Mechanical Turk.






















Notes: This figure plots the average sentiment of Trump’s tweets on golf and non-golf days. Lower
values mean more negative sentiment. The sentiment was hand-coded using Amazon Mechanical
Turk on a scale from -2 to 2.
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Notes: This figure shows how the content of Trump’s tweets changes on days when he is traveling
abroad (panel a) or receives a policy briefing (panel b). These topics were hand-coded using
Amazon Mechanical Turk.
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Table 2.31: Summary Statistics for Time Series
Variable Mean SD p50 Min Max N
Trump tweets
Muslim Trump tweets (1+log) 0.08 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.79 365
Total Trump tweets (1+log) 1.95 0.58 1.95 0.00 3.30 365
Muslim Trump tweets (dummy) 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 365
Hate crimes against Muslims (1 + natural logarithm)
All types 0.45 0.47 0.69 0.00 1.79 365
Assault 0.31 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.61 365
Vandalism 0.15 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.39 365
Theft 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.10 365
Burglary 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.69 365
Robbery 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.69 365
Other hate crimes (1 + natural logarithm)
All hate crimes 2.99 0.27 3.00 2.08 3.74 365
Ethnicity (incl. Hispanic) 0.44 0.47 0.69 0.00 1.79 365
Race 2.27 0.37 2.30 0.69 3.00 365
Sexual orientation 1.32 0.46 1.39 0.00 2.40 365
Religion (excl. Muslims) 1.40 0.50 1.39 0.00 2.89 365
TV news coverage (1 + natural logarithm)
Muslim mentions (total) 3.71 0.64 3.69 0.69 5.26 365
Muslim mentions (Fox News) 2.75 0.66 2.77 0.00 4.29 365
Muslim mentions (CNN) 2.24 0.94 2.30 0.00 4.29 365
Muslim mentions (MSNBC) 2.75 0.66 2.77 0.00 4.26 365
Trump’s golfing
Trump golfs 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 365
Trump golfs (NYT only) 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 365
Trump golf (alternative) 0.25 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 365
Golf holiday 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00 365
Golf at any point in previous week 0.71 0.45 1.00 0.00 1.00 365
Other control variables
Google searches (PC) -0.19 1.59 -0.48 -1.47 11.94 365
Terror attack in the US 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 365
Terror attack in Europe 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 365
Terror attack elsewhere 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 2.00 365
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the IV sample. The sample year is
2017, for which we have information on Trump’s golfing. 1+log or 1+natural logarithm
means that the logarithm of any variable is calculated with 1 added inside. The data
on hate crimes come from the FBI hate crime statistics. Data on Trump’s golfing come
from the New York Times, the official White House presidential schedule, and trump-
golfcount.com. Google searches (PC) is the first principal component of Google trends
for the key words ”islam”, ”mosque”, ”muslim”, ”refugee”, ”sharia”, and ”terror”. We
use these same keywords as measures of TV news attention based on data from the in-
ternet archive. The sources for the number of terror attacks is the Global Terrorism
Database. See the online appendix for more details on data and variable construction.
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Table 2.32: Summary Statistics by Day of Week (2017 only)
Day of week Hate crimes against Muslims Tweets about Muslims Trump golfs
Monday Sum 43 3 4
Mean 0.83 0.06 0.08
Tuesday Sum 33 6 3
Mean 0.63 0.12 0.06
Wednesday Sum 43 10 4
Mean 0.83 0.19 0.08
Thursday Sum 43 6 6
Mean 0.83 0.12 0.12
Friday Sum 36 12 13
Mean 0.69 0.23 0.25
Saturday Sum 36 4 30
Mean 0.69 0.08 0.58
Sunday Sum 42 6 32
Mean 0.79 0.11 0.60
Total Sum 276 47 92
Mean 0.76 0.13 0.25
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics by day of week for the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes,
the number of Trump’s tweets about Muslims and the number of Trump’s golf outing for the sample used in



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.38: Time Series Regression Full Period
Add Add Add Use
lagged terror total Trump
dependent attack tweets Tweet
Baseline variable control control dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Before campaign announcement
Log(Muslim Trump tweets) 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.053
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.098)
Observations 2,234 2,232 2,233 2,234 2,234
R2 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.026
Panel B: After campaign announcement
Log(Muslim Trump tweets) 0.108** 0.104*** 0.090** 0.094** 0.307**
(0.042) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.132)
Observations 930 928 929 930 930
R2 0.079 0.082 0.092 0.082 0.077
Fixed effects (month, day of week) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the number of
hate crimes against the group in the top row on any given day based on FBI data. The sample
is split into the period before and after June 16, 2015 when Trump announced his presidential
campaign. All regressions include day-of-week and year-month dummies as well as linear and
quadratic time trends. See online appendix for more details on data and variable construction.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.40: Time Series Regression Full Post-Campaign Period: Split by Moti-
vating Bias
Sexual Religion
All Muslim Ethnicity Race Orientation (excl. Muslims)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Before campaign announcement
Log(Muslim Trump tweets) 0.013 0.017 -0.001 0.005 -0.012 0.015
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Observations 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234
R2 0.232 0.026 0.016 0.153 0.107 0.064
Panel B: After campaign announcement
Log(Muslim Trump tweets) 0.027 0.108** -0.030 0.027 -0.006 -0.056
(0.039) (0.042) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.039)
Observations 930 930 930 930 930 930
R2 0.196 0.079 0.034 0.155 0.077 0.119
Fixed effects (month, day of week) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the number of hate crimes against
the group in the top row on any given day based on FBI data. The sample is split into the period before and
after June 16, 2015 when Trump announced his presidential campaign. All regressions include day-of-week and
year-month dummies. See online appendix for more details on data and variable construction. Newey-West
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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2.9.5 Appendix 5: Additional Bartik Evidence
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Table 2.41: Bartik Timing Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Reduced Form Reduced Form
F4.Muslim Trump Tweet × Twitter Usage -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
F3.Muslim Trump Tweet × Twitter Usage -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
F2.Muslim Trump Tweet × Twitter Usage 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
F.Muslim Trump Tweet × Twitter Usage 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Muslim Trump Tweet × Twitter Usage 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
L.Muslim Trump Tweet × Twitter Usage 0.009** 0.010** 0.007* 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
L2.Muslim Trump Tweet × Twitter Usage -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
L3.Muslim Trump Tweet × Twitter Usage 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
L4.Muslim Trump Tweet × Twitter Usage -0.001 -0.000 -0.005 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County x Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County X Day of Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop. deciles x Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
7 lags dep. variable Yes Yes
Observations 2865576 2856252 2865576 2856252
Notes: This table presents OLS and reduced form regressions where the dependent variable is the
log number of anti-Muslims hate crime in county c on day d. The independent variable is either the
interaction Trump’s anti-Muslim tweet with county-level Twitter usage or a reduced form/IV specifica-
tion with our SXSW variables. The variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard
deviation of one. All regressions include 4 leads and lags of Trump’s anti-Muslim tweets. All regressions
include population controls, county, day, county time month and county times day of month fixed
effects. Later regression control also control for 7 lags of the dependent variable. Robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by state. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
This table presents OLS and IV regressions where the dependent variable is We standardized the
variables to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one



































3) How Polarized are Citizens:
Measuring Ideology from the Ground-up
Carlo Schwarz (University of Warwick)
Mirko Draca (University of Warwick)
3.1 Introduction
In political terms, we seem to be living in the midst of the proverbial ‘interesting times’.
Across established democracies there appear to be strong trends of political populism and
ideological polarisation. In the US, a large body of evidence indicates that the political
positions taken by elected representatives in legislatures have sharply polarised. For example,
this is apparent in recent work examining partisanship in the use of political language (Jensen
et al., 2012; Gentzkow et al., 2019b). In particular, Gentzkow et al. (2019b) isolate this
increase as occurring from the mid-1990s onwards, a period when the nature of political
communication changed as parties became more acutely strategic with their use of language.
Further evidence of ‘elite polarisation’ is also found in the extensive literature (following
Poole and Rosenthal, 1985) that has measured the evolving ideological positions of elected
representatives using data on Congressional rollcall voting.
By comparison, the evidence about political polarisation amongst the general public (or
‘citizens’) is more contested than the findings that have emerged for political elites. In the US,
contributions such as Fiorina and Abrams (2008) make the point that both the underlying
distribution of views across issues and the level of self-identification with ‘strong’ political
positions have been stable over time. Similar scepticism about citizen polarisation in the US
is also evident in the studies of Glaeser and Ward (2006) and Ansolabehere et al. (2006), while
a recent analysis by Kaplan et al. (2019) emphasises an important trend of rising within-state
polarisation. In Europe, recent contributions by Algan et al. (2017) and Guiso et al. (2017)
have documented a strong pattern of populist politics across the continent that appears to
have roots in changing economic conditions. However, these populist trends are not necessarily
symptomatic of ideological polarisation. For example, Algan et al. (2017) detect no significant
shift in political positioning along the left-right scale in their cross-country sample and pick
up a decline in close party identification.63
In this paper, we propose a new approach to measuring citizen ideology and political
polarisation using unsupervised machine learning tools as applied to ‘issue-position’ data on
individual political views. In short, the core of our approach is based on applying Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic models (Blei et al., 2003) to individual-level survey responses
across a typical range of social and economic issues. Topic models are mainly known in
63In terms of international comparisons, recent work by Boxell et al. (2020) finds that the US stands out
internationally in terms of ‘affective’ polarisation (ie: dislike towards other political parties).
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the social sciences for their use in the analysis of text data, in particular for their capacity
in identifying the latent topic structure that underpins the generation of documents across
various corpora. Applications of topic modelling have thus proliferated recently with empirical
studies of text data across a range of social science questions (Gentzkow et al., 2019a). Within
economics, the general approach we take here for analysing discrete, non-text data is closest
to Bandiera et al. (2020)’s empirical model of behavioural manager ‘types’ in CEO time-use
data.
Similarly, rather than analysing text we instead make individual-level responses from
survey data the main objects of analysis, interpreting the latent topics as political ideologies
that underpin the generation of individual political beliefs amongst the general public. The
advantage of this particular approach is that it is based on a probabilistic generative model
of ideology, allowing individual beliefs to be explained as mixtures of latent ideologies. As
such, it is a concept of ideology that is directly empirical, that is, built up from the statistical
pattern of political views across the population. Our approach also allows the identified
citizen ideologies - defined practically as probability distributions over issue-positions - to
evolve over time such that ‘within’ and ‘between’ shifts in ideology can be measured. In this
way, we can move beyond ideologies defined based on political party affiliations.
We use this methodology to explore two main questions. Firstly, we ask: to what extent
do the general public hold beliefs that can be summarised as statistically coherent ‘ideologies’?
Further to this point, to what extent do the latent ideologies found in the data conform to
the traditional left-right ideological line that dominates both popular discourse and classic
formal models in the spirit of Downs (1957)? This assumption of systematic coherence in
political views within the population has been challenged by puzzles about citizen political
views that have emerged from research on subjects such as preferences over redistribution
(e.g Ashok et al., 2015)64, as well as recent critiques of the principle of retrospective voting
that have explored how people use different types of information in electoral decisions (Healy
and Malhotra, 2013)65.
The second main question we address is then: how do the empirically-based citizen
ideologies we identify vary across countries and over time? In practical terms, this involves
64For example, data on evolving political views indicates that the demand for re-distribution via taxation is
not increasing despite higher economic inequality. Ashok et al. (2015) show that, in US data, this cannot
be explained by a general ideological shift to the right and focus their explanations on how re-distributive
preferences vary by demographic sub-group.
65Achen and Bartels (2002) point out the apparent sensitivity of voters to arbitrary local events while
contributions such as Wolfers (2002) and Leigh (2009) test for evidence of economic voting.
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studying the factors that determine the ideological mixture of views held by citizens at the
individual level and assessing the extent to which aggregate shifts can be explained in terms
of changing demographics or other observables. Importantly, because our topic modelling
approach allows for the mixed membership of individuals with respect to latent ideologies,
it lets us parse individual ideological positions very finely. As a result, we can develop a
measure of ‘citizen slant’ that captures the degree to which individuals weigh alternative
ideologies within their overall beliefs. This measure captures, for example, the extent to which
a given person is, say, ‘a bit conservative and a bit liberal’. We then use this measure of
slant to better characterise overall patterns of political polarisation. In particular, we put
forward an analysis of multidimensional polarisation over more than two ideologies following
the framework of Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos et al. (2004).
The main data source we use in our analysis is the cross-country World Values Survey
(WVS) which provides a wide-ranging set of consistently asked questions from the late
1980s onwards. In answer to our first major question, a series of coherent citizen ideologies
do indeed emerge from our modelling. A left-right dimension is strongly evident in the
data but, alongside this, citizen confidence in institutions defines another major ideological
dimension. We generically label the ideological types that are characterized by low confidence
in institutions as ‘anarchist’ but note that the broad position that this type represents is
consistent with the anti-establishment or populist positions that have been the focus of recent
research (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Piketty, 2018; Rodrik). The anarchist label that we use is
meant to avoid pejorative interpretations of terms such as populist66 and emphasize opposition
to current institutional structures as the defining feature of this ideological type.
Our unsupervised machine learning models allows us to document that ideological types
emerge as a clear hierarchy of empirical ideologies as fit models with different numbers of
types to the WVS. Inspired by the literature on topic cohesion (e.g. Chang et al., 2009), we
propose a measure for the cohesion (quality) of ideologies based on a Normalized Pointwise
Mutual Information (NPMI) criteria, as tested on hold-out samples of our WVS data. Based
on this cohesion measure, our main empirical model of ideology takes the shape of a 4-type
model. We label the 4 main types as Liberal Centrist, Conservative Centrist, Left Anarchist,
and Right Anarchist.
Next, we use our findings regarding the structure of the ideologies to analyze the variation
66For example, see media critiques such as ‘Populism: It’s the BBC’s new buzzword, being used to sneer at
the ‘uneducated’ 17 million who voted for Brexit’ from the UK’s Daily Mail (Murray (2016)).
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of ideologies across countries and time periods. Firstly, at the level of the latent ideologies,
we find that our 4 main ideological types are stable over time with limited ‘within ideology’
changes, as measured by the weighting of different issue-positions. The most notable finding
here is an increase in the intensity of socially liberal attitudes across most types. For example,
the Conservative Centrist type shifts in their attitudes on issues such as homosexuality and
abortion.
Secondly, we use the information on individual type shares (the mixture parameter
in our LDA model) to measure how prevalent different ideologies are across countries and
how this changes over time. The general pattern is consistent with the existing literature
- for example, northern European countries are more liberal while countries with stronger
religious traditions are more conservative. In turn, this is reinforced by a sensible pattern of
correlations between individual-level characteristics and type shares (eg: women are more
liberal and conservatism increases with age). Our main finding here is that the composition
of the aggregate type shares is stable across time for most countries. However, a notable
exception is the US where the total type share for the two Anarchist types increases from
around 30% in the 1989-1993 wave to 50% by the fifth WVS wave in 2005-2009. The majority
of this increase is accounted for by the Right Anarchist type.
The ideological type shares also have interesting relationships with variables representing
self-positioning on the Left-Right scale and the probability of voting for ‘populist’ political
parties. We find a strong relationship between type shares and Left-Right self-positioning -
note here that the question on the positioning is excluded from the LDA model that defines
the types. The ideological type shares also prove to be better predictors of populist voting
than Left-Right self-positioning. For example, we estimate that an individual with a 50%
type share in either the Left or Right Anarchist ideologies has a 38% higher probability of
voting populist relative to the mean even after controlling for Left-Right self-positioning and
other covariates.
The final part of our analysis then uses the outputs of the empirical LDA model to
devise two further measures of ideological structure. The first ‘citizen slant’ measure we
calculate provides a within-person measure of ideological concentration and is constructed
following a basic Gini index logic. It directly exploits the mixed membership format of our
unsupervised learning framework to capture how partisan individuals are in their ideological
views. We find that the mean citizen slant across types, countries and years is relatively
high at around 0.75 on a 0-1 scale. The degree of slant or within-person concentration has
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also increased over the time window we consider. There is a slight increase in the case of
Europe (of around 1% relative to the baseline in the initial wave) but much stronger shifts
are apparent in the US. The rise in the US is also focused heavily on the Anarchist types
(which increased their slant by around 15%) as well as the Centrist Conservative type (a 5%
increase).
The second societal polarisation measure that we put forward builds on the framework
of Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos et al. (2004). This framework allows us to develop
a novel, multi-polar analysis of ideology in terms of own-group identification and between-
group alienation. Practically, this is achieved by leveraging the information on relative
group size within countries (where group membership is defined according to the dominant
type share), alongside the other information from the LDA model outlined above. We find
that changes in the level of polarisation over time are muted. Again, the US stands out as
experiencing the sharpest increase, chiefly driven by the compositional change in type shares
noted above. Interestingly, the nature of the US polarisation experience is more characteristic
of a ‘disappearing centre’ driven by the growth of anarchist types than it is by a traditional
left-right division.
Related Literature. The nature of this paper’s main topic (pun unintended) means
that it has connections with many literatures and contributions. Some areas to highlight
are the following. Firstly, there is the literature on democratic politics and populism, with
recent examples that include: Acemoglu et al. (2013), Algan et al. (2017), Buisseret and
van Weelden (2017), Bursztyn et al. (c), Dal Bó et al., Dal Bó et al. (2018), Guiso et al.
(2017), and Rodrik67. As discussed, our work sheds light on the potential long-run ideological
underpinnings of these political trends in the population.
Secondly, there is fast-growing literature that studies aspects of ideology, policy-making
and political communication using tools from machine learning and natural language processing.
This includes the already noted Gentzkow et al. (2019b) and Jensen et al. (2012), as well as
other text-based studies such as: Ash, Grimmer (2009), Hansen et al. (2014), Cagé et al. (2015)
and Jelveh et al. (2015). Another branch of this overall literature (Blaydes and Grimmer
(2013), Gross and Manrique-Vallier (2012), Wang et al. (2017), Munro and Ng (2019)) has
also begun to explore the application of unsupervised learning tools to survey response data.
67A range of studies that have looked at the recent determinants of voting patterns are also relevant here:
Becker et al. (2017), Dippel et al., Dorn et al. and Che et al..
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Finally, there is a large literature that explicitly addresses polarisation and fractionali-
sation along political, ethnic and cultural lines. This literature often focuses on measuring
group structure in societies and relating this to patterns of conflict. An indicative list includes:
Alesina et al. (2003), Bossert et al. (2011), Caselli and Coleman (2013), Duclos et al. (2004),
Esteban and Ray (1994) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Canen et al. (2020). Some
recent work of interest here includes Bertrand and Kamenica, who measure ‘cultural distance’
between population sub-groups in the US and find a constant relationship amongst most
outcomes and group splits. They do however note divergences in social attitudes based on
political ideology and income. Desmet and Wacziarg (2018) also examine cultural distance,
again finding stability across most dimensions.
Our paper extends the overall polarisation and fractionalisation literature by using a
rigorous, data-driven approach for the definition and analysis of ideological groups. Recent
works suggested that the left-right ideological model needs to be extended by either incorpo-
rating voters’ identity (Gennaioli and Tabellini, 2019), a “globalists” vs “nativists” dimension
(Piketty, 2018) or moral foundations Enke (2020). Our approach allows us to investigate
which ideological dimensions and groups are most apparent in survey data across Western
countries without reliance on predefined categories. Our results indicate that in addition to
the left-right spectrum, trust in institutions appears to be a significant determining element
of citizen ideology in the countries that we study.
The approach to identifying social sub-groups in a purely data-driven way has the
potential to inform the emerging literature on identity politics (Atkin et al.; Grossman and
Helpman; Shayo, 2009). Currently, this literature has focused on identity groups whose
definition hinges on, ex-ante characteristics (eg: race, gender, income class). Our methodology
shows that there is scope to define latent social sub-groups based on observable positions. We
also note that the ‘identification and alienation’ framework used in our polarisation measures
is directly analogous to key concepts in the identity literature (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000)
and therefore provides metrics to study the potential frictions between politically social groups
over time.
Structure. The paper is organized in the typical way. In section 2, we outline the
main data used, namely the World Values Survey (WVS) as well as our approach to defining
answers to survey questions as ‘issue-positions’. Section 3 describes our unsupervised learning
methodology for studying this issue-position data. This includes details on how we develop a
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hierarchy of ideological types and select the optimal number of topics in our LDA models.
Section 4 outlines the results and section 5 concludes.
3.2 Data
World Values Survey
For our main analysis, we use data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European
Values Study (EVS). These surveys are an output of a global research project conducted by
a large network of social scientists and run via a non-profit association based in Stockholm.
They have been widely deployed in social science research and some prominent studies using
the data include: Alesina et al. (2013, 2001); Blanchflower and Oswald (2008); Inglehart
(1997); and Norris (2016).
The WVS consists of 6 waves from 101 countries while the EVS consists of 4 Waves
from 48 countries. We construct what is formally known as the Integrated Value Survey (IVS)
by combining the two datasets. The resulting dataset contains the 4 EVS waves and the
corresponding waves 1, 2, 4 and 5 from the WVS68. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to this
combination of the data as the ‘World Values Survey (WVS)’.
The set of questions asked and countries covered differs across successive waves of
the WVS. We, therefore, develop a sample of WVS observations based on the principle of
capturing the widest range of consistently asked questions over waves and across countries69.
Since the first wave has limited country and question coverage70 we construct our sample from
the second wave onwards and develop a set of 17 countries in Europe and North America
(Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, United States, North Ireland) and 29
questions. The selected questions cover issues such as abortion, immigration, sexuality, the
role of government, and confidence in institutions. The resulting dataset contains a total of
82,338 observations over 3 waves spanning the years from 1989 to 2010.
68There is no wave of EVS that corresponds to the 6th wave of the WVS. Therefore, our main dataset ends
in 2010 to focus on a consistently defined set of repeated country-question cross-sections.
69We provide additional details on the selection of questions in Section 3.6.1. We also later find (in
Section 3.6.5) that the basic structure of the ideological clusters we identify is robust to the inclusion or
exclusion of questions.
70The countries Austria and Portugal, as well as 7 complete questions, are not contained in the first wave.
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Construction of Features
As part of the data preparation, we unify the coding of the questions and convert them to the
same scale. The intention here is to represent the answers to the survey questions as discrete
‘features’ for the subsequent topic modelling. Specifically, we recode the responses for each of
the 29 questions into two indicator variables expressing either support or opposition to each
issue, for example, an indicator variable if the person believes that abortion is justifiable and
a second indicator variable if the person opposes abortion. In cases where a person expressed
neither support or opposition to an issue both binary variables are coded as zero.
Summary statistics for the 58 recoded issue positions can be found in Table 3.1. Im-
portantly, the features cover a broad range of salient political issues. Several questions deal
with what would be typically classified as ‘social issues’ such as abortion, prostitution and
attitudes towards minority groups while three questions deal with classic economic questions
relating to the role of government, private sector competition and support for the welfare
state. Finally, there is a set of questions dealing with confidence in a comprehensive set of
social and political institutions.
The information in Table 3.1 indicates a rich mix of positions across political issues.
There is a current of anti-foreigner sentiment with 12.3% of respondents preferring not to
have immigrants as neighbours, and this is backed up by an overwhelming 60% endorsing a
priority for native workers in the allocation of scarce jobs. However, most respondents either
hold liberal or neutral views on leading social issues such as abortion and prostitution. There
also is a widespread lack of confidence in key institutions, with only around 35-45% expressing
a favourable view of the press, parliaments, the civil service and major companies.
3.3 Discovering Latent Ideology
We develop an approach based on machine learning topic models to investigate the pattern
of responses in the WVS data in terms of a generating structure characterized by latent
political ideologies. To be clear, we will define an ‘ideology’ as a probability distribution of
issue-position responses across questions. Since the basic methods we use are most commonly
applied to the analysis of text in terms of underlying topics or subjects, we first outline how
we adapt the methods to study citizen ideology. We then describe an approach for model
selection, that is, discerning the number of topics or ideological types that best describe the
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics, WVS Questions
Code Question Scale Share For Share Against
On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention
any that you would not like to have as neighbors?
0,1
A124 02 People of a different race 0.097 0.903
A124 06 Immigrants / foreign workers 0.123 0.877
A124 07 People who have AIDS 0.208 0.792
A124 08 Drug addicts 0.638 0.362
A124 09 Homosexuals 0.219 0.781
C002 Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following
statements?: ”When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority
to people of this country over immigrants.”
1-3 0.600 0.305
E036 Rate your view on a 1 to 10 scale between the positions: ”Private
ownership of business and industry should be increased” vs. ”Gov-
ernment ownership of business and industry should be increased”
1-10 0.506 0.255
E037 Rate your view on a 1 to 10 scale between the positions: ”Government
should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided
for” vs. ”People should take more responsibility to provide for them-
selves”
1-10 0.376 0.469
E039 Rate your view on a 1 to 10 scale between the positions: ”Competition
is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas” vs.
”Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people”
1-10 0.613 0.215
Could you tell me how much confidence you have in these organiza-
tions:
1-4
E069 01 Church 0.519 0.481
E069 02 Armed Forces 0.567 0.433
E069 04 The Press 0.356 0.644
E069 05 Labour Unions 0.385 0.615
E069 06 The Police 0.704 0.296
E069 07 Parliament 0.413 0.587
E069 08 The Civil Services 0.451 0.549
E069 13 Major Companies 0.432 0.568
E069 17 Justice System / Courts 0.533 0.466
Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it
can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:
1-10
F114 Claiming government benefits 0.076 0.869
F115 Avoiding a fare on public transport 0.086 0.842
F116 Cheating on taxes 0.106 0.828
F117 Someone accepting a bribe 0.035 0.931
F118 Homosexuality 0.407 0.432
F119 Prostitution 0.196 0.663
F120 Abortion 0.348 0.458
F121 Divorce 0.496 0.280
F122 Euthanasia 0.418 0.430
F123 Suicide 0.149 0.730
G006 How proud are you of your nationality? 1-4 0.885 0.115
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the recoded questions from the WVS. The third column reports the original
coding of the question in the WVS. Questions with a binary or 1–4 coding are recoded into two indicator variables expressing
either support or opposition to each issue. Questions with 1–3 or 1–10 allow for a neutral coding if the answer is coded as 3 or
5 in which case both indicator variables are coded as zero. The fourth (fifth) column contains the share of people are coded as
a positive (negative) response to the question.
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data. Finally, we discuss how we track changes over time within our overall topic model
methodology.
3.3.1 Discovering Citizen Ideology via Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA)
The basis of our approach is Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei et al., 2003) which can
be summarised as a Bayesian hierarchical model that defines a probabilistic structure for joint
distributions of observed data and latent generating factors. It was originally developed for
the unsupervised classification of text data into a user-chosen number of topics.
In the context of text-based applications, LDA makes use of the fact that authors tend
to use similar words when they talk about the same topic. For example, a text containing the
words ‘equilibrium’ and ‘preferences’ is far more likely to be about economics than sports. LDA
is therefore built on the principle of algorithmically classifying any corpus of text documents
as a probabilistic mixture of underlying topics. Again, as an example, a document discussing
a Pigovian tax might get classified as a mixture of a taxation topic and an environmental
policy topic. Each LDA topic is defined as a probability distribution over words. A taxation
topic, for example, might put high weights on the words ‘tax’, ‘revenue’ and ‘IRS’.
Since the LDA algorithm itself does not provide any topic labels and the standard
machine learning topic labelling approaches (e.g Lau et al., 2011; Aletras et al., 2014) are not
applicable in our setting, it is up to the user to interpret and judge the focus of each topic.
However, some metrics for ‘topic coherence’ are available for assessing the quality of a given
topic model and to facilitate the choice of the optimal number of topics.
At its core, LDA is a clustering algorithm for discrete data. As a result, LDA can be
used in non-text applications, for example, image classification tasks in the field of computer
vision (e.g. Putthividhy et al., 2010)71. For our study, we apply LDA to the WVS survey
responses of individuals. Instead of clustering frequently co-occurring words into a topic, LDA
will combine issue positions that are frequently held together into an ‘ideological type’. Each
of the respondents in the WVS will also be classified as a mixture of ideological types based
on their answers to questions, for example, as 20% ‘conservative’ and 80% ‘liberal’.
Each ideological type will be described by a probability distribution over issue positions.
This probability distribution describes how important the individual issue positions are for
71See also the collection by Airoldi et al. (2014) for a diverse set of applications of mixed membership
modelling.
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each ideological type. Our general approach is most closely related to Bandiera et al. (2020)
who model CEO time use across discretely-defined activities.
The advantage of LDA in comparison to other clustering algorithms is that it provides a
generative model of the data and thereby a quasi-microfoundation as each LDA parameter has
a direct empirical interpretation. While both Principal Component Analysis (PCA) or Factor
Analysis (FA) have been widely used to either identify the big 5 personality traits (e.g. Tupes
and Christal, 1961; Norman, 1963) or the general intelligence factor g (e.g. Spearman, 1904),
neither models the latent types of each individual directly. Moreover, both PCA and FA use
linear transformations of the data while LDA allows for non-linear relationships. Overall,
LDA is hence better suited for categorical data than either PCA or FA. Another advantage of
LDA is that it is a mixed membership model which describes every observation as a mixture
of types rather than in terms of some attachment to a single type or category, as in Latent
Class Analysis, k-means, or spectral clustering.
Underlying our LDA model of citizen ideology is a probabilistic model which assumes
that every individual i ∈ I can be described as a probabilistic mixture of t ∈ T topics or
‘types’. These probabilities are contained in a vector θi of type proportions. The latent T types
are described by ‘type vectors’ βt with a question response profile for each of the Q questions.
The entries in the type vector give the probability of holding a particular issue-position when
drawing from a particular latent type. The generative process underlying the data is defined
as:
1. For each individual i in the data draw ideological type proportions θi ∼ Dir(α), where
α is a hyperpameter
2. For each of the n ∈ Ni responses of individual i which we refer to as ri,n :
 Draw a type assignment zi,n ∼Mult(θi)
 Draw a response ri,n from P (ri,n|zi,n, β)








P (zi,n|θi)P (ri,n|zi,n, β)
 (3.9)
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The first term describes how likely it is to observe an individuals ideological type proportions
θi. The second term in brackets is the probability of observing the responses of individual’s
i. LDA identifies ideological types by finding parameter values for β and θi such that this
probability is maximized. Due to dimensionality, simply maximizing this likelihood for the
relevant parameters is computationally unfeasible. LDA therefore makes use of an approximate
inference algorithm. We use the inference algorithm developed by Hoffman et al. (2010, 2013)
and implemented by (Pedregosa et al., 2011).
In our application, the assumption of the independence of responses does not strictly
hold. If a question has been answered the same question cannot be answered again by the
same person. We discuss this in detail in Appendix 3.6.2, with specific reference to the survey
data application of Gross and Manrique-Vallier (2012). In short, the inference of LDA is
nonetheless still valid, since the bias in P (ri,n|zi,n) is identical for all types. Therefore, zi,n
still represents the correct probability of a person belonging to one ideological type. Only the
interpretation of the β vector changes. We provide an exposition of this specific point about
the β vector in Appendix 3.6.3.
3.3.2 Determining the Optimal Number of Types
LDA makes it possible to estimate any number of ideological types. Therefore, the question
of model selection is crucial for understanding which level of topic model best describes the
data. In recent years, several methods for the understanding of topic cohesion in text data
have been developed (e.g. Chang et al., 2009; Newman et al., 2010; Aletras and Stevenson,
2013; Lau et al., 2014). We modify these methods for the application to our “issue position”
data. One advantage of our topic cohesion approach is that it is also applicable to any LDA
model, especially non-text data. As such our approach could find application in any setting
where previously the number of topics was simply chosen by the authors.
Our approach follows standard k-fold cross-validation principles. K-fold cross-validation
works by fitting models to different parts or ‘folds’ of data. These models are then evaluated
against each other based on an appropriate measure of model fit. As is standard in machine
learning, the model with the best fit is used for analysis.
In our case, we first randomly split the data from the largest wave in our sample (wave
5) into 10 folds (each 10% of the data). Nine folds are then grouped into a training sample
and the remaining becomes the test sample. Afterwards, we fit 10 LDA models with different
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numbers of types (1 type up to 10 types) to the training sample. In each run of LDA, a
different test sample is chosen and we evaluate the fit of each model relative to this hold-out
data.
The optimal number of ideological types is then automatically chosen based on the
cohesion of the generated types. A type is more cohesive if the issue positions with the largest
weight for that type also frequently appear together in the held-out survey responses of WVS
participants. The intuition behind this is that more cohesive ideological types should put more
weight on issue positions that people frequently hold together, e.g. the co-occurrence of the
views that abortion and suicide are not justifiable. This approach is preferable to evaluating
the likelihood or the perplexity of the model in the hold out data, since the hold-out likelihood
is not necessarily a good predictor for human judgment of topic cohesion (see for example
Chang et al., 2009).
As a measure of co-occurrence of issue positions, we use Normalized Pointwise Mutual












Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI) is simply defined as the log-ratio of the joint and
marginal probabilities. Hence, PMI measures how probable it is that two features k and l
appear together in comparison to how often we would expect them to appear together if the
features were independent of each other. NPMI additionally normalizes PMI between [−1, 1].
If two features always appear together, their NPMI will be 1. In the case where two features
never appear together, their NPMI will be −1.72
The average NPMI for all pairwise combinations of the B most important issue positions






B · (B − 1)
(3.11)
72More details on the topic cohesion literature and an example for the calculation of NPMI can be found in
Section 3.6.4.
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Similarly, the overall cohesion for a model with M ideological types can be calculated






Follow the findings of Lau and Baldwin (2016) we average our measure of cohesion over
different number of features B ∈ (5, 10, 15, 20). As we discuss later, based on these scores we
choose the 4 type LDA specification as our benchmark model, since it seems to best describe
the pattern of responses across citizens.
Dynamic Type Models - Ideological Change Over Time.
The three waves of the WVS that we use stretch over 20 years. For our analysis, we want
to allow for the ideological types to change over time. We do this by fitting LDA models
separately to the 3 waves in our sample and only linking the ideological types together
afterwards based on the similarity of their issue positions. Our approach is more generic than
a dynamic topic model (Blei and Lafferty, 2006) or continuous topic model (Wang et al.,
2008) since we neither impose any assumptions on the dynamics of the ideological types nor
on the shares of the types over time. The general structure of our approach is most closely
related to the topic chains suggested in Kim and Oh (2011) and has the advantage of allowing
for completely different ideological patterns to emerge in each wave. But, as we will see, the
ideological types in our WVS data displays a high degree of stability over time.
3.4 Results
We report our results across four linked sub-sections. In the first sub-section, we show the
results of our LDA models in terms of different variants of type model - from 2-types to 5-types.
The results here indicate a coherent hierarchy of types across the models such that types can
be seen to ‘split off’ into related families as we move to higher-order models. The second
sub-section then applies the NPMI model selection criteria outlined above to the different
orders of type models with the conclusion that the 4-type model is the most preferred.
We then use the 4-type model as our main vehicle of analysis in the third sub-section,
focusing on within-type and between-type differences over time. To guide the reader, this
boils down to a close study of the β type vectors in the LDA model, that is, the probability
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distribution of issue-positions per estimated type. In the final subsection, we focus on how
the distribution of type proportions - essentially the θi values outputted by the LDA model -
play out over countries and time. In turn, this leads to our analysis of within-person slant
and country-level polarisation.
3.4.1 Hierarchy of Ideological Types.
In Table 3.2 we summarize the results of various orders of LDA models, reporting the ‘top
ten’ features for each type. These top ten features represent the issue-positions with the
highest probability values in the β type vectors and are effectively the defining features of
each ideological type. We present the results as separate panels in the table per order of type
model. 73
Panel (a) shows the results for the basic 2-type model in the first column. These
two types are distinguished by stances on social issues - for example, a liberal attitude
towards minority groups (eg: reporting ‘no problems’ with neighbours who are homosexuals
or immigrants) by one type and conservative positions on social issues such as abortion and
prostitution by the other type. We, therefore, label these types in panel (a) generically as
‘Left’ and ’Right’. Across the 58 features, the β topic vectors for these types have a correlation
of 0.39, indicating that they have some common positions.
The second column of panel (a) then reports the top features for the 3-type model.
Two ‘Left’ and ’Right’ types distinguished mainly by their positions on social issues such
as sexuality, race and abortion are still apparent. However, the most striking result from
this model is the nature of the third type. Rather than being a simple mixture of the basic
Left-Right types of the earlier model the third type draws on a qualitatively different set of
issue-positions for its top features. Specifically, the third type draws heavily on features that
represent low confidence in major institutions such as parliament, the civil service, the press
and major companies. We provide a more detailed discussion of the rationale for our type
labels in the next sub-section but here we flag type 3 as an ‘Anarchist’ type to reflect this
type’s opposition to the current workings of major social institutions. In contrast, the main
left and right types in the 3-type model report confidence in institutions across the majority
73The type hierarchy we show in Table 3.2 relates to wave 5 only. We focus on this wave as it represents the
latest version or ‘most recent evolution’ across time of our basic types. However, as we show across multiple
exercises (cohesion-based model selection, pooled wave model), the type structure is very stable over time.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) 4-5 Type Model
4 Type Model 5 Type Model
Liberal Centrist Liberal Centrist
Confidence: Police Confidence: Police
No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals Confidence: Justice System/Courts
No problem Neighbours: People different race Confidence: The Civil Services
Justifiable: divorce Justifiable: divorce
Proud of nationality Confidence: Parliament
No problem Neighbours: People AIDS Proud of nationality
Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe No problem Neighbours: People different race
No problem Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers Confidence: Armed Forces
Not Justifiable: claiming government benefits Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
Confidence: Justice System/Courts No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals
Conservative Centrist Conservative Centrist
Confidence: Police Not Justifiable: abortion
Confidence: Churches Not Justifiable: euthanasia
Confidence: Armed Forces Not Justifiable: prostitution
Not Justifiable: suicide Not Justifiable: suicide
Not Justifiable: prostitution No problem Neighbours: People different race
Not Justifiable: abortion Confidence: Churches
Proud of nationality No problem Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers
Confidence: Justice System/Courts Confidence: Police
Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
Confidence: The Civil Services Not Justifiable: cheating on taxes
Left Anarchist Left Anarchist
No Confidence: Churches No Confidence: Armed Forces
Justifiable: divorce No Confidence: Churches
No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals No Confidence: Parliament
No problem Neighbours: People AIDS No Confidence: Major Companies
No problem Neighbours: People different race No Confidence: Police
No problem Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals
No Confidence: Parliament No Confidence: Civil Services
Justifiable: homosexuality No Confidence: Justice System/Courts
No Confidence: Armed Forces No problem Neighbours: People AIDS
No Confidence: Major Companies No problem Neighbours: People different race
Right Anarchist Right Anarchist
No Confidence: Parliament Against Neighbours: People AIDS
No Confidence: Civil Services Against Neighbours: Homosexuals
No Confidence: Justice System/Courts Against Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers
No Confidence: The Press Against Neighbours: Drug addicts
No Confidence: Labour Unions If Jobs scarce: priority to (nation) people
No Confidence: Major Companies Not Justifiable: homosexuality
Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe No Confidence: Parliament
Not Justifiable: claiming government benefits Against Neighbours: People different race
Not Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport Not Justifiable: suicide
Not Justifiable: cheating on taxes Proud of nationality
Market Liberal
No Confidence: Parliament
No Confidence: Civil Services
No Confidence: The Press
No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals
No problem Neighbours: People different race
No problem Neighbours: People AIDS
Not Justifiable: claiming government benefits
Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
No Confidence: Labour Unions
No problem Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers
Notes: This table reports the 10 most important features based on the β vectors for a n-type LDA model, where n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}.
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of features in this category. We label these types as ‘Liberal Centrist’ and ‘Conservative
Centrist’ to reflect their contrasting positions on social issues but common pattern of support
for established political institutions.74
The top features for the 4-type model are reported in the third column of panel (a),
Table 3.2. The type structure continues to evolve here. Most notably, two anarchist types
now become apparent, again distinguished by contrasting views on social issues but similar
positions in terms of confidence (or lack thereof) in institutions. These are labelled ‘Left
Anarchist’ and ‘Right Anarchist’ to reflect this.75 Intuitively, the top ten features reported in
panel (c) suggest a splitting of the Anarchist type from the 3-type model has occurred.76
We can validate this by examining the cross-model correlations in the weights on
issue-positions in the β type vectors. These correlations are useful for indicating how close
the individual types in the 4-type model are to those in the lower order 3-type order. We
report these in Figure 3.1. In line with the intuitive ‘eyeballing’ of the top features, the Left
Anarchist and Right Anarchist types are most strongly correlated with the Anarchist type
from the 3-type model, with correlation measures of 0.86 and 0.68 respectively. This splitting
of the Anarchist type is reinforced by the continuity in the Liberal Centrist and Conservative
Centrist types as we go from the 3-type to 4-type model. These two types can be tracked
across the different hierarchies of type model, with correlations of 0.97 (Liberal Centrist) and
0.88 (Conservative Centrist) across the models.
The top features for a further 5-type model are reported in panel (b) of Table 3.2.
Additional nuances in the types become evident here. The set of Liberal Centrist, Conservative
Centrist and Left Anarchist types remain intact relative to the 4-type model but there appears
to a splitting of the Right Anarchist type. Two variants of the Right Anarchist emerge. One
variant still expresses a lack of confidence in institutions but appears to be liberal on social
issues and is economically liberal in terms of attitudes towards unions and the claiming of
government benefits. We label this type as ‘Market Liberal’77. The other variant of the Right
Anarchist is not socially liberal, with a string of conservative positions on minorities and
74Note here that the Conservative Centrist type in the 3-type model reports confidence in the churches,
armed forces and police as its 11th-13th ranked features.
75The Right Anarchist type reports pride in his nationality, opposition to prostitution and drug addicts in
the 11th-15th ranked features.
76Further evidence on which features separate the types for this 4-type model can be found in Table 3.16 in
the Online Appendix, which reports the most important type differences.










































































































































































































































































































































































social issues amongst its top ten features. The correlations indicate that this type is strongly
correlated (0.64) with the original Right Anarchist from the 4-type model but negatively
correlated with the Liberal Centrist (-0.195) and Left Anarchist types (-0.295) types.
Further results on potential 6-type and 7-type models are reported in Table 3.12 in
Section 3.6.6. The basic set of types is preserved such that we can directly label the types in
line with those identified in the 4-type and 5-type models. The evolution of the hierarchy is
apparent in the further splitting of the Right Anarchist type (6-type model) and the emergence
of a nihilistic ‘Super Anarchist’ type (7-type model).
Overall, the results presented above indicate that both the low-order (2 or 3 types) and
higher-order (4 plus types) models offer plausible sets of types and, considered together, can
be interpreted in terms of a coherent hierarchy. We next turn to the question of formal model
selection using the NPMI framework outlined previously.
3.4.2 Model Selection and Type Labelling
Automatic Model Selection
Our NPMI framework for assessing model cohesion is based on comparing predictions of
feature co-occurrence in hold-out data. Simply put, the approach asks: to what extent do the
(say) top 10 features suggested by our type models occur together in data held out from the
original estimation of the given model? Figure 3.2 reports the results of this exercise for all
waves of the WVS. The x-axis denotes the order of model we are estimating (going from a
1-type model up to a 10-type model) while the y-axis denotes the resulting cohesion score.
In the 5th wave, the cohesion scores show an inverse u-shape pattern. At first, the
cohesion score increases with the number of topics. After the number of topics increases
beyond 4, the cohesion scores begin to fall. The exception being 8 topics for which we observe
another increase of the cohesion score. Overall, the most cohesive models (M) appear to
be either the 4 or 3 type models. We decided to use the 4 type model, since it delivers a
higher cohesion score. In Figure 3.2 we also show that the 4 type model is preferred when
we repeat the analysis for the other waves of the WVS. Only in the pooled model, there is
a slight preference of the 3-type specification over the 4-type model. Given this evidence,
our analysis from this point, therefore, employs the 4-type model composed of the Liberal
Centrist, Conservative Centrist, Left Anarchist and Right Anarchist types.
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# of Types
Notes: This figure show the topic cohesion scores calculated for models with M ∈ {1 − 10} types for the
2nd/4th/5th wave as well as for a pooled model. The topic cohesion is calculated based on different numbers
of features B ∈ (5, 10, 15, 20). Afterwards, the average of the cohesion scores for different values of B is taken.
See Section 3.4.2 for a more detailed description.
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That said, note that our results do not hinge on this aspect of model specification and
are qualitatively very similar if we use models of higher or lower numbers of types. The reason
for this is that the types develop as part of a coherent hierarchy (see Figure 3.1). Moving to
a 3 or 5 type model hence does not fundamentally change (for example) the prevalence of the
Anarchist types in the data. We will return to this point about model specification again as
we discuss various results (eg: on ‘slant’, polarisation, and links with populist voting).
Type Labelling
The labelling of our LDA-derived types is a point for discussion. An important advantage of
our approach is that it is based on ideologies that emerge from the ‘bottom-up’ collection of
views amongst the general public. The topics that we identify are empirical ideologies and
may not necessarily have a tight mapping to traditional taxonomies of ideology78.
Our labelling attempts to capture the main empirical differences in issue-positions
between types. Note that we primarily use labels to simplify the exposition since we otherwise
would have to refer to the types by numbers. Furthermore, the type labelling does not drive
any of our results. Arguably, the main issue here is the labelling of types 3 and 4, which we
have dubbed Left and Right Anarchist respectively. These two types are strongly distinguished
by issue-positions that hinge on (low) confidence in institutions79. We use the term ‘anarchist’
to denote a pattern of opposition to current structures of political authority and hierarchical
organization. That is, our use of the term is meant to be distinct from historical uses of the
label, as per early socialist or syndicalist thinkers such as inter alia, Proudhon, Bakunin or
Kropotkin.
Other plausible labels for these types are ‘Populist’ or ‘anti-Establishment’. In particular,
the fact that recent studies of populism (such as Algan et al. (2017)) have directly leveraged
data on institutional trust provides some foundation for such a branding. However, we choose
Anarchist as our label for this type because (i) it is a more generic and potentially neutral
78These taxonomies, covered in texts such as Vincent (2009) and Geoghegan (2003), are centred on
‘classical’ ideologies (eg: liberalism, conservatism, socialism) that are often explicitly articulated as bodies of
thought by key writers (Locke, Burke, Stuart Mill, Marx), as well as modern ‘post-materialist’ ideologies (eg:
environmentalism, feminism).
79See Appendix Table 3.16 for a breakdown of the largest differences in β issue-position weights across pairs
of types. This shows the points of separation between the Centrist and Anarchist types.
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term for the concept of an opposition to existing institutional structures80, and (ii) the types
that we identify are apparent from the early 1990s, thereby pre-dating the latest wave of
populist politics. As a result, our empirical findings indicate that there may be some clear
historical roots to the current populist trend, extending at least as far back as the late 1980s.
Alternative Models
In our appendix, we discuss two further modelling issues that relate to the quality of the
information provided via the LDA framework. Firstly, in Appendix 3.6.5 , Table 3.10 we look
at the sensitivity of our baseline 4-type model to the removal and addition of features. The
basic model is very robust to the removal of features with types from iterative ‘leave one out’
models showing a high correlation with the types in the original model. The relative ordering
of β weights is also preserved when we substantially widen the feature set (ie: add lots more
questions - see Appendix 3.6.5 Table 3.11).81 Both of these exercises provide reassurance that
our overall baseline feature set is comprehensive enough to identify stable types in the data.
The second modelling issue that we examine (in Appendix 3.6.11) is a comparison
of our LDA approach with other unsupervised learning methods. Specifically, we apply
principal components analysis (PCA), factor analysis (FA) and k-means clustering to the
same discretized feature data as our LDA models. As we discuss in Appendix 3.6.11, these
alternative approaches are distinct from LDA in that they are linear methods and capture
mixed membership relationships in a less explicit way. For example, a method such as PCA
will pick out linear combinations of features with the highest degrees of variance in the data
and therefore may not parse more complex data generating processes.
This is borne out in the types derived from these models which are reported in Ap-
pendix Tables 3.21, 3.22 and 3.23. The PCA models tend to identify conservative and
anti-establishment types as part of the main model components, with no clear centrist or
socially liberal types emerging. The FA and k-means models produce similar results. Further
to this, no plausible hierarchy or ‘family’ of types emerges from these alternative models.
80As mentioned, the term ‘populist’ can be considered pejorative - see the blunt critique of UK’s Daily Mail
(Murray (2016)). The term ‘anti-establishment’ is subject to similar concerns, with competing claims of who
the elite or establishment are. See, for example, Hume(2017) for a polemic about the liberal establishment
and Jones(2014) for one about the conservative establishment.
81Among the questions in the widened feature set are many that no do not directly relate to political
ideologies and which were therefore excluded from our baseline model. Further, some of the added questions
are missing for close to 50% of the data and nearly a third of all questions are missing for more than 10% of
the sample. Hence the model with the widened feature set requires extensive imputation and does not lend
itself to be used as a baseline model.
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Again, this provides reassurance that our LDA models - which are, after all, specifically
intended for the analysis of discrete multinomial data - identify stable and interpretable types
that are difficult to pin down using other methods.
Cross-Check Exercise Using the European Social Study
As further validation of our findings, we cross-check our results using the European Social
Survey (ESS). This exercise serves two purposes. First, we want to demonstrate that our LDA
methodology extends to other survey data. Second, we aim to understand if it is possible to
recover similar ideological types using a different data set and a comparable set of questions.
If our main LDA exercise is picking up valid latent types from the WVS data then this ‘signal’
should be apparent in other datasets.
Section 3.6.7 provides additional details on the ESS data and reports the full list of
questions we selected for the exercise. Overall, the results from this exercise (see Section 3.6.7
for details) are striking. Although we use a completely different data set and varied the set
of questions, the types that emerge from the ESS are broadly similar to those we identify
in the WVS. In particular, we again find a split of the ideological types along the left-right
spectrum and see a set of types characterized by their distrust in institutions.
3.4.3 Changing Ideologies?
Given the baseline 4-type model established above our next exercise examines within and
between-type shifts across the different waves of the WVS. Our approach here is to estimate
the 4-type model separately for each wave and compare the β type vectors over time.
The first point to note is that our main types are stable and repeat themselves across
waves. This is evident in Table 3.3a which reports the correlations between the separately
estimated types across waves. It is straightforward to pin down similar types across waves
since the correlations are high, for example, the Liberal Centrist type showing a correlation
of 0.97 between waves 2 and 4 or the Right Anarchist type reporting a correlation of 0.94
between waves 2 and 5.
These high correlations also imply that there are fairly limited ‘within-type’ shifts over
time, as measured by the probability weights in the β type vectors. Since we are using the
same issue-position features across waves we can directly report the shifts in probabilities
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Table 3.3: Type Correlations
(a) Between-Wave Type Correlations
Centrist Liberal Centrist Conservative Left Anarchist Right Anarchist
Wave 2 Wave 2 Wave 2 Wave 2
Wave 4 0.973 0.985 0.963 0.981
Wave 5 0.935 0.963 0.943 0.939
Notes: This table reports the correlation of the β issue-position probability weights across types estimated in separate waves.
That is, we identify 4 types in the initial Wave 2 (1989-1993) and correlate their β weights with the most similar types estimated
separately on Waves 4 (1989-1993) and 5 (2004-2009).
(b) Within-Wave Type Correlations
Wave 2
Liberal Centrist Conservative Centrist Left Anarchist Right Anarchist
Liberal Centrist 1.000
Conservative Centrist 0.418 1.000
Left Anarchist 0.225 -0.525 1.000
Right Anarchist 0.191 0.267 0.130 1.000
Wave 4
Liberal Centrist Conservative Centrist Left Anarchist Right Anarchist
Liberal Centrist 1.000
Conservative Centrist 0.468 1.000
Left Anarchist 0.322 -0.505 1.000
Right Anarchist 0.251 0.289 0.178 1.000
Wave 5
Liberal Centrist Conservative Centrist Left Anarchist Right Anarchist
Liberal Centrist 1.000
Conservative Centrist 0.523 1.000
Left Anarchist 0.257 -0.408 1.000
Right Anarchist 0.224 0.287 0.265 1.000
Notes: This table shows the correlation of the β issue-position probability weights amongst types in the same wave. That is, we
estimate our 4 types using data on a single wave and then correlate the β weights across pairs of types in the same wave.
per feature. To facilitate the interpretation we have re-scaled the β vectors as described in
Section 3.6.382.
These probabilities can be interpreted as statistics for the approximate ‘likelihood of
expression’ for a given issue-position conditional on drawing on a latent type. For example, a
(re-scaled) β weight of 0.46 for ‘Confidence: Labor Unions’ within the Liberal Centrist type
indicates that an individual drawing on this type to form their issue-position will express
confidence in this institution 46% of the time.
The ten largest shifts in probabilities for the Wave 2-5 difference are shown in Figure 3.3
for each type. The baseline numbers are also reported in Appendix Table 3.15 along with the
82Since the rescaling of the β vectors is a non-linear transformation, the changes between the re-scaled β
vectors and unscaled β vectors can differ. See Section 3.6.3 for further technical details.
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changes.83 The most noticeable trend is an increase in socially liberal attitudes across types
with, for example, the Conservative Centrist increasing their weights on issue-positions such
as ‘No problem neighbours: Homosexual’ and ‘No problem neighbours: People with AIDS’.
Also notable is the Right Anarchist type, which shows higher confidence in the police and
armed forces over time, along with more intense hostility towards immigration. Some of these
changes are nominally large, with 10-15% increases in liberal attitudes on gay rights for the
Conservative Centrist and 20-30% increases in confidence for the armed forces and police for
the Right Anarchist. However, the overall changes in the β weights have not been pervasive
enough to drastically shift the between-wave correlations evident in Table 3.3a84.
The between-type differences can also be summarized using correlations across the β
type vectors within the WVS waves and we show these in Table 3.3b. The increase in the
intensity of socially liberal issue-positions is now most clearly seen via the increasing closeness
between the Conservative Centrist type and the two left-wing types. Between waves 2 and 5
the negative correlation with the Left Anarchist type moderates (going from -0.525 to -0.408)
while the correlation with the Liberal Centrist type strengthens (from 0.418 to 0.523). Hence,
at the between-type level defined by the β-vectors, we can say that there has been some
convergence in the overall ideologies driven in part by attitudes on social issues. Despite this
convergence, note that the types remain clearly distinct and opposite to each other on many
issues. As an illustration, in Appendix Table 3.16 we report the most important differences
between the 4 types for the 5th wave.
3.4.4 Analysis of Type Shares
Correlates of Type Shares and Country Differences
We start the analysis of the θi individual type shares by studying the micro-level correlates.
In particular, we estimate regressions of the individual type shares of the following form:
yticw = X
′
icwδ + τw + µc + εicw (3.13)
83Note that given the coding of each question into two features, the issues of decreasing importance will be
approximately the opposite of the increasing features. Again, this relates to our adaptation of the LDA model
for studying survey questions, which we outline in Section 3.6.2 and Section 3.6.3
84In the case of Right Anarchist attitudes towards the police and armed forces it should be noted that this














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































, where Xicw is a vector of covariates including the gender, age and the employment status.
85
τw and µc are wave and country fixed effects. The dependent variable y
t
icw is the share of
type t of individual i in country c and wave w. Since the dependent variable is a continuous
share the regression tells us how the intensity of ideological positions changes with different
covariates. The results are reported in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Correlates of Individual-level Type Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Liberal Centrist Conservative Centrist Left Anarchist Right Anarchist
Female 0.015*** 0.010*** -0.011*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.003*** 0.004*** -0.003*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployed -0.073*** -0.003 0.049*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Wave 4 0.086*** -0.055*** 0.007*** -0.039***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Wave 5 0.069*** -0.076*** 0.032*** -0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 81,141 81,141 81,141 81,141
R-squared 0.143 0.105 0.111 0.055
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column reports the regression results for individual level regression of Equation (3.13). The dependent variable
are the type shares for one of the 4 types created by LDA. Robust standard errors are used. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, and * p<0.1. The data come from the World Value Survey and the European Value Survey.
We run four regressions corresponding to each type. These indicate some intuitively
plausible correlations - women are more liberal and centrist, with a magnitude of 1.5% points,
and the unemployed have higher shares in the two anarchist ideologies. Furthermore, there
are clear shifts in the distribution of type shares over time. After conditioning on covariates,
it is evident that the Liberal Centrist share increases by around 6.9% points after Wave 2
with the Conservative Centrist share falling by a similar amount. Following a similar pattern,
the Left Anarchist share rises in Waves 4 and 5 while the Right Anarchist share falls.
Hence, across the sample of countries, the net result is a growth in the share of the two
left-wing types (ie: Liberal Centrist and Left Anarchist). However, there are also significant
country-level factors evident from the individual-level analysis. The country fixed effects in
Table 3.4 account for 50-75% of the explained variation and we plot the country-level means
by type in Figure 3.4. This again shows some expected relationships - northern European
85We only use a limited number of covariates in this exercise because these are the most complete ones
available in the WVS in terms of missing values. When we run similar exercises with additional variables on
reduced samples (circa N = 50,000) we get similar results (eg: low incomes are positively correlated with
Anarchist shares, high education is positive with Liberal Centrism). These results available on request.
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countries (eg: Denmark, Finland, Netherlands) are more liberal while countries with strong
religious traditions (Malta, Ireland, Portugal) are more conservative.
To summarize the changes across countries over time we implement some splits along
different ideological dimensions. Firstly, in Figure 3.5a we examine the left-right distinction
and pool the type shares for the left-wing Liberal Centrist and Left Anarchist types.86 The
plot of changes in these pooled type shares between Waves 2 (1989-1993) and 5 (2005-2009)
shows that most countries have moved left ideologically, with a mean shift of 8% points. In
Figure 3.5b we then plot the changes for the pooled Left and Right Anarchist types. This
provides an indicator of the overall strength of anti-establishment ideological sentiment across
countries. The results show a large increase in the Anarchist type shares for the US (around
16% points), with significant increases also evident for the Anglo-Celtic domains (Great
Britain, Northern Ireland) and the Netherlands. In net terms, however, the anarchist trend is
more muted across countries.
In Figure 3.6, we further probe the sharp increase in the Anarchist ideologies for the US.
The clearest development is the growth in the US Right Anarchist share, which increases from
a 24.9% share in Wave 2 (1989-1993) to 36.5% in Wave 5 (2005-2009). Note here however
that this increase took place as a single step change between Waves 4 (1999-2004) and 5
(2005-2009). By comparison, the rise of the US Left Anarchist share from 7.9% to 12.7% was
more gradual across the waves.
As discussed in Section 3.2, the set of countries available in wave 6 (post 2010) of the
WVS is limited. However, in Section 3.6.8 we provide evidence that for the available countries
the patterns in the 6th wave are consistent with the trends we document for wave 5. For
example, the Anarchist type shares in the US remain at a high level.
Overall, these country-level findings are generally consistent with other international
studies of shifts in political attitudes (Inglehart (1997); Inglehart et al. (2010)). Taken together
with the within-type analysis, the basic message on the ideological change that follows from
our methodology so far is one of a stable structure of ideologies over 20 years and some
increase in social liberalism. This increase in social liberalism has occurred both on the
intensive margin (ie: the weights on liberal issue-positions in the β vectors) as well as the
extensive margin (the growing individual-level type shares for the Liberal Centrist and Left
86The type differences are based on the sum of the average type shares for the Liberal Centrist and Left
Anarchist types for each country and wave. The figure then plots the difference between a country’s average














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.5: Changes of Types over Time
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Notes: This figure shows the change in θ type shares by country between Waves 2 (1989-1993) and 5 (2005-2009)
in the WVS. In 4(a) we pool the type shares for the Liberal Centrist and Left Anarchist types. In figure 4(b)
we show the pooled change in the Left Anarchist and Right Anarchist types. 95% confidence intervals are
reported in red.
Figure 3.6: Type Shares - US vs non-US



































































Notes: This figure compares the levels of θ type shares across waves for the Left Anarchist and Right Anarchist
types. We pool all 16 non-US countries (effectively all Western European countries apart from Iceland and
Canada) and contrast them to the US. The pooling for the non-US sample is based on WVS sample weights.
The timing of the waves is Wave 2 (1989-1993), Wave 4 (1999-2004) and Wave 5 (2005-2009). 95% confidence
intervals are reported in red.
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Anarchist types). The other major development in the data on type shares is the strong tilt
towards anti-establishment Anarchist ideologies in some countries - particularly the US.
Ideological Types and the Left-Right Scale.
We next analyze the relationship between our ideological types and the self-positioning of
individuals on a left-right scale. For this analysis, we make use of question E033 in the WVS,
which asks people to position themselves on a scale of 1 (left) to 10 (right). Recall that this
measure of self-positioning is not one of the ingredients in the feature set for our LDA analysis.
It is held out from the estimation of the ideological clusters and therefore provides a useful
test of validity.
The mean left-right scores according to the dominant type are telling. Individuals with
a dominant Left Anarchist type position themselves furthest to the left (mean: 4.33), followed
by the Liberal Centrist (5.24), Right Anarchist (5.49) and the Conservative Centrist (mean:
5.74).87 In line with our previous findings, average political attitudes are moving leftwards
with a shift of -0.17 on the left-right scale between waves 2 and 5.
In Figure 3.7, we visualize the relationship between the right-wing (Conservative Centrist
and Right Anarchist) type shares and the left-right scale. We find a strong relationship
between the type shares and the political orientation of individuals. As expected, the larger
the share of the right-wing types in an individual, the further right they place themselves
on the political spectrum. The inverse mechanically holds for the left-wing type shares (not
shown). This provides further validation for our type labels as they appear to align with the
classic left-right ideological spectrum.
Ideological Types and Populism.
Lastly, we investigate whether our anarchist types are associated with stronger support for
populist parties. To do so we consider the question “which political party would you vote
for” (question code E179/E179WVS). We recode the responses of individuals as populist
parties based on the classification by Rooduijn et al. (2019) (See Section 3.6.9 for additional
details). In Figure 3.7 panel (b) we then plot the support for populist parties conditional on
the anarchist type shares of the individual. Again a clear positive relationship between voting
87Note that, while the mean difference in positioning appears nominally small in these comparisons this is
because answers are clustered on middle values: more than 55% of the people position themselves between 4
and 6 on the Left-Right line.
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for populist parties and the anarchist ideologies emerges. This suggests that the anarchist
types might indeed be a base for populist political mobilisation.
Figure 3.7: Self-positioning on Left-Right Scale and Support for Populist Parties
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Notes: The binscatter in panel (a) visualizes the relationship between the individual-level type share of the
right-wing types (Conservative Centrist and Right Anarchist) and the self-positioning of individuals on a 1
(left) to 10 (right) scale based on question E033 from the World Value Survey. Panel (b) shows the relationship
between the individual-level share of anarchist types and the voting for populist parties coded according to
Rooduijn et al. (2019). See Table 3.19 in the online appendix for the full list of parties.
As further evidence, we estimate a simple linear probability model (LPM) of voting for
populist parties in Table 3.5, contrasting the explanatory power of our ideological type share
variables with that of the left-right self-positioning question. Table 3.5 shows a strong positive
relationship between the anarchist type shares and populist voting across all specifications.
Interestingly, the left-right self-positioning question only has a significant association when
we specify the variable either as a set of dummies for far left or far right positions ((column
(4)) or as a step function for each value (Figure 3.8).
In particular, this Figure 3.8 step function shows a U-shape in the probability of populist
voting with respect to the left-right scale. That is, people located near the centre of the scale
are the least likely to vote populist. One possibility here is that the anarchist type shares
are proxying for extreme left or right positioning. However, as noted above, in column (4) of
Table 3.5 we control for indicator variables of extreme positioning and this has minimal effects
on the previous association. The anarchist type share variables appear to pick up tendencies
for populist support from across the left-right spectrum. This association is non-negligible:
based on the estimates in Table 3.5, we calculate that an individual with a 50% type share in
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Table 3.5: Support for Populist Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Types L-R Scale Types L-R Scale Dummies Far Left/Right
Cons. Centrist -0.007** -0.007** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
L. Anarchist 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.033***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
R. Anarchist 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)






Observations 67,666 67,666 67,666 67,666
R-squared 0.050 0.047 0.050 0.052
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column reports the regression results for individual level regression. The dependent variable is an indicator variable
for the support of a populist party. Robust standard errors are used. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
The data come from the World Value Survey and the European Value Survey. Note that the 67,666 sample presented here
is smaller than our main 81,141 sample due to missing values and non-responses for the populist voting and left-right scale
questions.
one of the anarchist type has a 34% higher probability of voting for a populist party relative
to the sample baseline.88
‘Citizen Slant’ - Within-Person Concentration
Our analysis so far has focused on changes at the level of the ideological types as well as the
total shares in the types across the sample. However, for the analysis of the polarisation,
the loadings of individuals on the four types is of key importance. In particular, the ‘mixed
membership’ structure of our approach means that two countries with the same overall type
distribution can have completely different individual type compositions.
For example, imagine a country which has an overall 50% share in Type 1 and 50% share
in a second Type 2. This country can either consist of completely identical individuals with
50% shares in the two types or it could consist of half the population holding a 100% share in
Type 1 and another half with a 100% share in Type 2. These two possible type compositions
have very different implications for the understanding of societal polarisation. A country
88As an additional exercise, we tested whether these findings also held across the entire left-right spectrum
by running regressions that split for each value of the left-right scale. For nearly all values of the scale a higher
Anarchist type share is associated with more support for populist parties. These results are available by
request, though note that the level shift in the U-shape plotted in Figure 3.8 directly corroborates this point.
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Notes: The figure plots the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for individual level regression, where
the dependent variable is an indicator variable for the support of a populist party. The independent variable
is a full set of indicators variables for an individuals positioning along the left-right spectrum, the excluded
categorie being 1 (far left). The reported coefficients in red additionally controls for the individual level type
shares θi.
with two separate sets of ‘pure’ homogeneous types is plausibly more vulnerable to political
conflict than a country where there is more ideological heterogeneity at the individual level.
We therefore develop a measure of how strongly an individual is loading on one of the
four ideological types by constructing a Gini-style measure of within-person concentration or












where θti and θ
s
i are the types shares of individual i. In short, this approach is aggregating
the absolute pairwise difference in ideological shares that exist at the individual level. The
measure of within-person concentration Gi is monotonically increasing the more an individual
loads on one of the ideological types. If a person has a 100% share in one type then Gi will
be equal to 1, while Gi = 0 implies shares of 25% in all types.
In this way, our measure captures how segregated type shares are on a within-individual
basis. Furthermore, it allows us to analyze which groups exhibit a particularly high tendency
towards within-person concentration. We plot the (Wave 5) country means of the Gi measure
in Figure 3.9 along with the changes between Wave 2 and 5. This shows that Gi is relatively
high across the sample with a mean of around 0.75. However, between-country differences are
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not dramatic. There is only a 7% gap between the most and least concentrated countries and
the ordering does not suggest that any particular ideological types are driving concentration.
That is, amongst the most concentrated or ‘slanted’ countries we see cases of both relatively
Conservative and Liberal countries defined in terms of the mean type shares seen earlier. The
major, positive country-level shifts in slant over the waves occurred in Denmark, Finland and
the US (Figure 3.9a) but the changes were muted for most countries.
Figure 3.9: Citizen Slant by Country
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the shows the change in our Gi Gini within-person ideological concentration measure
(‘citizen slant’) from Waves 2 (1989-1993) to 5 (2005-2009) by country. Panel (b) shows the level of the
within-person Gini measure by country in Wave 5. 95% confidence intervals are reported in red. Country
means and confidence intervals are calculated using WVS sample weights.
To study the importance of individual characteristics on within-person concentration
(as well as the development of Gi over time) we estimate the following regression equation:
Gicw = X
′
icwδ + τw + µc + εicw (3.15)
where Xicw is a vector of covariates
89, τw are wave dummies, µc are the country dummies
and Gicw is the of Gini coefficient of individual i in country c and wave w. The results are
reported in Table 3.6 with controls for the type shares and with the Liberal Centrist set as
the baseline type. The purpose of the type share controls is to allow us to study whether Gi
concentration is increasing with shares of certain types. The results indicate that the Left
Anarchist is the least concentrated type followed by the Right Anarchist. In turn, this means
89We use the same individual covariates as in Table 3.4.
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that the individuals with larger shares in either of the two anarchist ideologies are more likely
to mix different ideological types than the centrist types.
After controlling for the available individual characteristics we find a 1.6% increase in G
in wave 4 and an 0.6% increase in wave 590. The results for the analysis of the US are similar
overall except that the increases of G concentration in Waves 4 and 5 are far larger, standing
at 2.8% and 5.0% (Column 3).
To further probe the increases in G over time we estimate eq. (3.15) separately for
individuals conditional on their main type and also broken down according to the US and
non-US samples. The results in Table 3.7 show that the increases in G within the US
are predominantly driven by the two Anarchist types, both of which exhibit increases in
concentration around 13% relative to the overall sample mean (0.753).
Table 3.6: Correlates of ‘Citizen Slant’ (Gini Concentration)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini Gini Gini US Gini US
Cons. Centrist 0.000 -0.013**
(0.002) (0.006)
L. Anarchist -0.035*** -0.060***
(0.002) (0.010)
R. Anarchist -0.024*** -0.045***
(0.002) (0.007)
Wave 4 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Wave 5 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.050*** 0.042***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 81,141 81,141 4,197 4,197
R-squared 0.019 0.010 0.037 0.017
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Variable 0.753 0.753 0.759 0.759
Notes: Each column reports the regression results for individual level regression. The dependent variable is the Gini Coefficient
of the individual type shares as a measure of polarisation. Column (1) and (2) use all data and column (3) and (4) restrict the
sample to the USA. Robust standard errors are used. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. The data come
from the World Value Survey and the European Value Survey.
To clarify, note that the message from the earlier table was that the Anarchist types are
less concentrated in the cross-section (hence the positive coefficients on these type variables in
the associated regressions). In contrast, the regressions in Table 3.7 track how concentration
developed over time on a per-type basis. The simple story then is that, when they do manifest,
90We suppress the reporting of the individual attribute coefficients in eq. (3.15) to avoid clutter. The
basic result for these covariates is that only gender (female) and unemployment contribute significantly
to within-person concentration but with small magnitudes. They enter with positive and negative signs
respectively.
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Anarchist views are becoming more concentrated or ‘purer’ at the individual level rather than
being spread out amongst more people.
In effect, this evidence implies that the Anarchist types have become an even more
dominant ideology for people who had already shown a lack of trust in social and political
institutions. While in earlier waves this section of the population might still have shown large
type shares in Centrist ideologies this potentially moderating centrist influence became less
evident in more recent years. The findings for the US also contrast fairly strongly with the
results for the non-US sample where the increase in concentration for the Anarchist types is
more muted and, in any case, is matched by increases for the Liberal Centrist type as well
(see Table 3.7, panel (B), first column).
3.4.5 Societal Polarisation
While the above measure of within-person concentration describes the strength of the individual
loadings on the four ideological types, it does not fully summarise the extent of the divisions
between citizens within a society. A society in which there are sub-groups of individuals that
heavily load on the same ideological type may not necessarily be dramatically polarised. The
extent of polarisation would hinge on how big these ‘purist’ sub-groups are relative to the full
set of ideological sub-groups across the population. As an example, the country-level type
share plots in Figure 3.4 indicate that some countries are characterised by widely represented
types with aggregate type shares around the 50% mark, such as Liberal Centrists in Denmark
and Conservative Centrists in Malta. At face value, these countries could be plausibly classified
as ‘unipolar’ and less vulnerable to group conflict no matter how concentrated the different
types are in terms of citizen slant.
We, therefore, study polarisation by adapting the measures proposed by Esteban and
Ray (1994) and Duclos et al. (2004) to our setting with 4 ideological types. These measures
have the feature of accommodating two forces that define polarisation as a general concept.
Firstly, there is identification which occurs amongst individuals with a common characteristic
and is an increasing function of the total number of common individuals (that is, group size).
Secondly, there is alienation which accounts for the social detachment that individuals feel
towards others who do not share some common characteristic. Again, the strength of the
alienation effect will depend on (relative) group size as well as the ‘distance’ between groups
in the key characteristic of concern.
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Table 3.7: ‘Citizen Slant’ - US vs non-US Comparison
Panel A: United States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lib. Centrist Cons. Centrist Left Anarchist Right Anarchist
Wave 4 0.036*** 0.008 0.037 0.046***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.024) (0.012)
Wave 5 0.006 0.040*** 0.098*** 0.095***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.011)
Observations 1,412 1,408 267 1,110
R-squared 0.016 0.018 0.090 0.090
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Non United States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lib. Centrist Cons. Centrist Left Anarchist Right Anarchist
Wave 4 0.045*** -0.007** 0.014*** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Wave 5 0.029*** -0.013*** 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 24,339 21,326 10,766 20,513
R-squared 0.055 0.041 0.032 0.022
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lib. Centrist Cons. Centrist Left Anarchist Right Anarchist
Wave 4 0.044*** -0.005* 0.015*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Wave 5 0.028*** -0.010*** 0.006* 0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 25,751 22,734 11,033 21,623
R-squared 0.053 0.038 0.032 0.021
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column reports the regression results for individual level regression. The dependent variable is
the Gini Coefficient of the individual type shares as a measure of polarisation. Column (1) use all US data
and column (2), (3) and (4) restrict the sample to the individuals based on their dominant type. Robust
standard errors are used. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. The data come from the
World Value Survey and the European Value Survey.
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Using the example of income inequality, Esteban and Ray (1994) prove that any measure
of polarisation P that accurately accounts for own-group identification as well as alienation
in relation to an out-group and fulfills 3 ‘reasonable’ axioms has to be of the form91:





π1+νi πj|yi − yj| (3.16)
where π are the number of people in the groups, y is amount of income of each group, K
is a normalizing constant and ν is the polarisation sensitivity, which parameterises how the
polarisation measure shifts with group sizes.
This general polarisation measure P was constructed for a one dimensional variable y,
for example, income. Polarisation in our case has to be measured over all 4 ideological types.
To do this, we divide people into meaningful ideological groups based on their dominant type
share. That is, we allocate individuals to one of our 4 groups based on their highest type
share at the individual i-level. We then add up the θi type shares amongst the defined group
members to get the mean type share, defined as θ̃t. This differs from the mean type shares θ̄t
we have presented earlier on the basis that we are only taking the mean over individuals with
the same dominant type rather over the whole population.
Given this modification, our polarisation measure is defined as:





π1+νt πj(|θ̃t1 − θ̃j1|ρt1 + |θ̃t2 − θ̃j2|ρt2 + |θ̃t3 − θ̃j3|ρt3 + |θ̃t4 − θ̃j4|ρt4)
where πt and πj are the number of people who have the dominant type share t and j.
The means of the type shares in the each of the 4 dominant type groups are θ̃t for own type
and θ̃j for a generic other type. The second subscript on θ̃t and θ̃j represents the dominant




uses information from the β type vectors. As such, ρtj is a measure
of the similarity of types based on the correlation of types rescaled to be contained in the
[1, 2] interval. Individuals of dominant type t weight differences in type t by 1 while all other
type differences have weight strictly larger than one.
As an example, consider setting type t as the Liberal Centrist and j is the Conservative
Centrist. We index the Liberal Centrist as the type 1 in the second conditioning subscript.
The calculation |θ̃t1 − θ̃j1| then represents the (absolute) difference between the mean Liberal
91The Axioms put forward in Esteban and Ray (1994) are explained in more detail in Appendix 3.6.10.
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Centrist type share for dominant Liberal Centrist individuals and the mean Liberal Centrist
type share for dominant Conservative Centrist individuals. This can be interpreted as a
measure of how close different ideological groups are despite their contrasting dominant type
shares. That is, a Liberal Centrist and a Conservative Centrist are more likely to ‘get along’
if they have high minority type shares in each other’s ideology.
The other components of P (π, θ) are the polarisation sensitivity parameter ν, which we
fix at ν = 0.5, and the constant κ = (
∑4
t=1 πt)
−(2+ν) that serves to normalize the polarisation
measure by population size. We provide more detail and show how P varies with different
values of ν in Appendix 3.6.10.
Intuitively, the polarisation measure will be largest for the case where there are two
major type share groups of identical size who exhibit completely different type shares. An
example of this would be a bipolar Liberal Centrist and Right Anarchist society where each
type group had very small minority shares in the other type. This provides a natural link back
to our earlier measure of citizen slant. Since an increase in citizen slant implies an increase in
the means for θ̃t and θ̃j, absolute differences in type shares between the groups increase and
polarisation rises due to stronger alienation effects.
It is also useful to note how polarisation also depends on the relative sizes of the groups
within a population, as measured by πt and πj. For example, given the same between-group
differences in types, a country in which 2 groups each make up 50% of the population will be
more polarised than a country with 4 groups each making up 25% of the population.
We calculate the polarisation measure separately for each country and wave in our
sample. The ranking of the countries based on their polarisation in each wave is shown in
Figure 3.10. The ranking of countries according to Wave 5 polarisation levels is distinct from
the earlier ranking for citizen slant. Denmark, which has the lowest level of polarisation,
provides an instructive example of how the P polarisation measure combines information.
The inputs into the result for Denmark are its high Liberal Centrist type share (above 0.5 - see
Figure 3.4) and high level of within-person concentration or slant (which intensifies over time
- see Figure 3.9 ). Hence the low Danish P measure reflects a case of ideological consensus
where there is a major plural type (Liberal Centrist) that is strongly held by individuals (as
manifested in high slant).
The US, which sits at the top of the polarisation ranking in Wave 5, provides a sharp
comparison that again illustrates the mechanics of the P measure. It has a relatively even
spread of type shares, with shares of around 30% for the Liberal Centrist, Conservative
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Figure 3.10: Polarisation by Country




















(b) Ranking of polarisation (Wave 5)



















Notes: Panel (a) shows the change in country-level polarisation measures from Waves 2 (1989-1993) to 5
(2005-2009) calculated following Esteban and Ray (1994). Panel (b) shows the level of the country-level
polarisation measure in Wave 5.
Centrist and Right Anarchist types. Hence, the group size effect picked up by the πt and
πj terms is stronger in the US compared to unipolar cases such as Denmark. Overall, the
increase in polarisation in the US is mainly driven by the rise in slant over time (Figure
3.9), which contributes by intensifying the alienation effect. The changes in dominant type
composition in the US only have a minor influence on the polarisation measure.
However, it should be noted that, across countries, the changes in polarisation over time
are not dramatic, with most of the shifts occurring in the 2-5% range relative to baseline
values in Wave 2. A key point to note is that the defining feature of some of the polarisation
episodes seen in the data is the qualitative content of developments. The US is the banner
example here since the increase in polarisation was driven by an increase in the presence of
Anarchist types. Hence the US experience with polarisation has the extra dimension of also
reflecting the trend of a ‘disappearing centre’, which is likely to have additional consequences
for social cohesion over and above the increase in P that we measure statistically.
In unreported results, we also calculated our polarisation measure using the 3, 5, 6 and
7-type models. The US is consistently either the top country or within the top 3 of most
polarised countries across these models.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new way to identify the latent ideologies of individuals
from survey data. Our approach does not presuppose any ideological structure for individuals.
Nonetheless, we are able to identify interpretable, consistent and stable ideological types in
the data. The findings generally align with the left-right framing frequently used in the social
sciences but we also identify anti-establishment ‘anarchist’ ideologies that are characterized
by their distrust in important societal institutions.
The approach taken in this paper can also be extended in a number of directions. Firstly,
the basic approach outlined here can be applied to other survey datasets, both for the countries
studied here and for those outside North America and Western Europe. Indeed, our measure of
topic cohesion might be used for any topic modelling application with non-text data. Secondly,
the approach is general enough to be used to study questions beyond political ideologies, such
as clusters of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, behavioral patterns or personality types.
This latter point about extensions that cover subjects apart from political views is
potentially very rich. Contributions such as Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015); Chapman
et al. (2018) and Enke (2020) have identified behavioural foundations of political views that
systematically map into voting and other outcomes. However, we see it as plausible that our
low trust ‘anarchist’ types may have some underpinnings in a further layer of personality
or behavioral characteristics. Given sufficiently rich data, these layers could be modelled
and validated using the hierarchical, out-of-sample approach we have outlined in this paper.
Simon’s (1969) concept of a hierarchic system is a potential model for such future work and
we think that our paper shows the potential of unsupervised learning methods to model such
latent, unobserved characteristics at a new level of depth.
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3.6 Appendix: How Polarized are Citizens
3.6.1 Appendix: Additional Details on the Selection of Question
from the WVS
This section describes in more detail, the selection process that lead to the 29 questions that
are used in the paper. There are 6 waves of the World Value Survey (WVS) and 4 waves of
the European Value Survey (EVS). The 4 Waves of the EVS correspond to the 1st, 2nd, 4th
and 5th wave of the WVS. When constructing the Integrated Value Survey by combining
the WVS and EVS we excluded the 1st wave since, it contained a smaller set of countries
and questions. The Integrated Value Survey (WVS) in total contains 971 different items
grouped in 13 different categories (number of questions in brackets): Environment (25), Family
(64), National Identity (105), Perceptions of life (210), Politics and Society (267), Religion
and Morale (122), Science (2), Security (22), Socio-demographics (38), Special Indexes (3),
Structure of the file (25), Sylatech module (42) and Work (46).92
We limited the set of questions to those question which were consistently asked in the
2nd, 4th and 5th wave of WVS. This already reduced the set of possible questions down to
92. From these 92 questions we chose our 29 based on which questions are most salient for
the evaluation of a person’s ideological type. The excluded question are listed in Table 3.8.
For example, we exclude questions about family structure (eg: single parenting, beliefs in
marriage), questions about non-political moral values (eg: ‘important child qualities’), life
satisfaction, and generic trust in others. This is because our aim is to model the latent
structure of political opinions that are most analogous to the concept of ideology. In the
conclusion of the paper we describe possible extensions of our general approach that would
accommodate an interaction between (say) behavioral characteristics and political beliefs.
In Section 3.6.5 we show that the selection of these 29 questions is not crucial for our
findings and that the ideological types are very similar if we use all 92 questions. We further
show that also removing any of the 29 questions from our data has no bearing on our results.
A further point is that LDA does not allow for missing responses in the data. If we simply
excluded all observations with any missing responses and restricted ourselves to observations
with complete sets of answers, we would need to drop sizable fractions of the WVS data. We
instead impute a small set of missing responses with the sample mean of the non-missing
92The categories socio-demographics, special indexes, structure of the study, Sylatech module and work do


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































data in the same wave. This treatment of missing data allows LDA to use the information
from this observation across other questions that have non-missing values. Moreover, the
imputation has only a minimal effect on the LDA classification, since the sample mean does
not influence the classification of each individual. Imputation with the mean is also preferable
to an alternative approach where we would simply replace all missing responses with 0s,
because the 0s would bias the classification.
In Table 3.14 we report the resulting type hierarchy for the approximate 50% of
observations in the sample that do not require any imputation. As it turns out the resulting
type hierarchy is nearly identical to the one achieved with imputation. Also the resulting
individual-level type shares are very similar. This suggest that the imputation of missings is,
as expected, not having a major influence on our results.
3.6.2 Appendix: Additional Details on the LDA Model Inference
One difference between our application and the standard use of LDA is that in our case
features can only appear once for each observation, i.e. people can only answer each question
once, while words can appear more than once in a document. As a result, the assumption
of the independence of features is violated in the case of the issue positions from the WVS.
This section describes while the LDA model inference nonetheless remains valid and compares
LDA to the model suggested by Gross and Manrique-Vallier (2012).
To understand why the approximation of the likelihood works even when features
can only appear once, it is helpful to analyze the updating steps of the approximation
algorithms. Of the existing LDA approximation algorithms the collapsed Gibbs Sampling
algorithm developed by Griffiths and Steyvers (2004) and for example used in Schwarz (2018)
provides the clearest inside into the workings of LDA. The collapsed Gibbs sampler works
by consecutively sampling new topic (type) assignment for each feature – words in text or
individual’s question responses –, based on the current topic assignment of all other features.93
In our application the Gibbs Sampler would calculate the probabilities for zi,n – the
type assignment of response n and individual i – conditional on z−(i,n) the current type of all
other features and the given response r based on the following equation:

















t is the number of times response r is currently assigned to type t and η
(.)
t
is the number of times any response is assigned to type t. Similarly, η
(i)
t is the number of
responses of individual i assigned to type t and η
(.)
i is the total number of responses given
by individual i. α, γ are the Dirichlet priors, Q is the number of Questions (58 in our case)
and T is the number of types. The first fraction hence captures the probability to observe
response r conditional on type t, while the second fraction captures the probability of type
assignment t for individual i.
After calculating P (zi = t|z−r, w) for all t ∈ T , the Gibbs sampler randomly draws a
new type assignment based on the calculated probabilities. In other words, the Gibbs sampler
exploits how likely P (zi = 1|z−r, w) is relative to P (zi = 2|z−r, w), · · · , P (zi = T |z−r, w).
Hence, assignment of zi,q to types captures the relative frequency of response r conditional on
types. Since all individuals can give response r at most once the type assignments are valid.
The type assignment only would be biased if individuals would differ in how often they could
give response r.
Gross and Manrique-Vallier (2012) developed an alternative model to model survey
responses, which leads to an alternative updating equation:















t is the number of times another response is given to question q and R is the
number of possible responses to question q. Therefore, the difference between the two updating
equations is that LDA uses the probability of response r relative to all other responses given
by type t, while the Gross and Manrique-Vallier (2012) model uses the probability relative to
other responses given to the same question. Hence, in LDA the probabilities of responses sum
to one across all questions (
∑Q
q=1 βq = 1). Whereas in the (Gross and Manrique-Vallier, 2012)
model the probabilities of responses sum to one for each individual question (
∑R
r=1 βq,r = 1).
Put more simply, in the Gross and Manrique-Vallier (2012) model every question is
treated separately. In the LDA model putting weight on one issue reduces the weight on
other issues. In this way, the LDA model creates a natural hierarchy of issue positions and
their importance for the ideological types. While the model of Gross and Manrique-Vallier
(2012) arguably better describes the actual data generation process our LDA approach better
accounts for the fact that ideological types might focus on a group of issue positions, e.g.
social issues, while the responses to other questions, e.g. economic issues, might be less
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important. Our recoding of questions into 2 features also naturally incorporates this feature
of LDA, as an individual who for example states trust in the government cannot also state
distrust in the government.
3.6.3 Appendix: Interpretation of the β Vectors
LDA allows for repeated draws of a feature, while in our application people can only answer a
question once. As already discussed in the main part of the paper and Section 3.6.2 this does
not influence on the validity of LDA, since LDA exploits how often features appear relative
to each other.
However, this difference influences the interpretation of the β vectors. The β vectors
capture the probability that a response is drawn in each of the 29 draws (questions) asked
to an individual, e.g. how likely it is that an individual will answer that he is opposed to
abortion in each of the 29 draws. Therefore, the β vectors do not take into account that once
a person has answered a question the same person cannot answer the same question again.
As a result, the β still capture which groups are more likely to exhibit an ideological
position, but the values do not have a natural interpretation within our setting. If necessary
one can scale up the β probabilities to give them a more natural interpretation within our
setting. To do this one has to calculate the probability that a feature shows up in any of the
29 draws of the LDA taking into account that a question can only be answered once. Given
this intuition Pf,t, the overall probability that a feature f appears if the chosen type is t, can
be expressed as Pf,t =
∑29
d=1(1− βf,t)d−1βf,t , where d is the number of the draw (question)
and βf,t is the value of the β vector for feature f and type t. In this expression (1− βf,t)d−1
is the probability that the response has not been given in any previous draw and βf,t is the
probability that the response will be given in the current draw.
As an example to illustrate this calculation consider the question of ”Confidence in the
Police”. In the 5th wave, the liberal centrist has a value of β14,1 = 0.0408 and the value for
the left anarchist is β14,3 = 0.0089. This difference in the β values translate into the following
overall differences in probability. While a liberal centrist will express confidence in the police
with a probability of 70.1%, the probability that a left anarchist will express similar views is
only 22.8%.
This scaling-up does not take into account some features are mutually exclusive. Hence,
the scaled-up probability of the features ”Confidence in the Police” and “No Confidence in
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the Police” will not necessarily add up to 1.
3.6.4 Appendix: Additional Details on Topic Cohesion
Automatic Evaluation of Topic Model Cohesion
The main theme of the literature on the cohesion of topic models is that humans judge topics
to be more consistent based on word co-occurrences (Chang et al., 2009; Newman et al., 2010;
Lau et al., 2014; Lau and Baldwin, 2016). Consider, for example, a topic containing words
like ‘labour’, ‘wage’ and ‘firm’, which often appear together in a text, will be judged as highly
coherent by humans. An alternative topic that contains words like ‘inflation’, ‘agriculture’
and ‘hospital’ appears incoherent since these words are not used together as frequently.
Given this approach, it is possible to automatically calculate measures of topic cohesion
that are highly correlated with human judgment. These measures are usually based on the
most frequently occurring words in each topic. One standard approach is to calculate how
often words appear together using the Wikipedia corpus (Newman et al., 2010). The title
and sub-sections of the Wikipedia article are used as ‘tags’ for discrete, human-curated topics.
The more frequently that words within an LDA-derived topic appear together in a Wikipedia
article (or within a sub-section of an article) then the more coherent the automatically defined
topic is judged to be.
In our specific case of using survey response data, there is no equivalent, human-curated
outside corpus available to guide analysis. We, therefore, take the approach of using hold-out
samples from within our data to calculate the cohesion scores. Our method thereby exploits
the same intuition normally used in the literature on topic model cohesion. The key here
is the β issue-position weights can be used as predictions of feature co-occurrence in the
hold-out data. A political ideology is judged to be more coherent, if people frequently hold
issue-position’s together. We use Normalized Pointwise Mutual Information (NPMI) as our
score of topic cohesion since NPMI has been shown to outperform other information metrics
such as PMI or Pairwise Log Conditional Probability (LCP) and shows similar performance
to pairwise distributional similarity (Aletras and Stevenson, 2013; Lau et al., 2014).
Making Sense of the NPMI Values
The calculation of the NPMI is based on the independent and joint probabilities of given
features k and l. The probability p(k), for example, could capture the share of the population
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that believes abortion is not justifiable, while p(l) captures the probability that a person has
confidence in the church. The joint probability p(k, l) then captures how many people believe
that abortion is unjustifiable and have confidence in the church at the same time. The larger
the joint p(k, l) is in relation to p(k) and p(l), the higher is NPMI score of the two features.












As an illustration, Table 3.9 shows two examples of NPMI scores for different values of
p(k) and p(l), as well as different joint probabilities p(k, l). In the first example, both features
appear with a probability of 0.2. In the situation where all people who are against abortion
also have confidence in the church, the joint probability of the features is 0.2 and the NPMI
value will be 1. If the two features were independent of each other one would expect them
to appear together in the data with a frequency of (0.2 · 0.2) = 0.04. In this situation, the
calculated NPMI will be 0. If the joint probability is larger than the probability in the case
of independence then NPMI will be positive, with the converse applying. The final two rows
of Example 1 in Table 3.9 illustrate this relationship.
Table 3.9: Example Calculation NPMI
Example 1
Case p(k) p(l) p(k, l) PMI NPMI
Perfect Co-Occurrence 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.609 1
Independence 0.2 0.2 0.04 0 0
p(k, l) > Independence 0.2 0.2 0.06 0.405 0.244
p(k, l) < Independence 0.2 0.2 0.02 -0.693 -0.177
Example 2
Perfect Co-Occurrence 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.511 1
Independence 0.6 0.6 0.36 0 0
p(k, l) > Independence 0.6 0.6 0.54 0.405 0.658
p(k, l) < Independence 0.6 0.6 0.18 -0.693 -0.404
A technical point to note here is that the exact value of the NPMI depends on the
individual as well as the joint probabilities. This is illustrated via the second example reported
in Table 3.9. Note that in both Example 1 and Example 2 the third row cases are characterized
by a joint probability that is 50% larger than in the case of independence. The PMI is identical
across the two different ‘third row’ cases but the NPMI is different. Two pairs of feature
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will only have the same NPMI if logp(k,l)(p(k), p(l)) = logp(k,l)(p(k), p(l)). In other words, the
NPMI is identical, if you have to raise the joint probability to the same power to get the
product of the individual probabilities.
3.6.5 Appendix: Sensitivity to Removal and Addition of Features
In this section, we analyze how sensitive our baseline 4-type model is to the removal and
addition of features. The exercises we run here can be interpreted as a leverage or influence
analysis on the statistical definition of our ideological clusters. We are unaware of formal
model robustness statistics of this nature in the literature on LDA. Hence, while we think
that the exercises below are promising in terms of the robustness of the basic clusters that
they reveal, they should be considered indicative.
‘Leave One Out’ Clusters.
As a first exercise, we re-estimate the 4-type model removing 1 of the 29 questions (2 of the
58 features) at a time. Afterwards, we compare the original model to the new ‘leave one out’
model based on the similarity of the β vectors, as measured by their correlation. Table 3.10
reports the results of this exercise.
Overall, independent of the particular removed question, we find high correlations
between the different β vectors. This is strongest for the Liberal Centrist type which has an
average correlation of 0.979 between the original and leave one out models across all dropped
questions. This indicates that the types generated by LDA are very closely comparable across
the different models. The highest degrees of sensitivity relate to the confidence in institutions
questions (where the β correlations are between 0.70-0.80 for three of the types). Another
point of sensitivity is questions relating to foreigners/immigration in the case of the Right
Anarchist. Given the centrality of the confidence and immigration questions to the character
of different types, these sensitivities are within expectations. This leads to the next issue of
how the types might change when we add more information into the feature set.
Widening the Feature Set.
In the next exercise, we investigate how the structure of our clusters changes when we include
additional features in the topic model. As described in Section 3.6.1, there are a total of
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Table 3.10: Sensitivity Removal of Features - ‘Leave One Out’ Exercise.
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Question Code Removed Question Lib. Centrist Cons. Centrist Left Anarchist Right Anarchist
A124 02 Against Neighbours: People different race 0.990 0.973 0.995 0.963
A124 06 Against Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers 0.991 0.976 0.996 0.955
A124 07 Against Neighbours: People AIDS 0.989 0.958 0.997 0.903
A124 08 Against Neighbours: Drug addicts 0.999 0.997 0.997 0.947
A124 09 Against Neighbours: Homosexuals 0.988 0.824 0.959 0.448
Average Neighbours: 0.992 0.945 0.987 0.843
C002 If Jobs scarce: priority to (nation) people 0.999 0.995 0.995 0.928
E036 Private better than state ownership 0.999 0.994 0.995 0.923
E037 More responsibility for government 0.999 0.998 0.997 0.957
E039 Competition is good 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.958
Average Economics: 0.999 0.996 0.996 0.941
E069 01 Confidence: Churches 0.993 0.836 0.954 0.577
E069 02 Confidence: Armed Forces 0.983 0.817 0.959 0.627
E069 04 Confidence: Press 0.976 0.833 0.951 0.727
E069 05 Confidence: Labour Unions 0.982 0.799 0.959 0.645
E069 06 Confidence: Police 0.976 0.951 0.980 0.284
E069 07 Confidence: Parliament 0.990 0.975 0.982 0.276
E069 08 Confidence: The Civil Services 0.990 0.975 0.983 0.289
E069 13 Confidence: Major Companies 0.993 0.966 0.979 0.135
E069 17 Confidence: Justice System/Courts 0.933 0.851 0.944 -0.340
Average Confidence 0.980 0.889 0.966 0.358
F114 Justifiable: claiming government benets 0.999 0.998 0.997 0.958
F115 Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 0.645 0.750 0.940 0.702
F116 Justifiable: cheating on taxes 0.999 0.998 0.997 0.955
F117 Justifiable: accepting a bribe 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.959
Average Fairness Values 0.911 0.936 0.983 0.894
F118 Justifiable: homosexuality 0.988 0.993 0.992 0.970
F119 Justifiable: prostitution 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.974
F120 Justifiable: abortion 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.974
F121 Justifiable: divorce 0.994 0.995 0.997 0.969
F122 Justifiable: euthanasia 1.000 0.998 0.999 0.981
F123 Justifiable: suicide 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.986
Average Social Values 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.975
G006 Proud of nationality 1.000 0.998 0.999 0.985
Average All: 0.979 0.946 0.984 0.745
Notes: This table reports the correlation of the β vectors of our baseline model with topic models in which 1
of the 29 questions from the baseline model was removed.
92 questions that are available across all 3 waves of the WVS used in this paper. As an
additional robustness check, we include all these 92 questions in our topic model and create
an extended type hierarchy. We then correlate the weights on the β positions between the
original and extended models where they overlap.
Practically, this exercise allows us to ask whether the relative ordering of the original β
issue-position weights changes as we add more features to the model. Note that this is more
of an ‘add them all in’ rather than an iterative ‘add one in’ exercise. We adopt this approach
both for the sake of brevity as well as to see how our original 4-type model is affected by a
large, lateral addition of information. The concern would be that the addition of many extra
features would fundamentally change the structure of the clusters and shift the ordering of
the initial set of features.
Table 3.11 reports the correlations between the β-vectors from the baseline type hierarchy
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and those from the extended-feature type hierarchy. Obviously, the correlation coefficients can
only be calculated on the basis of the 29 original questions used in the baseline hierarchy. The
correlations are very high across all the hierarchy models. Overall, we find these results to be
encouraging. The same basic type structure is intact even when adding in a large amount of
information. This is compatible with the idea that the extra questions/features fit in as new
responses that tap into a stable set of underlying latent types.
Table 3.11: Sensitivity to Additional Features
2 Type Model





















Notes: This table reports the correlation of the β vectors of the type hierarchy from the main paper and the type hierarchy of
a topic model including all 92 consistent questions from the WVS. The prime’ notation indicates the types estimated using the
92 feature topic model. We report the highest cross-model correlations for the overlapping β weights, except for the 4-type Left
Anarchist case where (in the interests of exposition) we report the three highest correlations.
We stress though that both of the exercises we present here are indicative with limited
formal precedents in the LDA literature. One interesting pattern here is that the Centrist
types are less sensitive to changes in features relative to the Anarchist types. This fits with
the intuition that the Centrist types are well-established and better defined with the Anarchist
types still being more fluid. The tendency of the Anarchist types to split as we consider
higher-order models (eg: 5, 6, and 7-type models) is also consistent with this assessment.
3.6.6 Appendix: Additional Type Hierarchy Information
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Table 3.12: Extended Hierarchy of Types (Top Ten Features)
6 Type Model 7 Type Model
Liberal Centrist Liberal Centrist
Confidence: The Civil Services Confidence: The Civil Services
Confidence: Parliament Confidence: Parliament
Confidence: Justice System/Courts Confidence: Justice System/Courts
Confidence: Police Confidence: Police
No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals Proud of nationality
Proud of nationality No problem Neighbours: People different race
No problem Neighbours: People different race Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
No problem Neighbours: People AIDS No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals
No problem Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers No problem Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers
Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe Justifiable: divorce
Conservative Centrist Conservative Centrist
Not Justifiable: abortion Confidence: Police
Confidence: Police Not Justifiable: abortion
Not Justifiable: prostitution Confidence: Churches
Confidence: Churches Not Justifiable: euthanasia
Confidence: Armed Forces Confidence: Armed Forces
Not Justifiable: suicide Not Justifiable: suicide
Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe Not Justifiable: prostitution
Not Justifiable: cheating on taxes No problem Neighbours: People different race
Not Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport Not Justifiable: cheating on taxes
Not Justifiable: claiming government benefits Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
Left Anarchist Left Anarchist
No Confidence: Armed Forces No Confidence: Armed Forces
Justifiable: divorce No Confidence: Churches
No Confidence: Churches Justifiable: divorce
No Confidence: Major Companies No Confidence: Major Companies
Justifiable: homosexuality Justifiable: homosexuality
No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals No Confidence: Parliament
Justifiable: euthanasia No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals
No problem Neighbours: People different race Justifiable: euthanasia
Justifiable: abortion No problem Neighbours: People AIDS
No problem Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers No problem Neighbours: People different race
Market Liberal Market Liberal
No Confidence: The Press No Confidence: Parliament
Proud of nationality No Confidence: The Press
No Confidence: Parliament No problem Neighbours: People different race
Confidence: Armed Forces No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals
Confidence: Police Confidence: Police
Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe Proud of nationality
Not Justifiable: claiming government benefits Confidence: Armed Forces
No Confidence: Labour Unions No problem Neighbours: People AIDS
No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
No problem Neighbours: People different race No Confidence: Labour Unions
Right Anarchist (‘Soft’) Right Anarchist (‘Soft’)
No Confidence: Justice System/Courts No Confidence: Parliament
No Confidence: Armed Forces No Confidence: Civil Services
No Confidence: Parliament No Confidence: Justice System/Courts
No Confidence: Civil Services No Confidence: Armed Forces
No Confidence: Police Not Justifiable: suicide
No Confidence: Labour Unions No Confidence: Major Companies
Not Justifiable: suicide No Confidence: Labour Unions
No Confidence: The Press No Confidence: The Press
No Confidence: Major Companies No problem Neighbours: People different race
Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe Not Justifiable: prostitution
Right Anarchist (‘Hard’) Right Anarchist (‘Hard’)
Against Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers Against Neighbours: People AIDS
Against Neighbours: People AIDS Against Neighbours: Homosexuals
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport Against Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers
Against Neighbours: People different race Against Neighbours: Drug addicts
Justifiable: cheating on taxes If Jobs scarce: priority to (nation) people
Against Neighbours: Homosexuals Against Neighbours: People different race
If Jobs scarce: priority to (nation) people Not Justifiable: homosexuality
Justifiable: claiming government benefits Proud of nationality
Against Neighbours: Drug addicts Confidence: Armed Forces
Justifiable: euthanasia Not Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
Super Anarchist (’Rage Against the Machine’)
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport
Justifiable: cheating on taxes
Justifiable: claiming government benefits
Justifiable: accepting a bribe
Justifiable: euthanasia




No problem Neighbours: People different race
Notes: This table reports the 10 most important features for a n-type LDA model, where n ∈ {6, 7}. The types are labeled on the basis of their





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.15: Issues of Increasing Importance between Wave 2 and Wave 5
Question Baseline Change
Liberal Centrist
More responsibility for government 0.004 0.222
Confidence: Armed Forces 0.430 0.199
State ownership better than private ownership 0.000 0.164
Justifiable: homosexuality 0.477 0.148
Confidence: The Civil Services 0.425 0.144
Confidence: Labour Unions 0.324 0.136
Against Neighbours: Drug addicts 0.456 0.130
No Confidence: Major Companies 0.285 0.091
Not Justifiable: prostitution 0.323 0.087
Confidence: Churches 0.328 0.075
Conservative Centrist
No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals 0.402 0.133
No Confidence: Parliament 0.009 0.122
No problem Neighbours: People AIDS 0.445 0.095
No Confidence: Major Companies 0.150 0.088
Justifiable: homosexuality 0.000 0.072
Not Justifiable: abortion 0.595 0.065
Competition is harmful 0.206 0.053
No problem Neighbours: Drug addicts 0.278 0.052
Confidence: Armed Forces 0.618 0.045
No Confidence: The Press 0.301 0.044
Left Anarchist
Confidence: Police 0.024 0.204
Not Justifiable: cheating on taxes 0.277 0.144
Proud of nationality 0.365 0.103
Competition is harmful 0.444 0.098
Confidence: Armed Forces 0.002 0.090
Justifiable: homosexuality 0.570 0.077
Justifiable: suicide 0.372 0.076
Justifiable: prostitution 0.463 0.076
No Confidence: The Press 0.487 0.064
If Jobs scarce: no priority to (nation) people 0.391 0.053
Right Anarchist
Confidence: Police 0.000 0.319
Confidence: Armed Forces 0.169 0.225
Justifiable: divorce 0.045 0.150
No problem Neighbours: Homosexuals 0.372 0.149
Justifiable: homosexuality 0.000 0.147
Justifiable: euthanasia 0.058 0.135
No Confidence: Churches 0.378 0.094
Against Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers 0.225 0.086
No problem Neighbours: People AIDS 0.431 0.077
More responsibility for government 0.258 0.062
Notes: This table reports the 10 feature of each type which show the biggest increase in weight from wave 2 to wave 5. Column




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.6.7 Appendix: Cross-Check of Results with European Social
Study
The European Social Study(ESS) is a biannual survey of 37 European countries covering the
years from 2002 until 2016. For our replication exercise, we use all countries in the ESS that
also appear in the WVS and were used in our main analysis. Overall, 13 of our original 17
countries also appear in the ESS (Germany, Great Britain, France, Denmark, Spain, Finland,
Portugal, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Iceland ). Similarly, we create a
subsample of the ESS waves that aligns with the waves of the WVS. We use ESS rounds
1 to 5 (2002 - 2010) which are comparable to the 4th and 5th wave of the WVS (Wave 4:
1999-2004 and Wave 5: 2005-2009). We further select a set questions from the ESS that cover
similar issues to those we used from the WVS. Table 3.17 provides an overview over the ESS
questions as well as their scale. Identical to the main results of the paper, we recode questions
into 2 binary features indicating support and opposition to issues .
As the next step, we fit LDA models with an increasing number of types to the ESS
data to produce a type hierarchy. Identical to the results in Table 3.2, we report the ‘top ten’
features for each ESS type in Table 3.18. It should be apparent that since we use a different
set of questions the ESS types can never be identical to the WVS types. What is important
for our purpose is that the resulting types recover a similar ideological spectrum.
For the basic 2-type model in the first column, the two types are distinguished by their
trust in institutions. While the first type, which we label as ‘Centrist’ trusts the police, the
legal system and is satisfied with the democracy in the country, the second type (labelled as
‘Anarchist’) does not trust politicians and political parties and is unsatisfied with the national
government. Interestingly, this shows that in the ESS data the ‘Anarchist’ type already arises
in the 2 type model.
The second column reports the top features for the 3-type model. The ‘Centrist’
type remains more or less unchanged, but we observe a split of the ‘Anarchist’ type along
immigration issues. On the one hand, the ‘Left Anarchist’ supports immigration and gay
rights. Moreover, this type considers it important to take care of people and treat them
equally. The ‘Right Anarchist’ on the other hand opposes immigration and puts a larger
weight on security and safety.
In the third column, we show the top features for the 4-type model. In the 4-type model,
a new split between two ‘Centrist’ types emerges. One important difference between the two
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Table 3.17: Selected Question from the ESS
ESS Variable Code Question Scale
ppltrst Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful
trstprl Trust in country’s parliament
trstlgl Trust in the legal system
trstplc Trust in the police
trstplt Trust in politicians
trstprt Trust in political parties
trstep Trust in the European Parliament
trstun Trust in the United Nations
stflife How satisfied with life as a whole
stfeco How satisfied with present state of economy in country
stfgov How satisfied with the national government
stfdem How satisfied with the way democracy works in country
stfedu State of education in country nowadays
stfhlth State of health services in country nowadays
gincdif Government should reduce differences in income levels
freehms Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish
imsmetn Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority
imdfetn Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority
impcntr Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
imbgeco Immigration bad or good for country’s economy
imueclt Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants
imwbcnt Immigrants make country worse or better place to live
rlgdgr How religious are you
rlgatnd How often attend religious services apart from special occasions
pray How often pray apart from at religious services
ipeqopt Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities
impsafe Important to live in secure and safe surroundings
ipfrule Important to do what is told and follow rules
ipudrst Important to understand different people
ipgdtim Important to have a good time
impfree Important to make own decisions and be free
iphlppl Important to help people and care for others well-being
ipstrgv Important that government is strong and ensures safety
ipbhprp Important to behave properly
iprspot Important to get respect from others
iplylfr Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close
impenv Important to care for nature and environment
imptrad Important to follow traditions and customs
Notes: This table reports the questions selected from the European Social Study.
‘Centrist’ types is the importance of religions, traditions and customs. Further, the two types
differ based on the importance they attribute to safety, but both profess trust in the legal
system.
Overall, the type structure that emerges from the ESS is reasonably similar to the
types that emerge in the WVS. We again find that types split apart based on their trust in
institutions. This allows us to label types as ‘Centrist’ and ‘Anarchist’. Additionally, we
observe type characteristics that are broadly in line with the left-right spectrum. For example,
one of the important dividing issues is immigration. The social issues which define the types
differ across the two datasets but this is mainly a result of the differences in the question set.
The ESS simply does not contain questions concerning support and opposition abortion and
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suicide, neither does the WVS contain a detailed set of questions concerning immigration.
We, therefore, view this exercise as useful corroboration that our core finding of ideological
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.6.8 Appendix: Robustness 6th Wave of the WVS
Our main analysis is based on the 2nd, 3rd and 5th wave of the World Value Survey (WVS)
and European Value Study (EVS). The combination of these two surveys significantly increases
the number of European countries that are covered in our data. For this reason, we excluded
the 4th and 6th wave of the WVS as there are no corresponding waves of the EVS.94 We can
extend our analysis past 2010 by making use of the 6th wave of the WVS but in this process,
the sample of available countries shrinks to Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and the US. Due
to the shrinking and changing sample, we regard the following analysis as solely suggestive.
Fitting a 4-type LDA topic model to the 6th wave of the WVS leads to broadly
similar types. We again observe a liberal centrist and conservative centrist type in the data
(correlations of 0.94 and 0.78 respectively with their wave 5 equivalent). Also, the right
anarchist type emerges in the LDA model (correlation of 0.72 with wave 5 equivalent). Only
the left anarchist type is less clearly apparent (correlation 0.47 with wave 5 equivalent). This
result is most likely driven by the fact that many countries with large left anarchist type
shares are not any longer in the wave 6 sample.
Figure 3.11: Type Shares - US vs non-US (Wave 6)
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Notes: This figure compares the levels of θ type shares across waves for the Left Anarchist and Right
Anarchist types. We pool all 3 non-US countries (Germany, Netherlands, Spain) and contrast them to the US.
The pooling for the non-US sample is based on WVS sample weights. The timing of the waves is Wave 2
(1989-1993), Wave 4 (1999-2004) and Wave 5 (2005-2009). 95% confidence intervals are reported in red.
To circumvent the problem that the shifting type shares might render our wave 6
analysis less meaningful, we keep the β-type vectors from wave 5 constant and only use LDA
to generate new individual-level type shares α for wave 6. Based on the resulting type shares
we analyze if any further changes in the type composition occurred in wave 6. In particular,
94A 7th wave of the WVS is currently in progress and should be completed in 2020. For this 7th wave of
the WVS there will be a corresponding wave of the EVS.
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we reproduce Figure 3.6 based on the countries that are available in all 4 waves. The results
are presented in Figure 3.11.
Overall, our findings are similar when we include the 6th wave. The anarchist types
stabilized at a its high level in the US. We only observe a slight shift from the right anarchist
to the left anarchist type. For the other countries in the sample, we do not observe any major
shifts in the prevalence of the anarchist types. If anything the anarchist type shares appear
to decrease slightly.
3.6.9 Appendix: Additional Details on Populist Parties
A list of European parties that can be classified as populists in 2019 was prepared by Rooduijn
et al. (2019). Their classification is based on the following definition:
“Populist parties: parties that endorse the set of ideas that society is ultimately
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus
“the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the
volonté générale (general will) of the people (Mudde, 2004).”
As the list does not contain any information for parties outside of Europe, we further code the
Reform Party in the US as populist parties based on the (see http://www.reformparty.org/).
Lastly also the NDP in Canada is classified as populist as it exhibited populists tendencies dur-
ing our observation period (see https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/populism).
To achieve a consistent coding of parties across waves, we also classify predecessor
parties as populist. For example, the German party “Die Linke” is listed in Rooduijn et al.
(2019). Hence, we also code the party “Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus” as populist.
3.6.10 Appendix: Additional Details on the Polarisation Measure
The Esteban and Ray (1994) measure of polarisation is based on three axioms. These three
axioms aim to capture sensible assumptions about how own-group identification and out-group
alienation contribute to an overall index of polarisation.
Figure 3.12 illustrates the three axioms of Esteban and Ray (1994) graphically. The
first axiom states that polarisation increases if two small masses b and c that are close to
each other are joined at their midpoint (see panel (a) of Figure 3.12). The intuition behind
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Table 3.19: List of Populist Parties
Country Party
Austria FPÖ
Austria Alliance for the Future of Austria









France Le Front National de Jean-Marie le Pen
France Le Front National de Bruno Megret





Netherland Party for Freedom
Netherland Socialistische Partij
United Kingdom UK Independence Part
United Kingdom Sinn Fein
United States Reform Party
Notes: This table reports the parties that were coded as populist based on the information from Rooduijn et al. (2019)
this axiom is that the joining of the masses increases the own-group identification of the now
joined smaller masses, while the average distance and out-group alienation with respect to
other major societal group a stay unchanged.
The second axiom states that polarisation increases if a small mass of people b moves
closer to the side of the spectrum where fewer people are concentrated (see panel (b) of
Figure 3.12). Put simply, this change increases polarisation because while the mass b has
moved closer to group c it has also moved further away from another group a. Since mass a
is larger than mass c, the overall alienation effect increases.
The third axiom states that polarisation increases if mass is shifted equally from a central
mass b to two lateral masses a and c that are each equally far away from the central mass
(see panel (c) of Figure 3.12). This axiom captures the effect of the disappearing centre. If
mass shifts equally from the centre to the fringes of the spectrum the own-group identification
at the fringes increases while the overall out-group alienation increases as well.
Esteban and Ray (1994) prove that any measure of polarisation that fulfills these three
axioms must be of the form:





π1+νi πj|yi − yj| (3.18)
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Notes: This figure illustrates the 3 main axioms use in Esteban and Ray (1994) to derive the polarisation
measure.
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The axioms hold for values of ν ∈ [0, 1.6]. The sensitivity parameter ν also influences
the maximal possible value of the polarisation measure. Note that the measure will not be
bounded between [0,1]. Esteban and Ray (1994) suggest a potential fourth axiom that would
make it possible to narrow the possible interval of ν ∈ [1, 1.6].
This fourth axiom is illustrated in Figure 3.13. The axiom states that moving mass
from a small mass a to a larger mass c will increase polarisation. Hence, the axiom makes an
assumption on the importance of small groups within a society. On the one hand, moving
mass from a to c reduced the distance between the groups and therefore lowered polarisation.
On the other hand the mass a is small in comparison to b and c and hence the effect of group
a for overall polarisation might be negligible, while increasing the mass of c can increase
societal tension.
The polarisation sensitivity parameter ν here captures the relative sizes of a and c for
which polarisation will increase. The larger is ν the smaller is the importance of a for overall
polarisation. It is a priori not clear whether this axiom is sensible in our context. Hence, we
do not restrict the range of polarisation sensitivity to ν > 1.




Notes: This figure illustrates the 4th axiom suggested in Esteban and Ray (1994). This axioms is not necessary
to derive the form of the polarisation measure but it allows for restrictions to the possible range of ν.
Extending the Esteban and Ray (1994) Measure to Higher Dimension
The Esteban and Ray (1994) measure was originally constructed for one-dimensional indicators
(e.g. the income distribution). Our measure extends the measure to the four dimensions of
our ideological type space. We assume that an individual identifies with groups based on his
or her dominant type share, since in our model the four ideological types are the most natural
line for group delineations.
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Theoretically, it would also be possible to define groups based on discrete intervals of
the type share distribution, such that a type would be defined by a specific interval in the
four-dimensional ideological type space (e.g. [0,0.1] Liberal Centrist, [0.2,0.3] Conservative
Centrist, [0.4,0.5] Left and Right Anarchist). This would lead to a far greater number of
ideological groups. The problem with this approach is that it is not obvious to decide on an
interval length such that we can plausibly assume sufficient degrees of separation between
these groups.
If the groups are defined by the dominant type share of each individual, intuitively,
the alienation between these groups will be based on differences in type shares. The only
alteration to the original measure then is the fact that in our case the groups can differ
along four dimensions rather than a single variable y. We hence define the overall out-group
alienation as the sum of the type share differences between different groups.
Robustness Esteban-Ray Measure
So far we have not addressed the question of the choice of ν. As explained above any
ν ∈ [0, 1.6] leads to a measure of polarisation that fulfils the axioms of Esteban and Ray
(1994). As a robustness exercise, we calculate the Esteban-Ray measure for several values of
ν. Table 3.20 reports the ranking our countries by their polarisation over the three waves
conditional on the choice of ν. It is important to note that the values of the polarisation
measure are not comparable across different ν, since dependent on ν the maximal possible
polarisation level varies.
Our main finding for the rising level of polarisation in the US holds for all except the
largest values of ν. As long as ν < 1 the US emerges as the most polarised country in our
sample. The results for ν = 1.6 differ, since for high values of ν the importance of small
groups in society is diminished. Hence, in this case, the polarisation P measure for the US -
where we observe four comparably sized ideological groups - is lower than for other values of
ν. In contrast, measured polarisation is higher in countries with one large ideological group,
e.g. the Conservative Centrist in Malta or Liberal Centrist in Denmark.
Overall, the results seem to point towards the fact that values of ν < 1 lead to a more
balanced polarisation ranking across countries. The fact that for ν = 1.6 countries such as
Denmark, Iceland, Finland and Canada - all of which are usually considered harmonious
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societies - end up at top of the ranking seems counterintuitive. Based on these findings we set
ν = 0.5 as the baseline value for polarisation sensitivity in our main P measure.
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Table 3.20: Esteban-Ray Polarisation Measure for different ν
Panel A: Wave 2
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 1 α = 1.6
Country Pol. Measure Country Pol. Measure Country Pol. Measure Country Pol. Measure
Spain 1.077 Spain 0.555 Malta 0.356 Malta 0.226
France 1.059 Austria 0.539 North Ireland 0.315 North Ireland 0.178
Belgium 1.058 France 0.539 Portugal 0.308 Portugal 0.177
Italy 1.024 Belgium 0.538 Austria 0.301 Ireland 0.167
Netherlands 1.024 Malta 0.532 Netherlands 0.296 Netherlands 0.161
Germany 1.017 Netherlands 0.531 Spain 0.293 Austria 0.154
Austria 1.006 North Ireland 0.530 United States 0.287 United States 0.150
Great Britain 0.990 Italy 0.528 Ireland 0.285 Canada 0.143
North Ireland 0.958 Germany 0.519 Italy 0.282 Denmark 0.142
Canada 0.954 Great Britain 0.518 France 0.281 Spain 0.139
Finland 0.929 Portugal 0.508 Belgium 0.279 Iceland 0.138
United States 0.921 United States 0.504 Great Britain 0.278 Italy 0.138
Iceland 0.902 Canada 0.503 Canada 0.278 Great Britain 0.135
Portugal 0.898 Finland 0.478 Germany 0.271 France 0.132
Ireland 0.853 Iceland 0.478 Iceland 0.266 Finland 0.131
Malta 0.849 Ireland 0.472 Finland 0.258 Belgium 0.130
Denmark 0.827 Denmark 0.442 Denmark 0.255 Germany 0.128
Panel A: Wave 4
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 1 α = 1.6
Country Pol. Measure Country Ray Measure Country Pol. Measure Country Pol. Measure
Spain 1.151 Spain 0.576 Malta 0.349 Malta 0.230
Austria 1.070 Austria 0.553 North Ireland 0.300 Iceland 0.188
France 1.066 Great Britain 0.546 Ireland 0.297 Denmark 0.182
Belgium 1.057 France 0.540 United States 0.295 Netherlands 0.163
Germany 1.053 Germany 0.537 Austria 0.294 Ireland 0.162
Great Britain 1.052 Italy 0.537 Canada 0.291 Canada 0.161
Italy 1.038 United States 0.533 Great Britain 0.291 North Ireland 0.157
United States 1.005 North Ireland 0.530 Spain 0.289 Finland 0.157
North Ireland 0.987 Belgium 0.529 Italy 0.287 United States 0.151
Canada 0.952 Ireland 0.514 Finland 0.286 Portugal 0.150
Portugal 0.946 Malta 0.509 Netherlands 0.284 Austria 0.141
Ireland 0.945 Canada 0.507 France 0.281 Great Britain 0.140
Finland 0.935 Finland 0.499 Germany 0.280 Italy 0.139
Netherlands 0.918 Portugal 0.498 Portugal 0.279 France 0.133
Malta 0.794 Netherlands 0.487 Iceland 0.279 Germany 0.131
Iceland 0.755 Iceland 0.428 Belgium 0.266 Spain 0.126
Denmark 0.669 Denmark 0.376 Denmark 0.254 Belgium 0.117
Panel A: Wave 5
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 1 α = 1.6
Country Pol. Measure Country Pol. Measure Country Pol. Measure Country Pol. Measure
United States 1.068 United States 0.563 Malta 0.320 Malta 0.208
Netherlands 1.063 Netherlands 0.543 United States 0.306 Denmark 0.175
Austria 1.057 Austria 0.534 Canada 0.291 Iceland 0.168
Spain 1.054 Spain 0.530 North Ireland 0.291 Finland 0.162
Germany 1.032 Canada 0.528 Ireland 0.291 North Ireland 0.157
France 1.020 Ireland 0.523 Netherlands 0.285 United States 0.152
Belgium 1.000 Great Britain 0.520 Finland 0.284 Ireland 0.150
Canada 0.999 Germany 0.519 Portugal 0.283 Canada 0.149
Great Britain 0.999 France 0.518 Great Britain 0.280 Portugal 0.147
Ireland 0.985 North Ireland 0.510 Austria 0.275 Great Britain 0.138
Italy 0.954 Belgium 0.507 Italy 0.273 Italy 0.138
North Ireland 0.949 Portugal 0.502 France 0.270 Netherlands 0.137
Portugal 0.930 Italy 0.499 Spain 0.269 France 0.128
Finland 0.916 Finland 0.489 Germany 0.264 Austria 0.126
Iceland 0.767 Malta 0.475 Belgium 0.263 Belgium 0.124
Malta 0.756 Iceland 0.413 Iceland 0.258 Spain 0.120
Denmark 0.595 Denmark 0.334 Denmark 0.233 Germany 0.118
Notes: This table reports the polarisation measure for different ν. For more details see text.
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3.6.11 Appendix: Comparison of LDA to PCA, Factor Analysis
and k-means
This section provides a comparison between Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) and the
other alternative machine learning dimensionality reduction techniques, specifically Principal
Component Analysis (PCA), Factor Analysis (FA) and k-means clustering. At their core, all
of these techniques aim to reduce high dimensional data to a set of more easily interpretable
topics, components, factors or clusters. Differences arise in the way these lower-dimensional
representations of the data are constructed.
As we have outlined in detail in the main part of the paper, LDA relies on a generative
model that makes assumptions about the data generating process and allows for a direct
interpretation of the latent objects as topics. Furthermore, the LDA model was specifically
designed for the analysis of sparse multinomial data.
PCA, on the other hand, relies on a truncated singular value decomposition to derive
components that explain the maximum possible amount of variance in the data while keeping
all components orthogonal to each other. The truncated singular value decomposition is
based on decomposing the original O × F data matrix D of rank R with O observation
and F features into three matrices such that D = UΣW T , where U is a O × R orthogonal
matrix, W T is a R× F orthogonal matrix, and Σ is a R× R diagonal matrix. Afterwards,
PCA truncates the resulting matrices by removing the rows and columns associated with the
smallest eigenvalues in the matrix Σ. This truncation process reduces the dimensions of the
matrices to a user-chosen number of components C, such that U becomes UC of dimension
O × C, Σ becomes ΣC of dimension C × C, and W T becomes W TC of dimension C × F .
Each of the resulting components are orthogonal to each other and represent a linear
combination of the original data weighted by eigenvectors. This highlights two important
limitations of PCA for our application. Neither is it obvious that the ideological types
(components) we want to find in the data should be orthogonal to each other nor are they
necessarily a linear combination of the data. As a result, the ideological type hierarchy created
by PCA (see Table 3.21) is less coherent than the types created by LDA.
Similar problems arise when using FA. FA represents the original data as a linear
combination of factors such that D = C+β ·F +ε , where D is the original data matrix, C is a
vector of constants F is the factor matrix, β are the factor loadings and ε a vector of Gaussian
noise. The advantage of FA in comparison to PCA is that it accounts for random measurement
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error through the ε vector and hence allows for heteroscedastic noise. Nevertheless, FA still
uses a linear model to decompose the data. Due to the linear model the ideological type
generate by FA (see Table 3.22) are less coherent than the LDA results. Note that the change
in type 1 and 2 from the 2 type to the 3 type model is driven by the change in the signs of the
factor loadings. The factors still load on the same features, they just point in the opposite
direction.
Last, k-means is a clustering algorithm that minimizes the distance of the original data
to a user-chosen number of centroids. As any other clustering algorithm, k-means assigns each
observation to a unique cluster. This seems counterintuitive in our case since people do not
necessarily subscribe to a single political ideology. For example, people might be liberal when
it comes to social issues but conservative with regard to economic questions. While LDA
captures this its mixture of ideological types, k-means cannot account for this.95 Moreover,
as discussed by Ding and He (2004) k-means clustering represents a discrete cluster solution
to the components derived by PCA. As such k-means suffers from similar shortcomings as
PCA and the derived ideological types (see Table 3.23) also are less coherent in comparison
to LDA.
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Bursztyn, L., González, A. L., and Yanagizawa-Drott, D. Misperceived Social Norms: Female
Labor Force Participation in Saudi Arabia: NBER Working Papers.
Bursztyn, L. and Jensen, R. (2015). How does peer pressure affect educational investments?
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(3):1329–1367.
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Hölig, S. and Hasebrink, U. (2016). Reuters Institute Digital News Survey 2017: Ergebnisse
für Deutschland, volume Nr. 38 of Arbeitspapiere des Hans-Bredow-Instituts. Verlag Hans-
Bredow-Institut, Hamburg.
Hopkins, D. J. and Washington, S. (2019). The Rise of Trump, the Fall of Prejudice? Tracking
White Americans’ Racial Attitudes 2008-2018 via a Panel Survey. Working Paper.
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political
change in 43 societies. Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R. F., Basanez, M., and Moreno, A. (2010). Human Values and Beliefs: A
Cross-Cultural Sourcebook. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Jelveh, Z., Kogut, B., and Naidu, S. (2015). Political language in economics. Working Paper.
Jensen, J., Naidu, S., Kaplan, E., Wilse-Samson, L., Gergen, D., Zuckerman, M., and Spirling,
A. (2012). Political Polarization and the Dynamics of Political Language: Evidence from 130
Years of Partisan Speech [with Comments and Discussion]. Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, Fall:1–81.
Jha, S. (2013). Trade, Institutions, and Ethnic Tolerance: Evidence from South Asia. American
Political science review, 107(4):806–832.
291
Kamenica, E. and Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian persuasion. American Economic Review,
101(6):2590–2615.
Kamps, H. J. (2015). Who Are Twitter’s Verified Users?
Kaplan, E., Spenkuch, J. L., and Sullivan, R. (2019). Measuring Geographic Polarization:
Theory and Long-Run Evidence. Working Paper.
Kim, D. and Oh, A. (2011). Topic chains for understanding a news corpus. International
Conference on Intelligent Text Processing and Computational Linguistics, Springer, pages
163–176.
Kinder-Kurlanda, K., Weller, K., Zenk-Möltgen, W., Pfeffer, J., and Morstatter, F. (2017).
Archiving Information from Geotagged Tweets to Promote Reproducibility and Compara-
bility in Social Media Research. Big Data & Society, 4(2):2053951717736336.
Kreißel, P., Ebner, J., Urban, A., and Guhl, J. (2018). Hass auf Knopfdruck: Rechtsextreme
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Vortrag.
Westfall, J., van Boven, L., Chambers, J. R., and Judd, C. M. (2015). Perceiving Political Po-
larization in the United States: Party Identity Strength and Attitude Extremity Exacerbate
the Perceived Partisan Divide. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(2):145–158.
Willnat, L., Weaver, D. H., and Wilhoit, G. C. (2019). The American Journalist in the Digital
Age. Journalism Studies, 20(3):423–441.
Wolfers, J. (2002). Are voters rational? Evidence from gubernatorial elections. Work. pap.,
The Wharton School.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2001). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, volume 1
of MIT Press Books. The MIT Press.
297
Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2014). Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4):1947–1994.
298

